Daily Report

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NOTICE TO READERS: Beginning Monday, 26 February 1990, the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT will feature a new section entitled "REGIONAL AFFAIRS." It will be divided into five subsections: "Baltic Republics" (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia); "RSFSR" (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic); "Western Republics" (Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia); "Caucasus" (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia); and "Central Asia" (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia, Kazakhstan). The new "REGIONAL AFFAIRS" section will include material from all sources on exclusively regional matters, including Moscow central media coverage of developments at the regional level and of central leadership activities and speeches in the republics.

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Prospects for German Unification Discussed

LD2102230690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1507 GMT 21 Feb 90

[By TASS political observer Yevgeniy Babenko]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—The idea that the Soviet leader put forward about holding a second all-European top level conference, Helsinki II, this year is gaining the backing of an ever greater number of statesmen and politicians and is acquiring fresh dynamism with every passing day.

Preparations for Helsinki II and the development of the all-European process occupied the main position at the meeting of EC foreign ministers in Dublin on 20 February. In this connection the ministers did not limit themselves only to general considerations about how the future conference will fit into the general architecture of the all-European home, whose creation has become a cherished cause for tens of millions of Europeans. The heads of the foreign policy departments of the Common Market member countries adopted a decision on the need to give fresh impetus to the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They urged the promptest convening of Helsinki II, and proposed that even prior to July a preparatory committee for the forum be set up and the agenda, dates, and venue be determined for it.

The issue of the unification of Germany was also, of course, touched upon in Dublin. Setting forth at the meeting his plan for the creation of a single German state Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the federal vice chancellor and FRG foreign minister, emphasized that along with bilateral talks between the FRG and GDR Governments on this problem it should be discussed at a "four plus two" meeting, at a conference of the leaders of the countries represented in Brussels and also at Helsinki II. Judging by everything this concept was approved by all the participants in the Dublin meeting.

Indeed, where else if not the all-European conference can there be a top level discussion of the vital issues for all the states of Europe, which have quickly come to the fore in an unforeseen way over the past few months?

I am certain that West Europe is just as aware as East Europe that the unification of Germany affects not only the Germans. A settlement between the two present German states, the process of a drawing closer together of the FRG and the GDR, and later even a unified Germany must not threaten anyone, act to the detriment of the national interests of neighbors and anyone whatsoever, or encroach on the borders of other states.

It is not fortuitous that the Bonn spokesman assured his counterparts in Dublin that West and East Germany are to be unified within the borders established after the war and there can be no question of their revision at the expense of other countries.

An approach where three or four initially reach agreement between themselves, and then present the other participants with an already coordinated stance is also unacceptable.

The novelty of the Dublin conference in our view is that the heads of the foreign policy departments of the EC countries clearly demonstrated that they regard Helsinki II as useful both for the further development of the CSCE process and also for the most serious consideration of the question of the unification of Germany. Moreover, as recent events have shown, Helsinki II and the German question are henceforth inseparably linked with each other.

Army General Shabanov Cited During U.S. Trip

PM2002143990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Contacts Build Confidence"]

[Text] Washington, 14 Feb—The delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security which is here at the invitation of U.S. Congress is continuing its tour of the country.

Having visited Colorado, on Tuesday the Soviet parliamentarians visited first the U.S. strategic nuclear forces base at Luort [name as transliterated] in South Dakota and then the Offutt Base which houses the headquarters of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. At Offutt Air Base the Soviet delegation was warmly welcomed by U.S. Air Force General John Chain, who stressed the importance of contacts between the USSR and the United States in the military field for the consolidation of bilateral relations and the growth of trust between the U.S. and Soviet peoples. The Soviet parliamentarians are being accompanied by Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

In his speech V.L. Lapygin, leader of the Soviet delegation and a major Soviet designer in the missile technology field, showed on the basis of specific examples that it is by no means the Soviet Union which is the initiator in the development of various strategic offensive arms systems. Then Army General V.M. Shabanov, USSR deputy defense minister, spoke. "You can spend a long time arguing about who has the initiative in deploying particular weapons systems," he said, "but one thing is undisputed: It was our country which solemnly stated that in no conditions will it unleash nuclear war. Unfortunately, the United States has made no such statement." V.M. Shabanov also recalled the U.S. Trident missile carrying submarines deployed on U.S. Navy submarines and surface ships. Those same arms systems which threaten strategic stability.

"Both the USSR and the United States," Army General V.M. Shabanov stressed, "must think not of the arms race but of the consistent reduction of nuclear weapons."

Late on Tuesday evening the Soviet parliamentarians arrived in Killeen City (Texas) where they will continue their acquaintance with U.S. military establishments.

Thatcher's Nuclear Weapons Position Cited

90WC0043A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Feb 90 p 3

[Aleksandr Kiselev political comment: "Realism Gains the Upper Hand"]

[Text] Teleprinters have carried news of a very surprising statement by Margaret Thatcher. "The changes and negotiations which are taking place at this time," she said in Parliament, "require a change in the approach to the question of what arms we need."

How can this be? After all, quite recently even the position of Britain's Conservatives was unequivocal. M. Thatcher categorically rejected the idea of the elimination of shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe and insistently and consistently supported the modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's European arsenals. She regarded thoroughly upgraded tactical nuclear missiles with a range of up to 500 km as the main counterweight to the Warsaw Pact's conventional arms, in which the USSR and its allies have superiority. The current words of the British premier, however, are hard to evaluate other than as a pronounced softening of her position on the question of tactical nuclear weapons.

The shift in the position of the head of the British Cabinet should, in my view, be seen in the context of the appreciable changes which have in recent months become a reality in the life of the European Continent. These include the unilateral reduction in Soviet Armed Forces in central Europe and the prospects of a constructive conclusion to the Vienna talks which have come to light.

With regard for the trend toward the unification of the two German states which has emerged, the ideas concerning a potential European "theater" which were current in Whitehall previously are in need of fundamental revision. It is for this reason that the question of the extent to which the concept of NATO tactical nuclear forces as a factor of "deterrence" of the USSR and its East European allies corresponds to present-day realities has been posed on the banks of the Thames.

M. Thatcher's statement may thus be followed by the formulation of London's more constructive position on problems of disarmament marking a growth of political realism in the actions of the British Conservative Government.

Impact of Semipalatinsk Tests Investigated

90UI0370A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report on interview with A.F. Tsyb, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, director of the Medical Radiology Scientific Research Institute, by I. Mosin; date and place not given: "The Semipalatinsk Testing Ground: Myths, Conjectures, and Reality"]

[Text] A.F. Tsyb, director of the Medical Radiology Scientific Research Institute and a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, told me in great detail about the activity of the commission of which he is in charge, trying to back up every word with a reference, protocol, or excerpt. I understood his caution and scrupulousness in presenting the facts for we were speaking about the results of the work of a special interdepartmental commission which studied and analyzed a complex of problems related to the nuclear arms tests at the Semipalatinsk Testing Ground.

[Mosin] Anatoliy Fedorovich, let us begin at the end. Your commission has done its work and drawn its conclusions, so what next? Just during the time of my career in journalism I recall so many similar commissions on Baykal, on the Nonchernozem zone, and a million other of our problems. And nothing has changed. Is this not why society is now experiencing a crisis of confidence in scholars? And will we ever start not merely listening to—we have found such a cautious word—but taking concrete measures on the recommendations of specialists. Whom can we believe if not them?

[Tsyb] You have probably been caught up in the mood regarding scientists and specialists which has taken over a certain part of our society. This is only human. The roots of mistrust go deep, to the time when it was with the approval of professionals that dams and levies were built, plans for diverting rivers were drawn up, and grand plans were created for restructuring society. Alas, everyone can see the sad results of this activity. And unfortunately we are now in some way paying for our lack of principles, our obsequiousness, and our inability and sometimes lack of desire to see beyond our noses.

As concerns the results of the work of the commissions, one must apparently proceed from their level and the goals they set for themselves. Our commission was organized at the request of the public in Kazakhstan. It includes more than 50 scientists from the leading scientific institutions of the country and also more than 140 scientists and specialists from the republic. Additionally it is mandatory for representatives of the Kazakh social movement Nevada to be present at all stages. Records of measurements have been signed by all parties. And it seems to me personally that the major task we have set for ourselves—to tell the public the truth about the testing ground—has been accomplished.

We have managed to achieve the declassification of a significant quantity of information. Moreover, the commission has recommended that the population that has received increased doses of radiation be included in the high-risk group. This entails making certain medical, social, and material compensations. It was suggested that the number of explosions be reduced and that their

power be sharply reduced. The population should be provided with the necessary information concerning the radiation and seismic situation during the tests. A republic scientific research institute of ecology and radiation medicine should be created in Alma-Ata with a branch at the base of the Semipalatinsk Medical Institute. A map of all radioactive traces should be published with an indication of the dates of their appearance and the basic radiation parameters. A brochure should be prepared with a records of the measurements and all information gleaned by the commission. We think these should be distributed among the local population. Let the people draw their own conclusions.

And, perhaps, the main thing. We held a scientific and practical conference on the results of our work in Semipalatinsk with the participation of the public. It approved the commission's conclusions. The conference adopted a resolution with a demand to shut down the testing ground. And, as you know, the tests were halted on 19 October.

[Mosin] One can only rejoice in such results. So what is the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground?

[Tsyb] Two periods can be singled out in the activity of the testing ground. The first is from 1949 through 1983. During this time surface and air nuclear tests were conducted here. It was they which had the greatest negative influence on people and the ecology. The first atomic bomb was exploded here in 1949. This was Kurchatov's brainchild. In 1953 there was the hydrogen bomb. "Sakharov's." The second period began in 1963 when the governments of the leading countries signed an agreement to halt the testing of nuclear weapons under water, on the ground, and in the atmosphere. Since that time only underground explosions have been conducted at the testing ground.

I should like to paint the general picture in which the tests were conducted. Archive documents show that the specialists tried to take into account all the factors that would have made it possible to conduct the explosions with the least consequences. But one must remember that their efforts were limited by the level of knowledge they had at that period of time. All preparations and the explosions themselves were conducted under conditions of strictest secrecy. The local authorities knew practically nothing. During the tests, except for the explosion in 1949, residents of the neighboring villages and towns were evacuated for various periods of time. Then they were returned to their native homes. True, as it turned out, many came at night to get something or to look at their homes. This increased the chances of radiation.

According to our data, during the 14-year period of ground and air tests about 10,000 people received radiation. These were basically residents of individual population points of three rayons—Abayskiy, Beskaragayskiy, and Zhanasemeyskiy—which are directly adjacent to the testing ground. About 85,000 people lived on this territory at that time. There is the opinion that everyone who lived next to the testing ground had to have received radiation. This is not at all true. One might say that whether or not a person received radiation depended on the particular case. If a radioactive cloud passed and rain from it fell on a person, there was a certain radiation dose. But you could be standing right nearby and, as they say, the cup will pass from you. One can also be "infected" by radioactive products and water.

In these 10,000 people the doses ranged from 2 to 160 rems.

[Mosin] Can you explain this radiation scale? What kind of dose is dangerous and what is not? There is now so much of all kinds of information about this that, in my opinion, many people do not know a rem from a milliroentgen, or a roentgen.

[Tsyb] Throughout the world people now think this way. A professional dealing with ionizing radiation receives 5 rems in a year. During the time of his labor activity he receives up to 150 rems. And this does not affect his health. For the population living in the region of the nuclear power plant the annual norm should not exceed 0.5 rems.

It is as though the doses people receive gradually are spread out through time. Therefore the organism manages to compensate for their effects and they are relatively harmless. It is another matter when large doses of radiation are received all at once. If a person receives more than 100-150 rems all at once he can contract a disease. If the one-time radiation is less than 100 bars the organism can stand it, but belated consequences are possible. As a rule, a person can tolerate radiation of less than 100 rems without harm to his health. Apparently there is a link to the individual peculiarities of the organism here.

The mechanism for the appearance of delayed effects such as tumors, for example, is the same for radiation as it is for harmful chemical substances. Therefore after many years it is difficult to say what caused the person to fall ill: the radiation or, say, the harmful conditions in production.

How did the radioactive radiation affect the 10,000 people who were subjected to the radiation? In this group over the past 40 years we have registered 55 more cases of malignant tumors caused by radiation. Note that the usual level of oncologic diseases for this group is 824 cases. The levels of genetic diseases and chromosome damage caused by radiation is also somewhat higher among these people. Child mortality also increased during the first years after the exposure to radiation. The immediate causes were mainly pneumonia, neonatal diseases, and gastro-intestinal infections. This is apparently associated with the reduction of immunity from the effects of radiation.

I should also like to emphasize that we have simply lost track of a very large quantity of data. For instance, there is no medical information for the first 7 years of the

operation of the testing ground. And it was during this time that the leukemia cases should have been registered.

[Mosin] Anatoliy Fedorovich, are you saying that nobody suffered except for these 10,000? I was in Alma-Ata during the time of the creation of the Nevada Society. There very impressive data were given concerning the influence of the testing ground not only on the health of people, but also on the environment and the entire atmosphere of the republic in the broad sense of the word.

[Tsyb] Our research, of course, encompassed a much larger number of rayons and people. The medical experts alone conducted more than 40,000 examinations and they also studied about 30,000 primary medical documents. But I have especially discussed those regions where the most critical situation has developed.

At the present time, fortunately, the picture looks different there. Today the level of oncologic diseases in these regions is relatively low. In various years it ranges from 99 to 216 individuals per 100,000 population. For comparison: The average union level is more than 230 per 100,000 residents. The children's mortality rate, the birth rate, the natural increase of the population, and the overall incidence of disease are considerably different from those in other regions of the republic. On the whole the medical situation in Semipalatinsk Oblast is analogous to the situation in other oblasts of Kazakhstan.

Today nonradiation factors are exerting a large influence on the population. During the first half of last year alone the maximum one-time concentrations of harmful substances in the atmosphere of Semipalatinsk exceeded the norm for dust by a factor of 5, carbon monoxide by a factor of 2, and nitrogen peroxide by a factor of 1.5. Practically all of the local rivers are polluted with wastes from animal husbandry farms and pesticides. The latter make their way into the drinking water and have even been discovered in mothers' milk. The ecological situation in these regions is clearly unfavorable and requires immediate measures. And here we must be quite clear and straightforward: The testing ground has nothing to do with it.

And you are quite right in saying that nuclear explosions are artificial earthquakes and affect both the psychological condition of the population and the overall spirit. Every underground nuclear explosion is an earthquake, sometimes with a force of 5-6 points. You have seen cracks in many of the adobe buildings in the towns surrounding the testing ground. The Semipalatinsk testing ground is located on basically rocky areas, and they withstand seismic tremors well. If one flies over the hills under which the explosions have been conducted one sees that they are cracked and torn up.

As concerns other factors, here we have obtained many results that also cause us to think seriously. The radiation situation in Abayskiy, Beskaragayskiy, and Zahasemeyskiy Rayons, the cities of Semipalatinsk and Kurchatov, and the village of Chagan are within the norms. An analysis of soil samples for the radionuclide content in it showed that everything is in order here. We have repeatedly inspected the meat and bones of agricultural animals, milk, and drinking and natural water. The concentration of radioactive substances in them is less than the maximum permissible levels by factors of 10, 100, and more. The situation is similar with respect to the air. The harmful radioactive substances there are less than the norms permissible for the population by a factor of 100-1,000. All these are absolutely reliable data. If necessary we can also conduct an international expert evaluation.

As concerns the testing ground itself, members of the commission drew the attention of the leaders of the testing ground and the oblast to the violation of radiation safety rules. The testing area does not have fences although it is protected. On the whole the radiation situation at the testing ground is normal. True, there are places with an increased radiation background. When farm leaders ask to be allowed to graze their livestock and procure feed there, the military zones are pointed out but the bans are frequently violated.

[Mosin] Anatoliy Fedorovich, a quite unexpected turn, and I find myself feeling ambiguous. One explosion after another has been conducted and in the inspection it turns out that in general things are not so bad. It turns out that the most dangerous thing is to let domestic animals in there. So, excuse me, but what has been all the fuss about the testing ground?

[Tsyb] You know, I myself had similar feelings after generalizing and summing up the results of the work of the commission. Because of my job I had to study the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. And when I had to go to Kazakhstan I thought that Chernobyl was only the blossoms, and the berries were waiting for us in Semipalatinsk.

But, of course, everything is not that simple. What testing grounds and weapons can justify the exposure to radiation of those 10,000 people about whom you spoke? And then, in addition to the indications on the instruments, there are people with their feelings, experiences, and attitudes toward nuclear testing. And today the most crucial problem, from my viewpoint, is associated precisely with the social atmosphere surrounding this question. The population is naturally afraid of explosions. How can they not be afraid if after powerful explosions the water even disappears from the wells? The number of visits to the polyclinic increases after the tests. It also sometimes happens that a particular explosion is canceled or delayed. All this makes people nervous. They are tired of living under constant tension.

I personally associate this with the complete lack of information of the people concerning the activity of the testing ground and the degree of its danger to people's health and the ecology. The local population is convinced that there is dangerous radiation all around them, they are all sick, and the truth is being hidden from them.

The people will not believe any admonitions, facts, or proof. To our great misfortune I think that if they ever believe us, it will not be soon. They want only one thing—to have the testing ground removed from their territory. Anything else is simply unacceptable. This excessive reaction is the result of the previous policy of remaining silent, concealing information, and completely ignoring public opinion. Such are the realities of the present day, and we must not fail to take them into account.

The situation is complicated by the fact that certain forces are speculating on the problem. This issue has been politicized. Passions have been skillfully inflamed and again there is a lack of information in the situation, and sometimes disinformation, so that people are brought to the point where they will not listen to the voice of reason.

For instance, there was a particular test explosion on 12 February of last year. The instruments registered that there had been a leakage of inert radioactive gases which passed through the village of Chagan. Rumors immediately began to spread and proliferate. Of course every time radiation gets outside the testing ground it is an emergency in itself. But inert gases very quickly break down and evaporate. They carry one-one thousandth of a rem. That is, they are harmless to people and the ecology. But nobody knows about this. Each resident of the zone adjacent to the testing ground should be equipped with a dosimeter and instruments should be installed for collective use. Perhaps that way we can turn back the wave of fear.

[Mosin] I am also in favor of destroying nuclear testing grounds and weapons in general. But now people are raising the question of moving the Semipalatinsk testing ground, and the mining engineers who built the shafts there for conducting the nuclear tests are coming to us. They are supporting the demands to halt the testing. But they categorically disagree with the conjectures and rumors that are hovering over the testing ground. The mining engineers assure us that the safety level of the tests is very high. Moreover, people are worried about what will happen to them after the testing ground is closed down. They live in a "closed" little city where there is no other work for them. I wonder if there is a spot on our planet where the testing ground could be located and everyone would be satisfied. Who would be responsible if, God forbid, something were to happen and we were not prepared for protection? And, finally, how are we to learn to combine the interests of the individual, the collective, the region, and the entire state?

[Tsyb] In the large picture our society has been left with the bill for our previous social, economic, and scientific-technical policy. After all, they did not use to ask the people where to build what and how. Moreover, the consequences of constructing dams, nuclear power stations, and biotechnological combines did not bother many people. And here is the result: The society resisted these "construction projects of the century." This had to happen sooner or later. I am convinced that the people are protesting not against scientific and technical progress, plants, nuclear power stations, and testing grounds as such, but against the thoughtless approach taken toward them.

For we all understand quite well that we cannot do without the products of the scientific and technical revolution—energy, gas, fertilizers. But still, before anything large is built the plan must undergo independent expert evaluation—social and professional. The people must know the consequences. What its realization will do to them personally, to their city, and to their region. But yet we have never had such a thing and, alas, we still do not. And can we really demand that awakened public opinion be calm? This will never happen until specialists learn to engage in dialogue with people. I am convinced that it is always possible to find mutually acceptable compromises.

In my view, along with the additional safety measures we must offer additional benefits as compensation to each resident of these regions. It is time to get used to the idea that everything must be paid for. It seems to me that such an approach would cost the state much less and possibly would satisfy the local population.

Warsaw Pact's Lobov Comments on NATO Contacts

PM2102163790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Army General V. Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, by TASS correspondent O. Moskovskiy; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Developing Constructive Dialogue"]

[Text] The North Atlantic Assembly, in whose work a delegation of Soviet parliamentarians took part, was held in Brussels 13 through 16 February. A TASS correspondent met with Army General V. Lobov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Moskovskiy] Please tell us about the impressions you gleaned from your involvement in the work of the North Atlantic Assembly.

[Lobov] I would like first to explain the reason for Soviet parliamentarians' presence at this assembly. Last summer a North Atlantic Assembly delegation visited the Soviet Union. The Western side then confirmed its readiness in Moscow to develop constructive political dialogue with the East and cooperate with it in resolving practical international problems on the principles of the new political thinking. This visit also promoted confidence-building between East and West and improved understanding of the sides' concerns and various approaches to pressing questions of international and European security. Thus, good groundwork was provided for further progress. We advocated holding Warsaw Pact-NATO consultations with a view to comparing these alliances' military doctrines, analyzing their character, and jointly considering their further evolution.

I believe that Soviet parliamentarians' current visit has played a positive role. In the course of the meetings and conversations in Brussels new points of contacts emerged on questions of stable security, reductions in armed forces, and arms control. I believe that we were able to have a better understanding of one another's intentions as expressed in military doctrines and determine the areas for their further development on strictly defensive principles.

[Moskovskiy] What is your viewpoint on questions of organizing relations and contacts between the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Lobov] Relations between us must be based on a nonconfrontational basis. In my view, the Warsaw Pact and NATO can and must resolve certain important problems of European security.

At present the sphere of mutual relations between the two alliances is not very extensive. It mainly encompasses military-political problems; this was, correspondingly, brought about by the essential nature of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Today we must talk about broadening this sphere. There are enough preconditions for ensuring that both alliances set about resolving a whole series of global problems. This is not utopian, as it may appear at first glance, but a quite real opportunity to realize Warsaw Pact and NATO human potential. Especially since authorities and dogmas that seemed unshakeable are now crashing down.

[Moskovskiy] How do you see the future existence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Lobov] The cold war is dying down, coming to an end. I believe that no serious politician in the East or West will dispute this obvious fact. However it is also obvious that its consequences still impede the development of East-West relations. Under these conditions we must proceed on the basis of the realities of today's Europe. The existence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is one such reality.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states believe that the "common European home" will have no need of blocs when it is built. That is why they advocate the simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. We are convinced that the way to this solution lies through further deepening disarmament processes, transforming the Warsaw Pact and NATO from military-political into political-military alliances, and confidence-building on the continent.

'International Observers Roundtable' Presented

LD1802202690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Feb 90

["International Observers Roundtable" program presented by commentator Nikolay Ivanovich Agayants; with Vadim Borisovich Kassis, editor in chief of GOLOS RODINY newspaper and OTCHIZNA magazine; and TASS political observer Yuriy Immanuilovich Kornilov]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Last week saw so many events of truly enormous importance, which have engrossed the international public's attention, that in the not so distant past they would have filled months of monotonous and bleak political life in which invariable suspiciousness and mistrust of potential adversaries were closely interwoven with standard propaganda eulogies for our breathtaking successes and achievements. Thank the Lord, times are changing, the new thinking is becoming a reality, and we international journalists are becoming more strict, objective, and substantial in approaching events which are taking place in today's world. [passage omitted]

[Kornilov] The issue of the reunification of the two German states is a very important one, indeed. The process of rapprochement between these states has proved to be, by far, more energetic and rapid than could be foreseen. And this, perhaps, marks the way this process is being discussed in political circles and the press, especially in West Germany. [passage omitted]

[Kornilov] Today the question of German reunifications starts with the word when, not with an "if", an international commentator said in an NBC program. I am not going to argue with that. But if we want to stay within the area of realism and objectivity, the word how must be added to the word when: How, in what way, and on what foundation the reunification of the two German states will be carried out, and what the shape of a new united Germany will be. We should not forget—and I think this should be particularly stressed—that the issue of German unity is the issue of Europe's future political outlook. German rapprochement should not damage the positive results attained on the continent, East-West relations, or upset the European balance. In this connection, both here in Moscow and in other European capitals politicians and members of the public are pondering over the question: What place will a united Germany finally be given within the military and political structures that exist in Europe now? Some people in Bonn, and not only there, would like to answer this question unequivocally: A united Germany will be a NATO member. But such a decision—and many publications stress this—would not guarantee that in the future German unity does not become a source of threat to other states' security. Moreover, I am positive that although some people in the west present as acceptable the concept of a united Germany as a NATO member, such a concept cannot be understood and accepted by our Soviet public.

[Agayants] Well, this concept, as you put it, Yuriy Immanuilovich, has different versions, too. For example, the following: A united Germany joins NATO but NATO troops or armaments will not be sited on the territory of today's GDR. This version is being studiously reiterated by Woerner, NATO's secretary-general, while some other West German and U.S. media present it as some concession to Moscow.

[Kornilov] Well, I think that such a plan cannot be regarded as constructive and realistic, either, because it too contemplates that the sphere of influence of the NATO bloc should be advanced eastward up to the Oder-Neisse border, but this very same fact cannot create reliable guarantees ensuring that German unity does not become a source of threat to others in the future. [passage omitted]

[Kornilov] In any event, it is important to state one thing. Contrary to the pronouncements by some western figures, including West German ones, and the press, there is nothing even remotely resembling a consensus on the issue of what place a united Germany will hold in Europe's military and political structure. Our public, I repeat, is against drawing this country, which does not yet exist, into NATO, and I think that we should proceed from the fact that between a country's participation in blocs, on the one hand, and neutrality, on the other hand, there is a margin of opportunities which has not yet been studied but which can be acceptable to all the parties. Therefore, a dialogue and a search are needed, a joint and constructive search for such a formula which, without damaging European stability, will be acceptable to everybody. [Kornilov] The process of German reunification is fraught with potential threat not only to the principle of the inviolability of borders. Thus, at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev particularly stressed in his speech that, I quote: We should not overlook an impending threat, in my view. It would be an unforgivable shortsightedness and mistake, he said, not to see that a Germany with an enormous economic and military potential is looming large on the world horizon.

[Agayants] It is true about looming large. This is clearly seen both in Moscow and in other European, and not only European capitals. The German issue is a focus of attention of our foreign policy and, frankly speaking, I do not understand the source of the fears that we are going to overlook the problem.

[Kornilov] Well, Nikolay Ivanovich, it is difficult to be against calls not to overlook anything important in the ambiguous trends and the complex and turbulent processes that are taking place in the world and especially in East Europe. But fairly recently, in September, the very same Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev was in the GDR, met the then leaders of the country, and appraised highly the state of affairs in the republic, especially in its agriculture. We read in PRAVDA then—permit me to quote again—that the stable and dynamic development of the GDR is a considerable contribution to strengthening the

positions of world socialism, unquote. But how important was it as early as at that time precisely not to overlook realities, to see an aggravating crisis within the party, faults in the country's economy, or the fact that millions of people in the GDR resolutely did not want to put up with the existence of the Berlin Wall or live in the conditions of barrack socialism. [passage omitted]

[Kornilov] In a word, summing up the subject, from whatever viewpoint we approach the problem of German reunification it is quite obvious—and we started our conversation with that—that today there still are more questions then answers in relation to this problem. The conclusion is obvious: The claims that this problem is all but solved are premature and can only sow unwanted and even harmful illusions among the public. Experience shows that any form of euphoria can hardly fit in within serious politics. What is needed now is not rash conclusions about the green light but an active continuation of a very responsible strenuous joint search for mutually acceptable solutions. [passage omitted]

[Kassis] Exactly one year ago, on 15 February, the last convoys of Soviet troops left Afghanistan. They left in accordance with the Geneva agreements and the wishes of the world community. That highly moral act marked the end of nine long years of war, a war that took many many human lives.

On the other hand, that astonishing country has remained for ever in the memories of those who spent one, two, or more years on its mountain paths and passes, some bearing arms, others with a Leica and notebook, as they say.

[Kornilov] Yes, you're right there, Vadim Borisovich. You and I have also had occasion to write on the subject of Afghanistan, not on hearsay either, but while spending time in the republic, right from the very end of 1979. How many years have elapsed since, yet our memories still retain numerous episodes from daily combat life. To be fair, however, it must be said that we were not able then to report in the press and on the radio the whole harsh truth about what was going on in that country.

[Agayants] Yes, for we knew that coffins were returning to the Soviet Union from Afghanistan one after another and that the hospitals were becoming overcrowded with maimed soldiers, but we didn't dare to tell people what our Afghan soldiers really were—true internationalist servicemen or victims of a terrible political adventure.

[Kassis] We openly admit now that the sending of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was a fateful mistake, although then we were creating around this action an atmosphere of blind jingoism trying as hard as we could to persuade soldiers and public opinion that this step was right.

[Agayants] What could our mass media do then? Broadcast that we had responded to repeated requests from the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and performed our internationalist duty by helping Afghans in repulsing an armed aggression? What's more, references were made to Article 51 of the UN Charter, again keeping silent about the fact that a considerable number of members of that international organization insisted on the urgent withdrawal of the Soviet subunits from Afghanistan.

[Kornilov] Yes, the situation that was very complex. Although we had no moral right to neglect the lessons of the past: the British expansion in Afghanistan and the U.S. adventure in Vietnam. The equivocal nature of the situation was also made manifest in a rather vague orientation of certain links [zvenya] of the Soviet side. Moreover, it was so clear cut that it was obvious even to civilians who never held a pistol or an automatic weapon. We were witnesses to that more than once, but it is all now a thing of the remote past.

[Kassis] One has to suppose tha politicians and military men will more than once turn back to the Afghan problem, to the history of that Muslim state, and to the tragedy of the last years of the war strife. Because, in effect, the numerous victims, about 15,000 dead and almost 37,000 crippled, were in vain. And the families of those dead? And how many of our boys still remain captives? What will happen to them?

[Passage omitted: Agayants talks about the past, saying that one can see now that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by war. He says the opposition leaders aimed at overthrowing the Kabul government the moment the Soviet troops had withdrawn; Kornilov says the opposition is still trying to achieve that; Kassis cites a news report from 8 February from Kabul on disorder there; Agayants adds that clashes with the opposition have not ceased; Kornilov mentions Arab and Pakistani advisers involved in the opposition; Kassis speaks of certain western and Pakistani circles starting a campaign in connection with Soviet weapons being sold to Afghanistan; Agayants asserts that the goods deeds of Soviet soldiers will remain in the memory of Afghans, among them not merely those on the battle field. Schools, kindergartens, and houses were built by them. Kornilov mentions in this connection a meeting of elders and workers of the Security Forces in the city of Gordes dedicated to the anniversary of the country's self-defense. Agayants says at the end that last December the second Congress of the USSR People's Deputies condemned Brezhnev's leadership for the decision to send troops to Afghanistan. Subsequent to that the Soviet Union proposed a new plan for the political settlement of the Afghan problem: first, to cut off the supply of weapons to the country; second to effect a cease-fire; third, to promote a dialogue between the Afghan Government and the opposition]

Vedenyapin Comments on German Unification

LD1902105190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0130 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Gennadiy Vedenyapin station commentary]

[Text] FRG Foreign Minister Genscher has condemned the utterances of Defense Minister Stoltenberg, who again called for the future united Germany to be a member of NATO. He asserted that the defense guarantee of the Western alliance must cover the whole of Germany. A Moscow radio commentary: Gennadiy Vedenyapin comments: Here is the recording:

[Vedenyapin] Among the stormy political events taking place today on the European continent, inter-German relations are probably marked by the greatest dynamism. I mean the fast developments concerning the solution of the problem of German unity. Indeed, one hopes they are not overhasty. It is not for nothing that the German question held such an important place in the recent conversation between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Secretary of State Baker.

Many people now know that it is already moving, in a sense, to the plane of practical decisions. In particular the FRG Government has decided to start talks with the GDR on forumulating a joint currency union, while Bonn has decided to set up a government committee of German Unity, headed by Chancellor Kohl.

However, one thing is clear: The issue of German unity effects the future political shape of the whole of Europe. It is also clear that the German rapprochement must not destroy the European balance, must not harm the whole package of East-West relations. Nevertheless, many people are now asking what is probably the most urgent question in this package of problems: What place will be given to a united Germany in the military-political structures currently existing in the continent? The definitive postition of the West German Government on this question has not yet been worked out, but the U.S. secretary of state spoke quite openly about it in a recent television interview. I quote: The position of the United States and of the FRG is that a united Germany must be a member of NATO. At the same time he noted than an agreement would be possible that would provide that no NATO forces could be deployed on GDR territory.

Such positions seem quite ambiguous. Although one can see through them perfectly clearly, certain people in Bonn—and not only there—would like to see the future united Germany unambiguously only as a member of the North Atlantic alliance. And this cannot be hidden by equivocal formulae saying that a united Germany should be connected to NATO in some way or other, or that it is a country where NATO armed forces are quartered only in its Western part.

Putting the question like this cannot fail to worry all Europeans, especially the citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; their pained reaction is perfectly comprehensible, for up to this very day the decision of the FRG Federal Constitutional Court asserting that the Third Reich continues to exist within its 1937 borders, remains in force.

One thing is obvious. Hastiness, just like overoptimism about the prospect for the solution of the German question, is not really appropriate. Here the concept put forward by Modrow, the head of the GDR Government, is very logical and well founded. Its essence is a step by step, circumspect movement along the path of creating a united German state. So far there are too many problems, and many fewer answers than there are questions.

Evidently, a definitive solution of the German question can only be reached in conditions of the free self-determination of the Germans in both states, in cooperation with the four powers, and taking into account the interests of all European countries. It must stimulate the general European process, a process which would free our continent from military danger forever.

United States & Canada

U.S. Congressmen's Entry Visas Denied

LD2102233690 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] A group of Canadian parliamentarians has arrived in Vilnius to observe the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania which will be held on Saturday, 24 February.

Meanwhile a delegation of United States congressmen is now stuck in West Berlin waiting for Soviet visas. Four American congressmen, two of them of Lithuanian origin, will come to Lithuania most probably to watch the forthcoming parliamentary elections. However, the Soviet Foreign Ministry is refusing to grant them visas, motivating this by the unacceptability of the presence of the congressmen in the Soviet Union at present.

The Lithuanian reform movement, Sajudis, that had invited the congressmen, is said to be unheard to send out invitations of this kind. Sajudis has made an especial protest to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

It is reported that Ambassador Jack Matlock is taking care of the unexpected visas problem on the instructions from President Bush.

Bessmertnykh, U.S. Ambassador Discuss Ethiopia

LD2002181990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1606 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—Today Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, first deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, received Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

A conversation took place, during which the situation in northern Ethiopia, which has recently worsened, was discussed. Both sides expressed the view of a need to halt the fighting which has flared up there and to seek a political settlement of the Eritrean problem at the negotiating table.

Other questions pertaining to the sphere of bilateral ties between the USSR and the United States were discussed.

President Bush Cited on CFE Treaty, Germany

PM1602101990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Bush News Conference"]

[Text] Washington, 15 Feb—President G. Bush has met with Secretary of State J. Baker, who briefed him on his talks in the Soviet Union and on the "Open Skies" Conference in Ottawa, in which the heads of the foreign policy departments of all the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participated.

After his meeting with Baker the U.S. President gave a brief news conference. "I am glad," he declared, "that the 23 participants in the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe have adopted the proposal that I advanced 31 January in my State of the Union message. The United States and the Soviet Union will each have no more than 195,000 servicemen in central Europe. The United States will be permitted to have an additional 30,000 servicemen in Europe outside the central zone. This is an important step forward which removes a major obstacle in the way of the speediest conclusion of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe."

"Another major step forward was taken on the question of Germany's reunification," Bush continued. "The accord reached provides for talks to be held between the foreign ministers of the two German states and the foreign ministers of the four powers—the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union—to discuss external aspects of the building of German unity."

Answering reporters' questions, the President declared that, in the U.S. opinion, a united Germany must be a member of NATO, but this position, according to him, does not exclude "flexibility on the question of just where the troops are located." "All these questions are being discussed. Changes are occurring so quickly that it is hard to keep up with them," Bush added.

China

Changes in PRC Military Strategy Cited

LD2102165190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1005 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—By the nineties, substantial changes have taken place in the PRC's position on questions of war and peace—the leadership's efforts to reduce the Army and for conversion are regarded in China as "the country's contribution to real disarmament," commentator Vladimir Smolko writes in the article "Disarmament: the Chinese Variant," published in the eighth issue of the weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

Touching on the reduction in personnel of the People's Liberation Army of China, the author points out that at the first stage (1982-84) the construction troops numbering 180,000 and the railway troops numbering 150,000 men were abolished in the PRC. At the second stage (1985-88) the People's Liberation Army was cut by another million men. Today about 3.2 million people serve in the People's Liberation Army's ranks.

The proportion of military expenditure in the state budget has also been reduced, falling from 17.7 percent in 1977 to 8.2 percent in 1988. However, in absolute figures, Vladimir Smolko stresses, military expenditure has increased from 15 to 22 billion yuan over the same period.

In the author's opinion, the application of economic laws in the PRC's military sphere is stimulating scientific-technical progress in the Army. The Army is concluding contracts with civilian enterprises on a competitive basis for the development and introduction of modern combat equipment. Eighty percent of research and development work in the military sphere is done on contract. On the other hand, defense enterprises include the output of civilian products in their output plans—last year the range of such goods grew from 60 to 1,000 goods.

Analyzing the process of improving the Chinese Army, Vladimir Smolko comes to the conclusion that, clearly, "a change in the PRC's military strategy, too, is imminent. This strategy will be linked to a great extent with the strategic interests in the region, and maybe in the world."

PRC's 'Invigoration' Policy Causes Problems

90UI0357A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Chen (name indistinct), All-Chinese Trade Union Federation, by A. Sukhotin in Beijing; date not given: "Problems Generated by... Success"]

[Text] **The policy of economic "invigoration" directed toward curbing inflation and rectifying the distortions in the development of the national economy has been in effect in China for a year already. One can see the first positive changes: The growth of prices has slowed down; consumer panic has been eliminated; finances are being utilized rationally; and interbranch disproportions are diminishing. The press regularly reports on these successes, but it sometimes also sounds the alarm regarding problems related to the social effects of "invigoration." What is the real state of affairs? Our correspondent in Beijing asked this question of an official of the All-Chinese Trade Union Federation (VKFP), Chen [name indistinct].**

[Sukhotin] The newspapers, in my opinion, report mostly about your achievements. They are obvious. But in order to clarify the situation, I suggest discussing the problems as well.

[Chen] As you know, our inflation was caused basically by two factors: excessive capital investments and consumption that exceeded our real capabilities. During the course of the "invigoration," capital investments were reduced and in some places they were completely frozen. There was also a marked reduction of the level of consumption, especially the so-called group consumption, when institutions were forbidden to purchase costly furniture, technical equipment, motor vehicles, and general equipment and were forced to strictly economize on funds.

Because of the decline of consumer demand the market became weaker. The fates of a very large number of enterprises in China depend on it. If they cannot sell their products they have no source of money and it is now very difficult to obtain credit from the bank. Experiencing a shortage of funds, enterprises were forced to reduce the output of products. Some of them ended up on the verge of bankruptcy. Naturally, this has an effect on the incomes of the workers and the increases in the number of people "between jobs."

The decline of the population's income stimulates a further reduction of consumer demand and a weakening of the market. Overstocking occurs. You have probably already noticed that many goods of various kinds have now accumulated on the shelves of the stores—television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, canned beer.... The people go and look but they do not buy much.

[Sukhotin] And how many enterprises have been closed already?

[Chen] Quite a few, I think. But they are mainly small ones and therefore the overall number of unemployed workers is relatively small. According to the results of inspections conducted by the VKFP, in several industrial cities at the end of the year shutting down of enterprises affected the incomes of four to five percent of all the workers in these cities. And I assume that throughout the country this has affected the incomes of a couple million workers, not counting, of course, the 3-4 million who were previously officially registered as "between jobs."

[Sukhotin] And so is it only the small enterprises that are experiencing difficulties?

[Chen] I shall explain with an example. Take the joint Chinese-American automotive enterprise "Beijing Jeep." It had to shut down recently. It had produced too many vehicles and they were not selling. The institutions had been forbidden to buy them and the population did not have enough money. Owning a private automobile in the PRC is an exception to the rule. It is good that the Ministry of Materials finally agreed to take the Jeeps for reserve and now the enterprise is able to resume operation.

One might say that such difficulties are temporary. The society and the people need products from these plants. Their effectiveness is high and the incomes of their workers are also high. And the enterprises themselves have enough of a reserve supply of raw materials to keep them going for a half year or at least a quarter.

The situation is much more difficult in branches of heavy industry, the processing industry, and the construction industry. The next two or three years will be difficult for them. Their chances of receiving money from the state are not great. Their reserves are exhausted. They have to work at less than full capacity and reduce their number of personnel. Previously many peasants worked in these branches at heavy labor. Now they have been released and we are trying to put city dwellers in their places. But the peasants are unwilling to go. It is not easy for them to find work. And in the rural areas there is a surplus of working hands.

As concerns enterprises that are operating at a loss and those that produce poor-quality products and products the people do not need, these enterprises must be reprofiled, absorbed, or eliminated.

[Sukhotin] You say that incomes are dropping. By how much have they decreased and how is this reflected in the moods of the workers?

[Chen] The worker's income is formed, as a rule, from the basic wage, his bonus, and a number of subsidies and additional payments. If one takes such relatively well-off enterprises as Beijing Jeep the workers do not receive bonuses and they are reduced by about 30 percent per month. [sentence as published]

At enterprises of the construction and processing branches and heavy industry that have found themselves in a difficult situation the incomes of the workers have decreased by half and sometimes more.

Workers of reprofiled productions and those that have been eliminated are living on stipends paid to them by the enterprises or the local authorities—up to 40-50 yuan per family member per month (the average monthly earnings throughout the country are 136 yuan). Of course, it is not easy for them. But we have no information about outbreaks of open rebellion anywhere in the country. To be sure, we are keeping our finger on their pulse. We are looking for a way out of the situation.

[Sukhotin] What do you think it will be?

[Chen] We have to rely mainly on the economic interests of the workers. If they are satisfied then everything will be peaceful. Or, as we say, we must buy stability.

Therefore, the question of subsidies, which I have already mentioned, was resolved with the help of the VKFP. We also insisted that the incomes of the workers not be reduced below the level of the base wage, which comprises 50-60 percent of the total. If they do, the enterprises or the state must offer compensation.

There is also the possibility of enlivening the market—for example, through the rural areas. We have now harvested an excellent crop. The peasants have received a lot of money. And there are more than 800 million peasants. The problem is how to motivate them to buy more. This means that we must reorient production toward the rural consumer. For example, we must curtail the output of light multiple speed bicycles intended for the city and increase the output of heavier ones intended for transporting things in rural areas, and we must also arrange for the production of other products that are important for rural areas....

Chinese Workers in Soviet Union Estimated

OW1702134990 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 14 Feb 90

[From the "Along the Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] According to contracts signed between the Soviet Union and China, there are now about 15,000 Chinese workers in the Soviet Union. As compensation for the labor, the Soviet Union supplies China with building materials, chemical fertilizers, and other commodities. This form of economic contact has benefited both sides. The cooperation can improve the living standards of Chinese citizens working abroad, according to a representative of China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.

Northeast Asia

85 Percent of Soviets Oppose Return of Islands

OW1902173990 Tokyo KYODO in English 1317 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Manila, Feb. 19 KYODO—Soviet Government spokesman Gennady Gerasimov said Monday a poll on the return of the Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido to Japan was rejected by more than 85 percent of the respondents but added the "problem" was being discussed in Moscow.

"We've conducted an opinion poll, and more than 85 percent of our population are against surrendering these islands to Japan," Gerasimov told a forum in the One Asia Assembly here, a four-day regional gathering of 500 journalists, business executives, and government officials.

Gerasimov said opposition to the return of the islands was anchored in the argument that giving them back to Japan would be a "dangerous precedent." He did not elaborate. Gerasimov said he "cannot agree" that the return of the islands, seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II, should be made a "prerequisite" for stronger trade relations between Tokyo and Moscow.

He told Japanese journalists who attended his forum that Soviet officials conduct "consultations with your government on any subject, so your government can raise this particular subject for discussion." "As to the return of the islands, this problem is discussed in our country," he said.

Gerasimov said the issue of the islands "must not interfere" with Tokyo-Moscow ties but noted that "unfortunately, it does."

Japan Reaffirms U.S. Military Strategy

OW1302202390 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Listeners, Japanese Defense Agency Administrative Vice Minister Nishihiro is visiting the United States. In this connection, Moscow Radio Tokyo correspondent Potapov writes:

Vice Minister Nishihiro met with Defense Secretary Cheney, National Security Adviser Scowcroft, and other

ranking officials of the Bush administration in Washington on 29 and 30 January. According to various Japanese newspapers, both sides affirmed the Japan-U.S. military alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Japanese Government's readiness to toe the line of U.S. military strategy. It appears no other results were achieved.

The continuity of Japan-U.S. military cooperation is one of the basic principles sought by the Pentagon, and according to Japanese newspapers, the examination of these principles appeared to be a focal point of the meetings between Vice Minister Nishihiro and ranking U.S. officials. The U.S. principles call for the presence of a sizable U.S. force in Japan and the maintenance of U.S. military superiority in the Western bloc. Vice Minister Nishihiro not only agreed with these U.S. principles but also agreed with the U.S. view that Soviet military strength remains undiminished on the whole. Thus, the conventional Japanese approach of viewing the Soviet Union as a potential enemy appears not to have changed.

Remarks by Chief Cabinet Secretary Moriyama at a press conference on 31 January appears to reaffirm this approach. The chief cabinet secretary said Japan should not close its eyes to Moscow's moves since the Soviet Union is a military superpower. This Japanese approach is specifically reflected in its defense spending increase. As you are aware, this approach is also evident in a draft budget for fiscal 1991. Japan appears ready to increase its burden for the maintenance costs of U.S. military bases in Japan, and these efforts of the Japanese Government are positively assessed in a report prepared by the U.S. Defense Department. This Japanese approach might soften somewhat the U.S. stand toward Japan in connection with trade friction.

Some Japanese observers believe that Vice Minister Nishihiro is visiting the United States to indicate Japanese efforts to increase its burden for the maintenance of U.S. military bases in Japan, and this is one of the objectives of his visit to the United States.

U.S. To Reduce Armed Forces in Japan

LD1802232590 Moscow TASS in English 1538 GMT 18 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Agarkov]

[Text] Tokyo February 18 TASS—The United States intends to reduce its armed forces in Japan by 5,000 men.

The programme for U.S. troop reductions is expected to be presented to the Japanese side during Cheney's forthcoming negotiations with Japanese leaders, the YOMIURI newspaper reports today quoting government sources.

Cheney, who is touring several Asian countries now, will begin his five-day official visit to Japan on February 20. The Pentagon's plan will be unveiled at Cheney's talks with Juro Matsumoto, head of Japan's National Defence Agency.

At its first stage the United States plans to reduce part of the auxilary units of its troops within two to three years. The Japanese side was not as yet notified about the terms of American troop reductions.

Until now Japanese leaders, including Premier Toshiki Kaifu, stated that they know nothing about any U.S. military manpower reduction, referring to the results of the recent trip to Washington of National Defence Agency Deputy Chief Seiki Nisihiro.

Moreover, spokesmen for the Japanese Foreign Ministry and government made it unequivocally clear that there was need for reducing U.S. military presence in the Far East. They justified this approach by arguments that the military situation in the Asia- Pacific region remains tense and a threat from the USSR is not diminishing.

Without displaying positive emotions to the forthcoming partial curtailment of American presence in Japan, in the Japanese Government circles they console themselves with the hope that possible reduction of U.S. military personnel in Japan will not bring about a weakening of the U.S. military might in the Asia- Pacific region," the YOMIURI writes.

The U.S. expeditionary corps on the Japanese islands numbers over 50,000 men at present. Tokyo bears the lion's share of expenditures on their maintenance.

During his stay in Japan Cheney is expected to insist once again on drastically increasing Japanese Appropriations for these ends.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Cordiality, Friendship Mark Soviet-Lao Talks

PM2002150990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Atmosphere of Friendship"]

[Text] Vientiane, 15 Feb—The visit to the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, headed by USSR people's deputy G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is taking place in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship.

Addressing a meeting with Lao parliamentarians, G.I. Usmanov dwelt on the course of perestroyka in the USSR, on the reform of the political system that is taking place in the country, and the Surpeme Soviet's work in the new conditions. The leader of the Soviet delegation expressed a high opinion of Laos' achievements in the socioeconomic sphere and its contribution to strengthening peace and stability in Southeast Asia. He expressed satisfaction with the development of relations between the LPDR and the PRC.

In his speech, Somlat Chanthamat, secretary of the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee, heading the LPDR Supreme People's Assembly delegation at the talks, gave an account of Laos' achievements and difficulties during implementation of the course of renewal being conducted by the LPRP. He dwelt in detail on what has already been done and what is planned in order to make the economy more effective and exploit the potential of all economic modes. Somlat Chanthamat pointed out the special significance the LPRP Central Committee and Supreme People's Assembly attach to expanding democracy in the country and improving legislation.

The Lao delegation head expressed sincere gratitude to the USSR for its support. The party, the Supreme People's Assembly, and the entire Lao people are grateful to the USSR for its assistance, with which all Laos' successes are directly connected.

Today the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation also paid a visit to the LPDR Foreign Ministry, where there was a ceremony to present the Order of the Friendship of the Peoples to Phoun Sipaseut, member of the LPRP Central Committee Politburo, vice chairman of the LPDR Council of Ministers, and minister of foreign affairs.

PRAVDA on Usmanov Meeting With Lao Leader

PM2202151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meeting of Parliamentarians"]

[Text] Vientiane, 17 Feb—The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today met with Kaysone Phomvihan, general secretary of the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and chairman of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] Council of Ministers. The meeting took place in the warm and friendly atmosphere typical of the entire spectrum of Soviet-Lao relations.

The Soviet delegation head conveyed to Kaysone Phomvihan and the entire Lao people greetings from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and his sincere wishes for major successes in the cause of the country's restructuring and renewal. He briefed Kaysone Phomvihan on the results of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum, the work of USSR people's deputies, and the contents of important draft laws being considered by the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

The coincidence of the viewpoints of Laos and the USSR on international problems and approaches toward the ways in which the two countries will further develop was noted during the meeting. G.I. Usmanov expressed gratitude for the warm reception accorded to the delegation during its stay in the LPDR.

Kaysone Phomvihan spoke in detail of the present situation in Laos and the party's and people's efforts to transform the LPDR into a developed modern society. He especially noted that the LPRP perceives its main task as being to enhance the people's prosperity and to develop democracy in the country. Kaysone Phomvihan emphasized that the party's course enjoys support by the overwhelming majority of the country's population.

Nevertheless, considerable difficulties are being encountered along the path of the country's development. A struggle is being waged between the old and the new thinking. In this context the LPRP gives paramount attention to the ideological and educational aspects of its work among the masses. The reforms now under way in the country, he said, are a continuation of the Lao revolution's cause.

Having emphasized the close friendly ties between the LPDR and the USSR, the Lao leader said that the Lao people are keenly interested in life in the Soviet Union.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which was on a visit to Laos at the invitation of the LPDR Supreme People's Assembly, departed for Moscow today.

Near East & South Asia

Zhuravlev Discusses Jewish Emigration Problem

90UI0377A Moscow TRUD in Russian
15 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Z. Nalpandyan, TRUD correspondent: "Emigrants and Occupants"]

[Text] One of the main subjects in the Arab press during the last few weeks has been the problems of Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the news has literally electrified the entire Near East.

What has happened? How could the absolutely personal intentions of several thousand people produce such an international response all of a sudden? After all, this is not the first year of immigration from the USSR to Israel. Why, then, is it causing such a strong reaction now?

Two circumstances might have played a part in that. First is the volume of immigration as announced by Israel. Tel Aviv started with the declaration that several dozen thousand people would immigrate in the next few years; later they gave the following numbers: 100,000 people in three years. But soon after that some people unofficially and the prime minister himself started to dramatically increase the expected number of newcomers. In early January Y. Shamir was already talking about a million people.

"Naturally, we cannot remain indifferent on hearing such figures," says a veteran of the Palestinian liberation movement Khisham Abu-Samir. "In practice this would mean an increase in the Israeli population by almost 25 percent. It goes without saying that an influx of such a size would considerably magnify both the military and the intellectual potential of the country. This, in its turn, will cause changes in the balance of power between Israel and its neighbors.

"But there is an even bigger cause for our concern than the number of possible immigrants," continues K. Abu-Samir. "It is the intention of Tel Aviv authorities to settle immigrants on the territories occupied in 1967. Prime Minister Shamir made this public and said that the new citizens could settle all over "Greater Israel." This will inevitably lead to an increase in the number of Israeli settlers on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. Now there are 120 settlements on the occupied territories with about 70,000 Israelis living in them. The newcomers will not only change the demographic situation but will also take land away from the Palestinians. The catastrophic results of this for the Palestinian liberation movement needs no explanation. A devastating blow would be dealt to the process of balancing the Near East situation which has been advancing, albeit painfully. For that reason we want the Soviet Union to take some decisive measures to reduce the volume of emigration to Israel."

This Palestinian's demand found support in the Arab world. According to their statements, leaders of many Arab countries regard the settlement of Soviet Jews on the occupied territories as a gross violation of the Palestinians' civil rights. The Arab League decided to send representative delegations to Moscow and Washington to discuss the problem. According to MENA, President H. Mubarak of Egypt sent messages to G. Bush and M. Gorbachev outlining the possible negative consequences of the decision to allow Soviet immigrants to settle on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. It also became known that King Hussein of Jordan suggested that an extraordinary meeting of the leaders of Arab countries be convened to discuss the problem.

What is our evaluation of the situation? Should one expect any restrictions on Jewish emigration? I addressed these questions to G. Zhuravlev, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Egypt.

"It is true that lately the Arab and especially the Egyptian press has published numerous materials reprimanding us for "neglecting the rights of the Palestinian people," for "concessions to Israel," etc. Some commentators even went as far as to mention some "secret deal between the USSR and the United States designed to increase emigration to Israel."

I feel quite responsible in denying all of these conjectures. Our policy in respect of the Near East remains honest, straightforward, and open. The USSR did not and does not recognize the occupation of Arab lands. We consider it illegal and we insist on the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli Army from all the territories it has occupied since 1967. Just as before we condemn the idea of establishing Israeli settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. Finally, we express our total support for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.

As for the emigration of Soviet citizens, it is well known that due to perestroyka we have reevaluated our policy towards people's rights. There are laws in effect in our country now which allow the people to choose their place of residence for themselves. These laws are true for all of the Soviet people whatever their nationality might be. This approach corresponds to internationally recognized norms. Under these conditions it would have been undemocratic to restrict emigration rights for any one group of the population.

To me, the basis of the present tensions is not in the Soviet position, but in the political and propagandist campaign conducted by Israel. The Israeli authorities intentionally inflate the number of immigrants; thus they try to exert pressure on the United States and other Western countries in the hope of getting an increase in economic aid from them. According to the Israeli papers, their government spends approximately $60 000 on the "absorption" (adaptation) of each new citizen. So the Israeli Government tries to present matters in such a light as to get as many donations as possible, even though nobody can give the exact number of future immigrants right now.

The problem of settling them on the occupied territories seems to me another kind of political game with pecuniary goals. Maybe it aims at getting more concessions from the Palestinians in future negotiations. By the way, according to the same Israeli newspapers, the Soviet Jews are quite unwilling to go to the occupied territories.

From my point of view, the present situation can cease to be so critical only if Israel publicly recants its intention to settle the Jews from the USSR on the occupied Arab lands. It also should guarantee that similar practices will not be repeated in the future.

To conclude, I want to remind you that a statement on this problem was issued by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It says, in particular, that: "The Soviet Union never did and never will recognize the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and that includes the Palestinian lands. It considers the occupation illegal and demands that it be ended in accordance with the known UN resolutions. The Soviet Union decisively protests Israeli settlement practices and calls upon the Israeli Government to stop any measures that it uses with a view to altering the physical character, the demographic composition, the organizational structure, or the status of the occupied territories."

Egyptian Delegation Begins Political Meetings

Meets With Vorontsov

PM1602141590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Soviet-Egyptian Consultations"]

[Text] Soviet-Egyptian political consultations were held in Moscow 12 February between Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and U. al-Baz, the foreign ministry's first under secretary and director of the political office of the Egyptian president, who has arrived in the Soviet Union on a working visit. There was an exchange of opinions of the prospects of expanding bilateral cooperation. It was stressed that Egyptian President H. Mubarak's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union will be a vigorous impetus to its development.

There was a discussion of new elements in the development of the situation in the Near East and in the efforts which are being made to convene an international conference on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There was an examination of the situation in Lebanon, the development of the situation in the Horn of Africa, and the problem of a peace settlement in Afghanistan.

Meets With Primakov

LD1402235890 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—Chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet Yevgeniy Primakov today received visiting Egyptian First Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the Egyptian President's Political Office U. al-Baz.

On the latter's request, Primakov informed him about task of the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and current activities of the Soviet parliament.

During a friendly meeting, the sides expressed satisfaction with the recent activisation of Soviet-Egyptian relations and noted the role of both countries' parliamentarians in the consolidation of bilateral relations.

They also discussed some aspects of the situation in the Middle East.

The meeting was attended by Egyptian ambassador to the USSR Ahmad Mahir al-Sayyid.

Views on Meetings

LD1502001690 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Dear listeners, the visit by 'Usamah al-Baz, first undersecretary at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, to Moscow has ended. Our correspondent Yevgeniy Sidarov conducted an interview with him before his return to Egypt:

[Begin recording] [Sidarov] Would Dr. 'Usamah al-Baz talk briefly to listeners about the results of his current visit to Moscow?

[Al-Baz] I came to Moscow to prepare for the visit by President Muhammad Husni Mubarak to the Soviet Union in the second half of this March. We are very hopeful about this visit because of our high appreciation of the strong relations between the two peoples and governments. The visit was also an opportunity to meet Soviet officials in the Foreign Ministry and other offices, and to exchange views about many important international and regional issues. We are interested in current international events. The visit was also an opportunity for us to be briefed on the great changes in the Soviet Union. This matter interests us because we hope that the Soviet peoples will be able to achieve more progress and success; to achieve more economic progress, more social and political progress, and more cultural and intellectual progress. The visit was a good opportunity to exchange views with our comrades in Moscow. This will enable us to return home with a clearer view about events and a better understanding of the Soviet explanation of the Soviet stance on numerous issues.

[Sidarov] What could you say about the prospects for Soviet-Egyptian relations in the light of the coming visit by President Husni Mubarak?

[Al-Baz] Relations are strong and close. They are cooperative and friendly relations, which stem from the two countries' mutual interest in consolidating peace in the world and in various regions, and our mutual interest in increasing cooperation among the various peoples and countries, regardless of their economic, social or political regimes. Most of the time, the relations between us and the Soviet Union have been strong. We believe that this will continue in the future because we both have many joint interests. We highly appreciate the spirit shown by Soviet friends in dealing with us and in supporting all our causes.

[Sidarov] There is a very sensitive issue, which we cannot ignore now. It is because of the Israeli authorities' decision to settle the emigrant Jews, especially the Soviet ones, in the occupied territories. What could you say about the Egyptian stance toward this problem?

[Al-Baz] This issue was at the forefront of the issues we discussed at our meetings with the brother Soviets. This issue preoccupies the majority of the Arabs, not only in Egypt, but also everywhere in the Arab world, from the East to the West. The basic starting point for us is the necessity to solve this issue. We know the problems which the Soviet Union faces, and we know the motives and considerations. We would like to reach a compromise, we would like a compromise between the interests of both sides. We are afraid that Israel might increase the settlements or the number of the settlers in the occupied territories, because if this happens, then it would diminish the chances of settling the Palestinian problem, or it might even destroy these chances completely. If this

happens then there would be a permanent focus of tension, violence and war in the Middle East.

This is a grave issue because the Middle East is an important region for all countries, especially the European ones. The Middle East is the southern shore of Europe. Therefore, while we appreciate the considerations which made the Soviet Union facilitate the emigration of all its citizens, we would like to contain and limit the effects which might stem from a large number of Soviet Jews going to Israel and then to the occupied territories to build settlements there.

We are discussing the matter with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has adopted a first step in this field, which was to resort to the UN Security Council. There are other steps which we are discussing with Soviet officials and which we discuss at the Arab level. We hope that the meetings and contacts on both the Arab and Soviet levels would lead to ridding the region of the problems which might stem from increasing the settlements or from the continuation of settlement activities. This is an opportunity to ban settlement activities completely in the occupied territories, whether for the Soviet emigrants or others. These activities should be stopped for every one's sake, because they threaten to destroy peace efforts and threaten the stability in the region as a whole. We are always committed to good relations with the Soviet Union, and we will never allow anything to spoil the amicability and close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

[Sidarov] Thank you very much 'Usamah al-Baz. [end recording]

East Europe

Grachev on German Unity Without Military Danger

AU1902113490 Paris AFP in English 0351 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Paris, Feb 19 (AFP)—German reunification should not pose any military danger and should be achieved in a European context, one of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's advisers, Andrey Grachev, said late Sunday.

Mr. Grachev, interviewed on the French Europe-1 radio network, said he was "divided" on the issue of German unity, recalling the 20 million Soviet soldiers and civilians killed during World War II. He said that memories of the war meant that "we have shivers" when "the possibility of having, once again, a united Germany on the western frontiers of the Soviet Union", is discussed.

"Obviously, this is a different Germany, which is no longer fascist. The only thing we seek from this future Germany is the guarantee" of the absence of all military danger, Mr. Grachev declared. "All Europeans have the right ask Germans for more information on the problem of frontiers and on the reduction of the military capacity of Germany to launch offensive strikes against its neighbours", he said. "We want a demilitarisation of Germany, not in an isolated context, because the errors of the Treaty of Versailles (ending World War I) must not be repeated, but in a more general context of a demilitarisation of Europe in stages", he declared.

Mr. Grachev said that central Soviet Asia was "very tense", because of inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. He said there had been pogroms but that Mr. Gorbachev "did not hesitate to use force to stop them". Ethnic conflicts, frequently pitching Moslem groups against Christians, have raged over the past weeks in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan.

Asked about the dangers of a rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Soviet Union's Moslem republics, Mr. Gratchev said the cause of the recent unrest was more due to social, economic and political issues than religious ones.

Powers of Soviet Commander in GDR Spelled Out

PM1502113190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 3

["Dialogue" feature in response to query from reader: "Has He Been Ordered to the West?"; first paragraph is reader's query]

[Text] I have often heard about the special status of Soviet troops stationed on GDR territory. In what way is it exceptional? V. Grinenko, Krasnodar.

The deployment of a Western Group of Soviet Forces (until June 1989—the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany) military contingent on GDR territory is a direct consequence of World War II and is regulated by agreements made by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. The concrete procedure for deployment was agreed between the GDR and the USSR, as well as between the FRG and the Western victorious powers, and is consolidated in bilateral agreements.

The concrete procedure for the deployment of our forces on GDR territory was agreed within the framework of a bilateral agreement. The commander in chief of the Western Group of Soviet Forces—an army general—can, in the event of a threat to the security to our units, take what he considers to be necessary measures, including using forces without prior agreement with the GDR Government, which does not even have the right of veto.

On the basis of the four victorious powers' legal rights, which restrict the sovereignty of the GDR and the FRG, the GDR Government cannot, unlike the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments, for example, demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces from its territory. It can only insist on their further reduction.

IZVESTIYA Assesses GDR Opposition Forces

PM2202100390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Second and final part of IZVESTIYA special correspondents S. Guk and Ye. Korolev dispatch: "On Both Sides of the Berlin Wall, Which Does Not Effectively Separate Anyone Anymore"]

[Text] Berlin—II. There is hardly anyone today who is capable of saying how many political parties and organizations emerged in the GDR after the "9 November Revolution," as people here describe the events which brought about radical changes in society. The figure 154 did appear, but no one can vouch for its accuracy. And no wonder: They emerge, disintegrate, and merge. Supporters of some organizations move across to others—like in communicating vessels.

Now that the former structures have been destroyed, society, which united in a single upsurge owing to hatred of the old regime, is not demonstrating that same unity with regard to the GDR's future. Quite the contrary, polarization of forces is continuing. There are left-wingers, a center, right-wingers, radicals, nationalists, and moderates.

"Bans on Professions in the GDR"

No one doubts that the incumbent government is spending its last days in power—after the 18 March elections other political forces will come to power. Despite the process of democratization and renewal which is under way within the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism], hostility and overt enmity toward it (see the interview with its chairman G. Gysi regarding the crisis situation within the party, IZVESTIYA No. 33) universally prevail.

The list of accusations and complaints against the recent ruling party seems never-ending. Total regulation of economic and social life, mass ideologization of all spheres of human activity, suppression of dissidents, claims of infallibility, unrestrained eulogies regarding real and imaginary successes amid economic disintegration. A system of all-out surveillance of the population. Privileges. Complete loss of the sense of reality in the artificial world in which the party elite lived. We heard these charges from virtually everyone with whom we spoke.

We had another interesting discussion on this subject. With an "interested" party: Guenter Schabowski, former member of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee Politburo, now no longer a party member and unemployed (he has another four years until his pension, and his chances of finding any work whatsoever are zero: People everywhere refuse to take him on. His wife has also been dismissed from television). In this context Schabowski's fate is by no means an isolated case. The "ban on professions" affected many thousands of people in the GDR—from former party functionaries to the personnel of the universally hated security service. The new political forces that have been swept to the top of the country's political life and have proclaimed the building of a new democracy began to fight their enemies from the very outset using the most undemocratic methods: They deprived a host of people of their constitutional right to work.

...Thus Guenter Schabowski resolutely disagrees with accusations that he is out of touch with life's realities.

"Thus it comes down to miscalculations by individual leaders," he said. "The administrative system itself evaded responsibility. Surely we had information about what was going on in the economy and society? Something else is at issue."

He explained: The main fault was that the party leadership falsely considered itself the sole repository of truth. The master of a universal theory that answers all social development questions. It tried to pack all the complex, subtle, interconnected processes into the Procrustean bed of a theoretical concept. On this premise it assumed the functions of a helmsman who alone can chart the correct path to the future.

If that is the case, notwithstanding the lack of a correctional instrument, he continued, we inevitably embarked on the path of errors. What about acknowledging them? Then for all I know people might have decided that we did not have the only correct universal recipe and doubted us. The system itself forced us to embark on another dubious path—self-vindication. Mistakes multiplied, and they were not only justified—in time people learned to present them as virtues, advantages of the system. This also led to deficiencies in the economy and undermined social achievements. We saw that the economic mechanism was increasingly beginning to malfunction and at the same time holes began to be patched up. The further we went, the more this happened: The party, which assumed responsibility for everything taking place in society, gradually awarded itself all the positive things while anyone else but the Politburo—the Council of Ministers, ministries, combine directors—was answerable for the negative phenomena. Criticism of the system was ruled out, it was was seen as undermining—if not betraying—the socialist cause.

This was perhaps the most terrible part of the system, which did not permit open dialogue in society, Schabowski continued. Did we realize the fallaciousness of our chosen path? Yes, the further we went, the more we did realize it. When first attempts to amend the system were made, it proved to be too late: The people came out onto the streets, no one wanted to reckon with the old leadership anymore...

Today people are listening to other people. New times, new names. Virtually no one dares to utter the word "socialism" in public—they prefer to talk of a "social market economy." This is like a word, an incantation, like Archimedes' lever, use of which is bound to entail rapid and radical modernization of the economy.

People are counting on the FRG, its billions, its technologies, its experience of economic management (nor are some people averse to copying its political system either). The plan to create an economic and currency union (once the elections have taken place) with the FRG is on everyone's lips.

But how will all this be practically, concretely implemented? We heard some details during an economic German-German dialogue organized in Berlin. Industrialists, managers, and financiers from the FRG and West Berlin predominated in the hall of 2,000 people. Hans Modrow was unable to attend—his deputy Christa Luft gave a speech. Other people also spoke. Then the guests got down to business. They began to clarify matters, asking their hosts, so to speak, "pointblank" questions. The main question was about ownership. Who will own the production enterprises—not the small and middling but the major enterprises? If it is the shareholders (here FRG business circles want to have a controlling interest and not the 49 percent they have been offered), that is one thing. Otherwise, excuse me, other sources of finance will have to be sought.

Don't Miss the Opportunity

Many of the new generation of politicians with whom we spoke are inclined to agree to their wealthy compatriots' harsh conditions. Not everyone, admittedly. In the House of Democracy on Friedrichstrasse we met with "roundtable" participant Bernd Gehrke, who represents the "United Left" initiative. This is not a party but rather a coordinating center, which is striving to rally around it all organizations and groups that cleave to a leftist orientation, everyone who does not want to "politely surrender" so easily.

In the past Gehrke was expelled from the SED and was unemployed for several years. Now the "United Left" (a broad spectrum—ranging from former SED members to left-wing Christians) is elaborating an election program and intends to put its candidates forward throughout the country. Gehrke believes that left-wingers have a historic chance of creating a truly democratic state, without copying bourgeois parliamentarianism ("which is experiencing a crisis, but no one notices this crisis against the backdrop of the stormy changes in socialist countries"). A combination of production and territorial councils—not the present bureaucratic model but truly popular councils, following the prototype of those that emerged in 1917-1918—is the foundation of the new democracy. Renunciation of planned diktat and a transition to the market are essential. But the "United Left" oppose selling off national enterprises—the foundation of the republic's economy. They also oppose the "Anschluss" of the GDR: Then the country would become an appendage of its rich neighbor with all the consequences which that entails in the form of unemployment, needy pensioners, large families, and other low-income people.

It would be better, Gehrke believes, to create joint enterprises with capitalist countries within the CEMA framework—not the current CEMA but a renewed CEMA. Gehrke sees no great opportunities to implement his plans today. Left-wingers are split, they are in the minority, populists with their promises of immediately setting everything to rights are setting the tone, pro-unification sentiments are spreading among the population. In an endeavor to win votes, populists support these sentiments without daring to tell people the truth—the price that must be paid for unification. Hopes are being pinned on the workers and their production councils: The movement is beginning to acquire an autonomous character and may yet have a decisive say in the republic's future.

The Social Democratic Party [SPD] Is the Favorite

...The recently created SPD is considered the favorite among the parties involved in the election marathon. Shteffen Raykhe [name as transliterated], member of the board and the party's press spokesman, told us that several public opinion polls have been carried out in various parts of the GDR. More than 50 percent of the future voters expressed a preference for the SPD. The trend is gaining momentum. The party now numbers approximately 100,000 people and the flood of membership applications is continuing.

The SPD's main competitor is the bloc of right-wing parties with their attempts to defame the Social Democrats. Raykhe lists them as follows: the so-called Christian-Democratic Union ("so-called" because, Raykhe explains straightaway, the true Christians are on our side), "Democratic Breakthrough" (which is called "Democratic Collapse" among the people, he adds rapidly), and the "German Social Union."

The question of what the SPD intends to do with the country if it is victorious in the election upsets his composure somewhat. Hints of sarcasm can be heard in his voice: "Unlike the communists, we have no intention of doing anything with anyone or commanding anyone. As the people's party, the SPD will act with the people."

A word about a "sore point"—the economy: The SPD lays the stress on aid from the FRG ("we must learn a great deal from them about how to resolve economic problems"). The economy must be modernized without permitting the GDR to be sold off. "Our republic's population wants to earn money, not coupons for use on the domestic market," he added.

The SPD has no doubts about the incumbent government: The population is grateful to Hans Modrow for the democratic transformations and for the opportunity to hold free elections, but after 18 March he will leave political life since he is a member of the party that is to blame for the country reaching crisis point.

The GDR and the FRG, Raykhe believes, will exist as two states for a long time yet (particularly in the military context). As long as the two blocs exist at any rate. The SPD sees the four powers' responsibility for the Germans' fate as being to conclude a peace treaty as soon as

possible between the GDR and the FRG. After which they would withdraw their troops from German soil.

It did not prove possible to speak with other SPD leaders, in particular with I. Boehme, whom many people in unison have destined for the post of head of a future GDR Government: Everyone is out on their travels. However, two days after our conversation at the SPD Board we read an interview with Boehme in the FRG's economic WIRTSCHAFTWOCHE weekly. The contender for the premiership advocated "privatizing a number of GDR combines," going on to say: "I am convinced that any premier who is elected will be at the same time the head of the last GDR Government." In his opinion, unification will take place within the next four years. Berlin will be the capital of Germany.

Two months ago a statement by the GDR SPD Board on the German question said the following: "As far as amalgamation with the FRG is concerned, rapid unification would pose a threat to the GDR as an equal partner. This country's population would have to bear social and political burdens imposed on it in an irresponsible fashion. Owing to the inefficiency of our current economy a large proportion of the population would sink into the lower strata of a welfare society. This would have unforeseeable consequences for large families, single people, pensioners, invalids, and the sick."

It is not only political events but also sometimes political views that are changing with kaleidoscopic speed in today's GDR.

Questions, Questions...

No one knows the answer to many of them. And if answers are found they are extremely vague and approximate. No one in either the GDR or the FRG can say with certainty whether or not the GDR will remain in the Warsaw Pact after unification. The idea of German neutrality was rejected from the outset in the FRG, the FRG must remain within NATO—that is the axiom. And where is the GDR to be if not in NATO? At present reports can be glimpsed about former GDR National People's Army servicemen who want to serve in the Bundeswehr...

What fate awaits the intelligentsia, primarily cultural figures, in this republic? Today calls can be heard from the "right flank" "to do away with the intelligentsia's babble." Some people now are not averse to holding the intelligentsia (like the SED and secret service personnel before) responsible for providing "ideological support" for the old regime. Previously books by GDR writers (particularly those who were "suppressed' in their country) enjoyed success in the FRG, like many performances, paintings, and sculptures. Today interest in them in the FRG has declined. What will happen to this layer of culture tomorrow?

How will the question of ownership—primarily state ownership—be resolved? Will the republic not actually be sold off, something that virtually all new politicians verbally oppose today in the GDR?

It is sometimes hard to shake off the feeling that, without realizing it, many people in the GDR are proceeding in their thoughts of the country's future on the strange precondition that all socialism's positive elements will automatically be left as they were following the introduction of a market economy (from which they only want to take the positive elements). That does not happen in life, unfortunately.

According to the crudest calculations, the GDR will require between 700 billion to 1 trillion FRG marks to plug all the gaps in a very short time. With the best will in the world, no one will give the republic that kind of financial aid. What is the way out? "Unpopular measures with the population," which some new politicians are already beginning to mention?

How can the FRG help? Realists, people who are not prone to self-delusion, believe that the FRG will give precisely enough for the GDR population to extricate themselves from the economic quagmire. And not a pfennig more. Then the cost of unification will be the optimum price for the FRG...

At the "Forum for Germany" in West Berlin, local historian Professor Arnulf Baring [name as transliterated] assessed the current opposition in the following way: "Weak program and cadres... Many good intentions, little political experience, and bad material working conditions characterize the new movements, along with an excessive number of parties whose characteristic features have been eroded and resemble one another. One still has the impression that we are dealing with amateur dramatics groups."

However, it is these new forces that will adopt decisions over the next few years on which the development of German-German relations and the situation in Europe as a whole will depend.

Modrow on German Unification, Army Function

PM2102110190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "On the Tasks of the National People's Army"]

[Text] Berlin, 15 Feb—It was and still is the task of the National People's Army to ensure the external security of the GDR and its citizens. This was stated by H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, in an interview in the weekly newspaper VOLKSARMEE. Speaking about the concept "For Germany—one fatherland," he pointed out that it is necessary to proceed from the creation in the future of "a single German state on the basis of various federal lands."

The head of government pointed to the importance of reaching agreement on the fact that the process of the

German states' gradual unification should be accompanied by a reduction in the strength of the National People's Army and also the Bundeswehr.

GDR Reactions to Modrow-Kohl Talks Cited

PM2102145390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "German Alternatives"]

[Text] The results of the visit by H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, to the FRG have been given an ambiguous reception in the republic. Notes of alarm can be heard in the numerous statements and commentaries, and it is noted that the visit could have been more successful if the FRG had taken a more constructive stance on a number of questions because in the unification process, G. Gysi, chairman of the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism], believes, both the GDR and the FRG must restructure themselves.

M. Plattsek [name as transliterated], spokesman for the "Green" party in H. Modrow's cabinet, stated that during the visit representatives of the FRG had instructive contacts with members of the GDR delegation. G. Pope [name as transliterated], representing the initiative "For Peace and Human Rights," pointed out that H. Kohl had not given any guarantees that the borders existing now will be respected in the future.

The unification process must not infringe certain human rights. In this respect socialism has always been strong, G. Krushe [name as transliterated], head of the evangelical church in the Berlin-Brandenburg territory, noted. This affects, for example, sickness benefit and the right to work.

BERLINER ZEITUNG noted that one of the most frequently used words at the meetings between Modrow and West German politicians and bankers was "foreign currency, money." H. Kohl made it plain that he is ready for a very speedy introduction of the Deutschemark into the GDR, although he did not name a specific date.

GDR Concedes FRG Role in Economic Recovery

90UI0368A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov report: "In Search of a Prescription"]

[Text] Berlin—The GDR press has published the news that the FRG Government is proposing to immediately begin negotiations on currency union between the two German states. The FRG Deutsche mark [DM] is preparing, consequently, to drive, like a tank, across the national economic landscape of the GDR, crushing its sovereignty and mining its social achievements, leaving in its wake bankrupt enterprises and mass unemployment.

Each day 1,000-2,000 persons are moving from the GDR to the FRG. Last year more than 343,000 persons left the country to settle in the West. A further 58,000 were added to them this January. Those who are leaving are persons hoping to find jobs in the Federal Republic—young workers.

Journalists comment that the GDR is experiencing a "brain and muscle drain," which has already cost approximately 40 billion marks. Some 250,000 vacancies in the country remain unfilled. At the same time, however, there are tens of thousands of unemployed—former employees of the party and state machinery which is being cut back and of the national security administration. Difficulties are growing in the FRG also—there is not enough money for settling the immigrants, nor is there work for everyone.

The incessant outflow of manpower to the West is a serious warning signal. The political situation in the GDR has changed fundamentally, but this has not been the case in the sphere of the economy. It is not fortuitous that both the GDR People's Chamber and the "Roundtable," at which 16 parties and public organizations are represented, are constantly returning to the question of the situation in the economy. Everything points to the economy ailing, as before.

This year's prospects may be judged even now. The figure of four or five percent—the amount by which, evidently, the level of production will fall compared with the first quarter of 1989—was heard at a meeting of the People's Chamber, and the domestic market imbalance is growing. And, furthermore, FRG citizens, who are buying up meat and meat products, sausages, and many other types of food, wine and champagne in significant amounts, are doing their bit here too. Figures characterizing the state of the country's foreign trade have been specified. The GDR's arrears amount to $18.5 billion.

Demonstrations and strikes demanding increases in wages, pensions, and leave and increased appropriations for other social needs have become a mirror of socioeconomic tension. The fulfillment of these demands will, as H. Modrow told the deputies, require an additional 40 billion marks, which corresponds to one-third of the entire annual retail trade turnover. Understandably, the demands which have been put forward far exceed the state's possibilities. It has as yet been possible to increase wages for individual categories of working people by 4.7 billion marks.

The GDR economy is in need of treatment. And urgently, what is more, as everyone recognizes. It is, however, far easier establishing the fact of an illness and describing its symptoms than mapping out an effective course of treatment. Various prescriptions are being offered here.

Some are based on the fact that economic recovery is possible and necessary within the framework of a sovereign and independent GDR pursuing a policy of "treaty association" with the FRG. An economic committee has

been set up under the auspices of the Council of Ministers which has formulated the basic principles of economic reform. They were examined at a meeting of the "Roundtable".

The reform provides for a renunciation of inordinate centralization and directive planning. They should be replaced by economic methods and the principles of a socialist market economy. Much is borrowed from the efforts already made in other socialist countries, particularly as far as the attraction of capital from overseas and the formation of joint ventures and also joint-stock companies and the use of various forms of ownership are concerned.

Extensive participation in the international division of labor is envisaged. During all stages of the reform it will be necessary to reliably protect the interests of the working people. Public ownership will, as before, be of paramount significance.

There are, however, other prescriptions also. The basis thereof is an aspiration to create in the GDR as quickly as possible the same socioeconomic structures as in the FRG and afford scope for private enterprise and a free market. As the authors of such prescriptions assume, conditions would take shape rapidly for economic and currency union with the FRG and for the further rapprochement of the German states. Such "medicine" is being prescribed most insistently by the new German Social Union Party, and it is contained in the programs of the national democrats, "Democratic Breakthrough" and a number of other parties.

The GDR Government proceeds from the fact that financial support on the part of the FRG is desirable. Immediate assistance could amount to DM10 billion-DM15 billion.

Under the pressure of circumstances the government, as Christa Lueft, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, reported, believes that urgent agreements with the FRG on currency union are necessary. However, the immediate introduction in the GDR as a means of payment of the Deutsche mark is a very complex issue. It would have its positive side—the elimination of bottlenecks on the domestic market, extensive opportunities for special trips abroad and enterprises' direct outlet onto the foreign market. But there would be substantial drawbacks also—the difference in productivity and level of remuneration would not disappear, and, consequently, the outflow of manpower would continue. Many enterprises would have to close, and those who worked there, to be dismissed. People's private savings would be in jeopardy. It would be necessary to revalue real estate and fixed capital. The West German Bundesbank would come to determine the GDR's financial policy.

The political and social consequences for the whole GDR people would be so serious that such a step could only be taken, the government believes, as the result of a referendum.

Sober calculations show that it would take no less than DM100 billion to bring all of GDR industry to a high level. And no less than DM1 trillion to pull transport, communications, trade, the ecology, in short, all walks of life, up to this level. FRG economists believe that it will take 5-10 years to cure the GDR economy.

Meanwhile, however, having declared its readiness to grant DM6 billion, the FRG has allocated for assistance to the GDR only DM1 billion. And they wish to give them not "generally" but for a specific purpose, which is being talked about openly—in order to drive the private sector into the front positions in the GDR.

Meanwhile FRG citizens who have decided that the time has come to show some concern for their property which they formerly left behind here are showing up in cities of the GDR. Television carried a discussion with one of them. He intends repossessing a large apartment house in Berlin. He distributed to the residents forms in order to get to know who the tenants were there. The number of claimants to their former possessions is growing by the day. One FRG insurance company declared that it owned half of the plot of land on which the Berlin Television Tower has been erected. A West Berlin pensioner is claiming land on which the Hotel Metropol and the International Trade Center have been built in Berlin.

The "temperature" of the ailing GDR economy has not returned to normal as yet. In the short period of the existence of the coalition government headed by H. Modrow, it has been possible to formulate merely the main direction as yet. But whether the GDR will succeed in advancing in this direction while preserving the social protection of the working people or whether the arrow will turn to another path will depend on the results of the political struggle unfolding on the threshold of the elections of the People's Chamber.

FRG Involvement in GDR Election Detailed

PM1302110990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Single Edition p 4

[APN and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA own correspondent Yu. Chervakov report under the rubric "GDR Preparing For Elections": "Who Will Join the Coalition?"]

[Text] Berlin—The constituent congress of a new GDR political party, the Free Democratic Party, held a few days ago in Berlin's Weissensee district, was essentially one of the finishing touches to the process of forming the republic's political forces ahead of the 18 March elections. Thus, already about 20 political parties and currents are officially in operation here today. But their unequal political significance is perfectly obvious, and by no means can every one of them count on a high percentage of election votes.

The Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] is in a difficult position. Of the 2.5 million party members that it had prior to last October, only 500,000 will be left by the

elections, Gregor Gysi believes. In spite of the losses and the bitter attacks from all sides, the PDS, according to various assessments, could secure 10-30 percent of the votes.

Its main opponent will be the Social Democratic Party, which was also recently created but is rapidly gathering momentum and which people are predicting will be the most influential political force in the republic after 18 March. To some extent strong social democratic traditions, particularly in the south of the GDR are having an effect. On the other hand, it felt the effects earlier than other parties of solid moral and organizational-material support from the West German Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]. On Sunday evening the first working session of a joint commission of the two parties was held in the capital's "Palast" hotel, which became essentially the basic working organ formulating and coordinating the entire process of the GDR Social Democratic Party's election campaign, its strategy and tactics. Representatives of both parties on the commission make no secret of the fact that henceforth they regard themselves virtually as a united whole.

The election campaign in the GDR has long been part of the election campaign in the FRG. The accords between Modrow and Kohl that each side must limit itself in the election campaign to its own territory are being completely ignored. But whereas the West German Social Democrats were able to define their position rapidly and so get a certain edge, the parties of the ruling coalition in Bonn were somewhat slow to get started, taking a long time to decide which of the GDR parties to pin their main hopes on.

The fear of leaving it too late and so missing the chance for people of like mind to succeed both in the GDR and at home is forcing the parties of the ruling FRG coalition into decisive action. At the end of last week Chancellor Kohl went at short notice to West Berlin, where he held talks on behalf of the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] with the leadership of the East German CDU, the "Democratic Awakening," the German Social Union, and the Forum Party. There was essentially one question on the agenda—the creation of a bloc of conservative and centrist forces to run united in the elections as a counterbalance to the PDS and the SPD. The first attempts were unsuccessful, but it has already been announced that they will be continued.

And, finally, let me go back once again to the Free Democrats' congress in Weissensee. The fact that almost the entire leadership of the West German liberals, including Lambsdorff, Genscher, Mischnick, and Baum, was present at it could make it look as though the Free Democratic Party had also made its choice. At first glance this may seem odd, since the Liberal Democratic Party has already existed in the GDR for many years, and its chairman Manfred Gerlach is now this country's president. Interparty contacts have been held, and have even been stepped up recently. But it was reckoned in Bonn that, having cooperated with the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany probably could not be an attractive force for all supporters of the liberal movement in the GDR, so they decided on an extreme step: to give their blessing, barely a month before the elections, to the birth of a sister-party, the Free Democratic Party of the GDR.

So, the main struggle for votes will be between the PDS, the SPD, the bloc of conservative forces, and the liberals. The "republicans," who have officially registered their first land organization in the GDR, could intervene vigorously in the struggle. Who will win it?

Zimmerman Interviewed on GDR Developments

90UI0363A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Feb 90 Morning p 5

[Report on interview with Brigitta Zimmerman, head of the GDR weekly WOCHENPOST and member of the Press Commission of the presidium of the Party of Democratic Socialism, by V. Lapskiy, IZVESTIYA correspondent, Berlin: "The Forces Are Strained to the Limit"]

[Text] **The name of Brigitta Zimmerman is well known in Berlin. She has headed the popular weekly WOCHENPOST for many years. Even in the stagnant times, when party officials held the press of the GDR firmly in their hands, the weekly published critical articles that presented problems. In the days of the most crucial crisis in the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], B. Zimmerman was a member of the working commission which prepared the extraordinary congress. She is now in the governing body of the press commission under the presidium of the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism].**

"The situation in the GDR can be defined most accurately in two words: instability and uncertainty," says Brigitta Zimmerman. "The old structures of authority are not functioning, and new ones are not even being looked into. The resettlement of citizens from the GDR to the FRG is continuing. There is great distrust in the PDS, although with the exception of the Social Democratic Party, which, perhaps, plays a leading role in the opposition, the other parties are unable to explain what they want in a simple way. Their political nuances are not always distinct, and their concepts on many key questions are not clear. The numerous letters of our leaders and meetings with them substantiate this conclusion.

[Lapskiy] Where is the GDR headed?

[Zimmerman] This cannot be answered in one word. A further polarization of forces is going on. There are supporters and opponents of an immediate unification with the FRG in practically all parties, new and old. Those who are against say: Immediate unification is impossible, because in a united Germany the GDR will become a "shelter for the poor." Secondly, social protection of the population is important—critical discussions

are going on regarding this question inside the opposition. It is understandable that a market economy will bring unemployment with it. Older people are concerned, not knowing what will happen to them in the future, whether "the weak will survive."

[Lapskiy] In your opinion, it there a possibility of a slow unification of Germany as, for example, is being demanded by the participants in the weekly demonstrations in Leipzig?

[Zimmerman] I think that the demand is unrealistic. The West German politicians, who during the preelection campaign in the GDR actively interfered in our affairs, at times create the impression that we could be united tomorrow if we wished. But, you will see, after the elections to the FRG Bundestag planned for December, these politicians will speak in another language. I consider it improper that West German politicians, interfering in our internal affairs, are pursuing selfish aims to make points for their own election campaign. The PDS said openly: Immediate unification is an illusion, and it is very dangerous and could cause harm to everyone. Unification is a gradual process that takes common interests into account.

[Lapskiy] What do you say about the threat of neo-Nazism in the GDR? Is it not being exaggerated?

[Zimmerman] We do not have that many neo-Nazis here; however, even those are sufficient for serious concern. Unfortunately, the theme of neo-Nazism "took root" in the election campaign. Opposition parties are trying to convince society: It is advantageous to our PDS, they say, to kindle the threat from the right, and "under this pretext" to set up mass protest demonstrations. They have reached the point of considering that the January storming of the MOB [Ministry of Internal Affairs] was also organized by its former officers, in order to blame the ultra- rightists. All of this is transparent. Our party is categorically against such methods. It is obvious that the ultra-rightists are gaining strength, making appeals: "Germany, awaken!" We are disturbed by this. I do not think that we are threatened by a fascist coup, but vigilance is necessary. In my opinion, it is necessary to create a single anti-fascist front both in the GDR and in the FRG. The defeat of the former MOB was a serious lesson for all of us. The personal intercession of Hans Morrow was needed to pacify the raging crowd. After this incident, even the opposition began to understand more clearly that anarchy and chaos is useful to the ultra-rightists.

[Lapskiy] But there is also talk about a left-radical threat. What is meant by this?

[Zimmerman] The West German BILD ZEITUNG spread a rumor that apparently some officers of our army, and also former officials of the MOB, are preparing a left putsch. This is not serious. We really have a lot of people who are living in confusion and even in despair. Take those former MOB employees. They are without work, and they are not being hired by anyone. There is a negative attitude toward them in the FRG as well. In my opinion there is more of a threat that they will turn to the right.

[Lapskiy] The impression is being created that your party is demoralized. It is melting away before the eyes—it lost approximately half of its members. Perhaps, its present passivity and lack of desire to make its voice heard once more is a pre- election tactic?

[Zimmerman] Because of mistakes in the past, our party has a lot to make up for. We are in an unimaginably difficult situation, and we have to concern ourselves with everything at once—to conduct a keen pre-election campaign and, while in operation, rearrange our internal structure and painfully overcome the Stalinist past. For this purpose, the leadership here was completely renewed. There are no party workers in it with a lot of political experience. Take Gregor Gyzi, could he have thought a half year ago that he would head the party? This question can also be asked of other members of the presidium. Inexperience is sensed in many of the questions. There is one other reason—the great pressure on us from all sides and from inside, and a demand to dissolve the PDS. Many want this.

[Lapskiy] Why?

[Zimmerman] It is not just a matter of dissatisfaction with the party. Some people are trying to dissolve the PDS for political reasons, and they want to sharply weaken the organized left movement in the GDR. This would play into the hands of the right. Contrary to the apparent inactivity for a month and a half after the extraordinary congress, quite a bit has been done. The party defined its economic policy. We want to gain the trust of the people once again with a new and efficient style. Now we do not attach much significance to meetings. The fact is that the public frequently comes to mass arrangements, from which one can expect almost anything. As previously, there is a great threat in the country of an outburst of violence, and the situation can get out of control at any moment.

Incidentally, representatives of other parties and movements sensibly do not participate in the weekly demonstrations in Leipzig. It is easy to become convinced that the tone there is set by quite specific forces. The atmosphere is red hot. Recently, Leipzig students tried to arrange a counter-demonstration—they were attacked with fists flying. A process of consolidating the party is taking place in the localities, and serious preparation for the congress is going on. It is important now for us to strengthen the base. The party has left the enterprises, and it is transferring its activities to residential regions. This is tremendous work which cannot be dragged out. Our forces are strained to the limit.

[Lapskiy] There will be parliamentary elections soon. What is the party counting on? How do you look at the prospects for shifting into opposition?

[Zimmerman] I do not doubt that the PDS will become an opposition party, but I do not see anything dramatic in this. Being in opposition has its own positive aspects. The main thing is that the party receives enough votes to remain an influential political force. The positive side lies in the fact that, sitting on the opposition bench, we will be able to do what others are now doing to us: Say "no." Moreover, we will have more opportunity to strengthen the party and to regroup forces—now we are forced to answer for each button that is not on sale. Being in the opposition we will be able to participate in the development of economic policy, the establishment of an internal market, and the resolution of the question about what forms of property should prevail in the economy—public or private. Finally, in a resolution of the German question.

[Lapskiy] Not long ago, Gregor Gyzi said that the party is counting on receiving 20 percent of the votes in the elections. How do you assess the chances of the PDS?

[Zimmerman] Twenty percent—that would be great. I think that the figure will be more modest. That which today unites practically all of the parties and movements, including our recent allies in the Democratic bloc, is the political campaign against us. Chaos reigns in the country. It is doubtful that any party could control it by itself. People are needed who are competent and who have a lot of political experience—we have people like this in our party. The draft law on elections is under consideration now. This law, which in all probability will soon be approved by the People's Chamber without any substantial amendments, is not particularly favorable for us. There will be voting for the party and not for specific persons.

[Lapskiy] What happened to the newspapers that belonged to the party? I have the local press in mind.

[Zimmerman] Previously, the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] practically had a monopoly on the mass media (the exceptions were the newspapers of the four allied parties). The main thing is that the typographical base was in the hands of the SED. For a law-governed society, of course, such a situation was impermissible. It was decided to convert the district newspapers to national property, and to do the same with the typographical resources. Negotiations are going on regarding this. In the future, these newspapers will have public soviets, whose members will be representatives of the various parties who participate in local "roundtables."

[Lapskiy] Are the former allied parties keeping their newspapers?

[Zimmerman] Yes.

[Lapskiy] Does this mean that the PDS will not have its own press in the districts?

[Zimmerman] NEUES DEUTSCHLAND is distributed throughout the republic, and its circulation is one million copies. An administrative reform is expected soon, and the GDR will switch over to a state structural division, and there will be, as was the case at one time, five states, so that district party newspapers in any case would not make sense. It is possible that, with time, it will be possible to establish state newspapers. We shall see.

[Lapskiy] There is persistent talk that West German publishers are starting to thrust themselves into the GDR in order to become partners with local publishers or to buy them out entirely.

[Zimmerman] I have heard about this. We would not want to be taken over by some kind of a Western magnate. However, the question of shared participation is entirely possible. Concerning the creation of joint enterprises with the newest typographical equipment. There is no denying that our typographical equipment has become obsolete. There is talk about various forms of cooperation. I do not exclude the fact that the publishing house BERLINER VERLAG, to which we are referring, will create a partnership, and that it will attract Western capital. In any case, we are not talking about a sale.

[Lapskiy] West German publications are beginning to be sold in the GDR. You now have serious competitors.

[Zimmerman] Indeed, in the near future about 50 newspapers and journals from the FRG will be sold unrestrictedly. It is difficult for us to compete with them, especially with the beautifully published illustrated journals. I share the concerns of our editors. Many of the journalists are perplexed, and they fear for the future, and some of them propose: Let us ourselves, they say, propose a "controlled package" of actions for our publishers to present to Western publishers, this would be more dependable.

[Lapskiy] I heard more than once that recently West German editorial offices have begun to "buy" local journalists—they work for two bosses.

[Zimmerman] I do not see anything special in this. In the final analysis, it is not a question of the kind of currency a journalist receives as a fee, but how he writes.

[Lapskiy] Not long ago a German acquaintance said: Soviet perestroyka has lost its luster in the eyes of GDR citizens in recent months. Previously, perestroyka was a guiding star, and an ideal, the paths which were blocked by the former regime, but now, when the GDR is restructuring itself, it has lost its attraction.

[Zimmerman] This is not so. Fears are growing among our citizens that the Soviet Union and its leadership "will not hold onto" perestroyka and bring it to its conclusion. Conflict in the Transcaucasus, national problems in other regions, strikes, economic disorders, extreme shortages—all of this is a reality of which we are

well aware. The people retain their former attitude toward perestroyka, but they are seriously worried that, if perestroyka comes to a standstill in the Soviet Union, then we also will be derived of important support without which, it is possible, in the final analysis, we will surrender to the mercy of those who are against the preservation of the GDR as a sovereign independent state.

Commentary Views German 'Unification' Issue

LD2002005790 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Yuriy Minayev commentary]

[Excerpts] In my opinion Margaret Thatcher was right in correcting the term of reunification and speaking rather of unification. This is important because the two German states might unite within their present borders, but not reunite within the borders of the former reich as it may be understood. Apprehensions on the part of the two Germanys eastern neighbors are still alive. Poland on the one hand is stepping up its diplomatic campaign to join talks on German unification. [passage omitted]

Already now many citizens of the GDR have been shocked by West German visitors to various towns and villages of their country where the visitors claimed plots of land and houses, producing half a century-old papers confirming their parents and grandparents had purchased all that property long before. True, these are inter-German problems, but can the Poles be sure they will not face the same problems in the near future? I think all this confirms that the process of unification should not be forced but cautious.

But the German issue is not only a problem for the east. Possible unification and quick monetary union with the GDR, pressed by the West German Government, poses serious problems for the West too. The immediate question for the European Community is whether it should speed up or slow down its drive to economic and monetary union. Indeed, with the GDR coming into the EC as a part of a union with West Germany, would pose unprecedented legal and economic problems. Some EEC governments also say that German unification might threaten broader political and economic integration after the establishment of a barrierfree single market in 1992. In my opinion it is clear that all the questions are to be answered before any steps to real unification take place. Otherwise answering these questions later may become a painful job.

PRAVDA on Polish Political, Economic Scene

PM2202110990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Special correspondents A. Starukhin and M. Tretyakov dispatch under the rubric "Poland Today": "Difficult Path to Stability; Panorama of Processes Taking Place in the Republic's Public Life"]

[Text] Warsaw, Feb—Warsaw seems to have quieted down. The passions that raged at the end of January around the 11th Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Congress, which was transformed into the constituent congress of Polish left-wing forces, have abated.

Somewhere in a quiet office the tactics and action strategy or, more simply, the prospects for the future daily life of the new political formation—the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SDRP]—which is replacing the PZPR are now being worked out. The leaders of the Republic of Poland's Social Democratic Union [SDU], which broke away at the congress, are doing the same. This was formed by a clear minority of the congress delegates headed by T. Fiszbach, a prominent figure in the former PZPR and now vice marshal of the Sejm.

The 11th congress which concluded the activity of the PZPR, which no longer exists on Poland's political map, and the new party's constituent congress is one of the main events in the country's life. But there are other significant questions affecting the interests of virtually every Polish family. We refer to the new realities which have arisen in Poland as a result of the implementation as of 1 January this year of the economic program of T. Mazowiecki's government, popularly known as the "Balcerowicz Plan"—named for L. Balcerowicz, vice premier and minister of finance.

Politicians, statesmen, and prominent economic leaders are holding meetings and making decisions. Political scientists, other specialists, and the press are analyzing events and are trying to draw the first conclusions. What sort of party is the SDRP? In Gdansk "Solidarity" leader L. Walesa held another press conference, inviting to it literally anyone who wanted to come, and with characteristic emotion expressed disappointment with the results of the congress. In his opinion, Polish left-wing forces ought to have changed completely and dissociated themselves from the PZPR. He predicted that the SDRP will survive about three months, or six months at most.

The leader of "Solidarity," which, legally speaking, remains a trade union but in fact determines the present Polish Government's policy, unequivocally passed sentence on the new political party. What is this? A keen sense of the democracy for which the striking workers fought in the summer of 1980, or just disappointment that, in spite of the forecasts, the left-wing camp continues to exist?

On the eve of the two congresses in Poland there was wide talk of L. Walesa's meeting with T. Fiszbach, who was intended to be the new party's leader. Such steps in political practice are no accident and have definite significance. Evidently, in the election campaign it was necessary to enlist the support of such an influential organization as "Solidarity." Many analysts also note the fact that T. Fiszbach focused the congress delegates' attention unduly on his long-standing ties with Walesa,

including the period when he headed the party organization of Gdansk Voivodship.

People here believe that he suddenly slipped as a result of the delegates' unequivocal attitude to "Solidarity" and its leaders.

Does this mean that the SDRP led by Aleksander Kwasniewski, the 35-year-old chairman of its Supreme Council, and Leszek Miller, general secretary of the Central Executive Committee, will suddenly become a big party and absorb the main membership of the PZPR, which before the congress numbered more than 2 million people? Probably no one today will answer this fundamental question in the affirmative.

Let us recall for instance that after the disbandment of the PZPR a good third of the delegates refused to participate in the congress and did not sign the declaration about affiliation to the new party. So won't PZPR cells emerge tomorrow, particularly at local level, in the country's voivodships and cities and primarily the countryside, won't they unite? And you get the impression that neither the PZPR Congress nor the constituent congress revealed the complete and objective distribution of forces. Among the 1,500 delegates, as we have already noted in previous articles from Poland, there were only about 100 workers and there were very few representatives of the peasantry and young people. Of course, perhaps the hours of thought will continue, but in the early post-congress days in 30 industrial enterprises in Warsaw almost none of the workers who were PZPR members changed their old party affiliation.

And A. Kwasniewski himself realizes the acuteness and difficulty of the moment. In an interview with the Italian newspaper LA REPUBBLICA he noted that "it will not be easy for representatives of the orthodox old guard to be members of the new party." A bit earlier at the end of the congress he admitted that the party still does not have a "finalized concept of activity as regards the peasants." He is also concerned that workers and young people are poorly represented in the party.

As we can see, the process of political transformations in Poland is extremely difficult, ambiguous and many-sided.

Look no further than the immediate "sealing" of the doors of the PZPR committees. In Warsaw about 200 party apparatus workers immediately found themselves... unemployed. To this must be added and added the party workers of other ranks.

As Waldemar Stelmach, former PZPR Central Committee official, said, it is virtually impossible to get appropriate work: "I'll have to open a cooperative store with friends. So you are now talking with a future storekeeper," he joked bitterly.

In the army and the militia the political organs are being disbanded and the security service is in a state of upheaval. For instance, a senior state security officer is offered a job as a driver at a motor vehicle depot. In the morning he finds his vehicle has punctured tires. Two days later the director of the motor vehicle depot says that he is not going to keep this worker on account of whom the wheels have to be changed every day.

This is not just one person's tragedy. This is the tragedy of many members of the former PZPR. The newspapers are focusing attention on it, and some of them are simply writing with malicious glee. There are constant headlines like "Heirs of the PZPR," "New or Renewed?" "Funeral Interrupted by Birth."

What about party journalists? The newly created 150-member SDRP Supreme Council resolved to close several party publications and to modify others. The harsh reality is that without state subsidies, and they have been abolished, it is difficult for the party to finance itself and its apparatus. Here economic accountability is not half-hearted, does not exist only "on paper," but is the real thing. And of course, it will be very problematic for the released journalists to get another job in an editorial post. The chief editor of the former TRYBUNA LUDU has been dismissed from his post, and the labor contract with all the editorial staff has been canceled. The collective of the new newspaper TRYBUNA is being formed. M. Siwiec, who was formerly in charge of the student magazine ITD, has been appointed its chief editor.

Other internal party changes are also taking place. Instead of the PZPR deputies' club in the Sejm a parliamentary club of left-wing democratic forces has been set up. It comprises SDRP members who are Sejm deputies. The club has also partly split—an independent circle of deputies who are members of the SDU has been formed within it.

From the first days of its existence the new party has been trying to establish ties and to expand its social base. Potential for cooperation with the almost 7 million-strong National Trade Union Confederation [OPZZ] has already been agreed and attempts are being made to establish contacts with the left wing in "Solidarity." There is simply no getting away from cooperation here—there are plenty of points of contact in the course of the activity of the party and the country's other mass public organizations. Above all, there is the defense of the working people's interests.

Indeed, alarming and painful problems are marching uninvited into every home without so much as a knock on the door, as it were. For instance, the unemployment problem. As Polish television has reported, in the port of Gdansk alone about 60 unemployed people are registering every day. The OPZZ believes that as a whole throughout the country this year there will be more than 1 million unemployed.

A few days ago the OPZZ Executive Committee put forward a number of proposals to the government with the aim of defending the interests of working people and labor veterans from the consequences of the economic program that is being introduced. This is based on the

fact that, according to trade union figures, by the end of this year the level of real average wages may fall by 60 percent, although the government names a figure of 20 percent which has been approved by the Sejm.

And the "Solidarity" National Executive Committee was forced to issue a statement on the question of collective dismissals of workers from enterprises.

Poland's Central Planning Administration has published the first official figures on the sharp drop as of the beginning of the year in the number of job vacancies, and on the registration of unemployed people in virtually all voivodships.

The problems in politics are closely intertwined with family budgets. The "Balcerowicz plan" envisaged an increase in prices in January by about 45 percent. But in fact the figure was 60 percent. As already announced, in February retail prices for goods and services will increase by another 23 percent. And family budgets are coming apart at the seams. The lion's share goes on foodstuffs, municipal services, and other necessary expenses. With an average wage of about 500,000 zlotys [Z] a white bread roll costs Z2,500 in Warsaw today. We think that this is the most typical indicator reflecting the Poles' present living standard.

Usually we do not write about this. But why should we not say that the Polish Government has refused point-blank to change the zloty-ruble exchange rate despite the steady increase in the cost of living. According to our economists' calculations, staffers at Soviet foreign missions in Poland last year alone lost the equivalent of three months' wages. And now, in January, for the same reason they failed to receive half their wages.

Recently Jacek Kuron, minister of labor and social policy, visited the FRG. Both countries' newspapers featured a photograph showing the chief of the Polish social department, wearing a cook's apron and holding a ladle, standing in front of a cauldron of steaming free soup for the poor. As an act of charity the West German firm "Nestle" gave the Poles 400,000 packets of soup concentrate. Expressing thanks for this, J. Kuron talked at length about man's honor and dignity, and then said: "It would be a misunderstanding to think that the gap between Poland and Germany can be filled with packets of soup... Everyone expects a river of money to flow into Poland. We still don't have this money. Besides, it will be in the form of credit, and not gifts, it is a question of cooperation, and not alms," the minister went on to explain, clearly addressing his compatriots. It cannot be denied that it pays to be frugal and it is well known that one good turn deserves another. Let us recall that Poland's foreign debt to the West alone is about $40 billion and it has to pay colossal interest on it annually.

Meanwhile steps "toward Europe" are still being taken. There is an accord on travel by Polish citizens, particularly young people, for seasonal work in the FRG. T. Mazowiecki, head of the Polish Government, has returned from a trip to Strasbourg and Brussels. He addressed the European Parliament. He presented an application to this organization to admit Poland to the Council of Europe. Hundreds of European and other firms are getting a firm "foothold" on Polish territory. State enterprises bought out by individuals are breaking up, and often become joint ventures. Now it is difficult to name a sector where foreign capital is not being intensively invested. Perhaps this will help industry to make a more rapid recovery.

Admittedly, serious misgivings are being expressed here that the country will sell itself down the river and end up supplying cheap labor and raw materials to the same European entrepreneurs.

The year in Poland started on a turbulent note. A little over a month has seen events which sometimes do not happen for decades. However, the government program for the economy's recovery also predicted a "rapid" progress of events without precedent in world practice—that the country will emerge from the crisis within six months and achieve stability. Time will tell how the situation will develop in the future. There is not long to wait.

Jaruzelski Pays Visit to Soviet Air Force Unit

LD2002142690 Moscow TASS in English 1305 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw February 20 TASS—Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski, touring the Szczecin and Gorzow Provinces, visited an air force unit of the Northern Group of Troops.

He congratulated officers and men on the coming Soviet Army and Navy Day and conveyed cordial congratulations to all Soviet servicemen.

"This year, we are marking the 45th anniversary of the Odra bridge-head occupation by Soviet and Polish troops. We should remember that this is a peace frontier and that Soviet and Polish servicemen jointly served there to make the life of our peoples and states safer," he said.

Article Ponders Anti-Soviet Acts in East Europe

PM2202112390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[L. Kraynov article under the rubric "Thoughts About Deplorable Facts": "Vandalism Under Attack"]

[Text] Almost every day we get news from the East European countries which provoke in most of us at the very least bitterness, or else profound indignation. It is not a question of the global changes which have shaken the Eastern European socialist countries. There is profound significance, a special kind of logic, and special reasons in the reassessment of the values and in the deep transformations taking place in East Europe. It is clear that socialism, like any other society, cannot develop without internal contradictions, a contest of views,

clashes of political forces, or renewal. But democracy and pluralism of opinions presuppose equal opportunities for everyone to participate in political life, tolerance and respect for other people's views, and political awareness and principle. And, of course, observance of the standards of morality common to all mankind and ethical principles governing relationships.

What do we read in reports from Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Berlin, and Bucharest? Why is the sense of satisfaction gained from the renewal processes and from the emergence of the first shoots of humane socialism mixed with a sense of bitterness and indignation?

Warsaw. The monument to V.I. Lenin in Poronino is removed from its pedestal. There is an attack on the Soviet general consulate in Krakow. The graves of Soviet soldiers are defiled.

Prague. The so-called "students' independent information center" organizes an anti-Soviet orgy in Wenceslas Square.

Bucharest. A hammer and sickle is depicted alongside the swastika on the wall of a building.

Budapest. Work begins to dismantle the star on the Hungarian parliament building.

Berlin. The foul outrages by the neo-Nazis in Treptow Park and in Leipzig.

The list of these facts could be continued.

In the GDR provocative outrages by extremists are assuming new dimensions. The neo-Nazis have particularly stepped up their activity in Leipzig, where an extreme right-wing organization of "republicans" has been set up which is close in its views to the West German party of the same name headed by F. Schoenhuber, a former member of the SS. It is paradoxical that this is taking place in a city with great antifascist traditions, where the speech of Georgi Dimitrov at the [Reichstag fire] trial sounded a stern warning to fascism.

I saw Poles, Germans, and Hungarians laying flowers at the foot of the monument to Lenin in Poronino, in Berlin's Treptow Park, and at the monument to the Soviet soldier-liberators on Gellert Hill in Hungary. These were not official delegations. These were simply young men and women, boys and girls, old men and married couples with carnations in their hands.

Two years ago on Remembrance Day, a holiday which is highly respected in Poland, I saw at the cemetery in Lodz a huge mass of candles burning like a living Eternal Flame. By the Soviet soldiers' grave boys of 12-13 years of age were readjusting the saucers and candles. The boys were lighting the flames which had gone out.

"Who did you come with?"

"We came by ourselves," the boys replied.

Not far from them two girls were laying flowers on the marble slabs. Russian names were carved into the slabs (I wrote them down in my notebook): Lieutenant Pirogov, Captain Stryapukhin, Junior Technician Lieutenant Teterin, and Lieutenant Grishanov.

No, I do not believe that these girls and boys could remain indifferent to the vandals who are defiling the monuments in Poland to the liberators of this country.

What has ha

West Europe

Chernavin Pays Visit to FRG for Military Talks

LD1602180890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 16 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by FRG correspondent V. Kondratyev]

[Text] We have become accustomed to visits abroad by our top military leaders. But the commander-in-chief of one of the branches of our troops—USSR Fleet Admiral Chernavin—has only now arrived in the FRG for the first time. This is an event which is notable and important for the Bundeswehr, the Bundesmarine and, of course, for the local press, especially since it is happening at a time when much is being said at all levels about German unification, and about possible changes in this connection in the existing structures in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The naval forces of the FRG occupy a leading place in the North Atlantic Alliance with 70 percent of the entire NATO potential in the Baltic and 100 percent of the sea-based combat aircraft there.

During his stay in the FRG Chernavin saw what not so long ago was considered to be top secret. Incidentally, we, too, are acting in exactly the same way at home. The Soviet admiral and his West German colleague Hans-Joachim Mann noted at a press conference today in Bonn the confidence which has strengthened between the military of the two countries, a confidence which undoubtedly will be raised to an even higher level in the future. [video shows Chernavin and other officers being photographed next to a helicopter; Chernavin and others at a press conference]

Chernavin Concludes Visit

LD1602145290 Moscow TASS in English 1225 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Bonn February 16 TASS—Soviet Naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, who visited the FRG at the invitation of West German Naval Inspector Vice-Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann, left for home on Thursday.

Chernavin met West German Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and General Inspector of the Federal

German Armed Forces Admiral Dieter Wellershoff. He also exchanged views with Vice-Admiral Mann and other representatives of the West German Armed Forces Command.

The Soviet navy chief had two meetings with officers of the West German naval forces, visited warships and a naval training centre, and was shown around a shipbuilding yard.

"The visit," Mann told a press conference at the FRG Defence Ministry, "reflected the recent positive processes in relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union." He said they were proof of growing confidence between the two countries and expressed satisfaction that contacts between West German and Soviet navies contributed to the strengthening of mutual relations.

Speaking about the positive changes in relations between the two countries, Admiral Chernavin noted that they were promoted by President Gorbachev's visit last June to West Germany and the signing of joint Soviet-West German documents. He praised his visit's frank, businesslike and friendly atmosphere. "Such meetings," he said, "help us to get to know each other better, to assess the situation more objectively, to seek and find ways for its positive development."

Chernavin stressed the possibility and necessity of developing cooperation between the Soviet and West Germany navies in such areas as rescue operations, prevention of sea pollution, etc.

"Joint efforts in these areas," he stressed, "are not merely a practical task, but our humane duty." Mann agreed with this.

Journalists showed substantial interest in the approach of the military leaders of both states to the inclusion of naval forces in the disarmament process. Explaining the Soviet stand, Chernavin said President Gorbachev's proposals, advanced in his U.N. speech, covered all types of armed forces, including navies.

"We are prepared," he said, "to go on in this direction. The Soviet Union has moved to extend the Vienna negotiations to the navies of the nations taking part in them. Unfortunately, the United States disagrees with this proposal."

According to Vice-Admiral Mann, the West German Naval Command is also not prepared to accept this intiative. He alleged the inclusion of naval forces in the Vienna negotiations would interfere with the achievement of concrete results. However, he did not rule out the possibility of this problem coming up in the future. The West German vice-admiral said the question should be decided primarily between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The press conference was told that a Soviet naval squadron would visit Kiel from June 5-8.

Admiral Chernavin invited Mann to visit the Soviet Union, the invitation was accepted with gratitude.

Commentary on FRG Military Maneuvers in Norway

LD1302045890 Moscow International Service in Swedish 1900 GMT 12 Feb 90

[Commentary by Oleg Vokulovskiy—read by announcer]

[Text] The NATO leadership announces that units from West Germany are taking part for the first time in the military exercises, which have just started in northern Norway. Here is a commentary by Oleg Vokulovskiy from the Radio Moscow Nordic Unit:

The question of West Germany taking part in military excercises in Norway has been debated, if I remember correctly, even a long time before the well-known changes now taking place in Europe: before the withdrawal of missiles, the reduction of armed forces, in other words, before the detention [as heard] period now taking place had gathered momentum. Even then, from the very beginning [word indistinct] the very much more tense security policy situation, there were questions in the first place. This was caused by the fact that German troops had not been on Norwegian soil since the World War II, when the Third Reich occupied the country.

These doubts of a moral and historic nature also strengthened the statements of high West German officers, who were in the NATO leadership, and who, when it was suitable, [words indistinct] that the German Armed Forces must carry the responsibility of the northern territories. This can [words indistinct] now or in other times. When we talk about a dialogue between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty organizations, when there in Copenhagen [words indistinct] has been Sovietologists who have more or less unanimously stated that the enemy picture no longer exists, that the possibility of Warsaw Treaty countries' attack against Western countries is not credible. There should not be any reason now for large-scale war preparations. Or, in any case, in the current situation one should not [words indistinct] in such matters on which one has earlier argued. It is just because of this that the decision of West Germany to take part in the Norwegian exercises is so surprising: like war exercises with a possible enemy in arctic conditions in Tromsoe.

It looks like NATO, when it planned these exercises, was lagging behind today's realities. Maybe they have also already planned the next lagging-behind action. To now plan West German participation in NATO excercises in the long run would be that sort of action. It would be to start [words indistict] for this participation, which would not (?correspond) with the times, Oleg Vokulovskiy from Radio Moscow writes, in conclusion.

Falin Addresses Strasbourg News Conference

PM2002150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Press Conference in Strasbourg"]

[Text] Strasbourg (Lower Rhine Departement), 14 Feb—A joint press conference was held here today by Magdalene Hoff, Europarliament deputy for the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] (FRG), who chaired the interparliamentary meeting, and the head of the Soviet delegation, V.M. Falin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

They noted the great importance of the present discussions between the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Europarliament, which both sides assess as an important step in the direction of deepening mutual understanding and cooperation and building confidence.

Dialogue during the interparliamentary meeting confirms that we have chosen the correct path and that we can help each other on this path, V.M. Falin noted.

We noted the need to deepen cooperation between the Europarliament and the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. Hoff said. We hope that a permanent Soviet parliamentary delegation for cooperation with the Europarliament will be created.

M. Hoff and V.M. Falin answered numerous questions from journalists, most of which concerned problems connected with Germany's unification. It was noted that unification should be implemented within the framework of the all-European process and in such a way that it accords with the consolidation of peace and stability in Europe.

It is extraordinarily important that our meeting is taking place in an atmosphere of openness, of readiness to discuss all problems constructively this makes it possible to hope that through joint efforts we shall succeed in finding mutually acceptable solutions which will promote further rapprochement between the USSR and the European communities and thereby the consolidation of peace, M. Hoff said in conclusion.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation and the Europarliament embarked today on the discussion of the question of ways of developing the Helsinki process. The Soviet deputies are also to meet with representatives of the Europarliament party groups.

Falin Interviewed on German Unity, Neutrality

AU1902153790 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 19 Feb 90 pp 168-172

[Interview with Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by Fritjof Meyer, Rudolf Augstein, and Joerg R. Mettke in Strasbourg; date not given]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Valentin Mikhailovich, German unification seems to be on a good course. Are you pleased about this?

[Falin] Whenever I was alone with my feelings and thoughts, I assumed that the terrors of war, which affected many peoples, in particular the Germans themselves, would be overcome sooner or later. The question was only: in which way, within what framework, and under which conditions?

[DER SPIEGEL] In 1942 Stalin, who, as is known, was a great foreign policy man, predicted this when he said the famous phrase: The Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state remains.

[Falin] I can tell you definitely and from precise knowledge what Stalin thought at the end of the war: The optimum solution is a united, democratic, demilitarized Germany as a good neighbor of the Soviet Union. He proceeded from the premise that the political forces in this united Germany would tend from the center to the left. This is, at least, what he said in an intimate circle in March 1945.

[DER SPIEGEL] At that time he seemed to have information that the United States wanted to use Germany after the war—not in the interest of general peace but in the interest of the pax americana. This resulted in the reaction: Put an end to the idea of dividing Germany into various separate states; we will put our proposal up for discussion in Potsdam: a united, democratic, denazified, demilitarized Germany. Today one big difficulty—perhaps the only one—seems to be achieving a military balance in Europe. Nikolay Portugalov, the consultant of your Central Committee International Department, who is well known in Germany, recently implied that a Germany in line with the French model would also be conceivable, that is, a Germany which politically belongs to NATO but enjoys complete military sovereignty.

[Falin] I think that for once German expert Nikolay has taken a wrong turn, if he said so. The circumstances of unification can hardly be defined if the factors which brought about the division have not been sufficiently cleared up previously. What was the common denominator of the entire Western policy after the war? The policy of strength. It was the midwife of all the wrong developments that followed.

[DER SPIEGEL] But the Stalinist system had to be understood as an existential threat in the West. Stalin's view was known: Where our troops go, our system is to be established.

[Falin] This does not describe Stalin's idea of the postwar system correctly. I am not a friend of Stalin and I have reason not to be a friend of his: because of my convictions, because of the tragedies my family suffered at Stalin's hand. But as a scientist who knows very much about the matter, I have to say that Stalin certainly thought of a demilitarized world after the war.

In this respect, he came close to Roosevelt's concept—everyone should disarm. What remained of the armed forces would have been used only in agreement among four or five powers. In no way should the nations in Eastern Europe be forced to adopt the Stalinist system. For Germany he considered a social system based on the Weimar republic as possible.

[DER SPIEGEL] He did very little for this system. However, in this demilitarized world, two states should have naturally had to control and guarantee demilitarization. A model for today?

[Falin] No. The world has changed. Today it is not a question of preserving prerogatives of this or that nation. We are finally equal in Europe and all over the world. Thus, we have to establish the same conditions for all states, in particular concerning security: All are equal, free, sovereign, independent, and cannot threaten each other.

A united Germany is not to be discriminated in the least; I rule this out completely; this is not our goal and not our interest. Otherwise, an explosive state would develop again.

[DER SPIEGEL] The victors of 1945 could not have known of the border-crossing, global problems of today.

[Falin] Ecology, demography, the overdue redistribution of the productive forces, the development of science and technology, and many other things—these things could perhaps be assumed in 1945, but the realities, which are now threatening the vital interest of mankind, simply did not exist at that time.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the past many people were frightened by the term neutralization. Today, on the other hand, there is rather the mood: We do not want war, we also do not want any weapons. The others may well neutralize us, we do not care.

[Falin] The term neutrality has been defined too narrowly. For us neutrality means that any new military danger must not emanate from German territory—from Germany itself or from foreign powers—toward the neighbors, to Europe, or to anybody else. This is all.

[DER SPIEGEL] And no danger to Germany itself, either.

[Falin] Yes. This would be a model for the future of all of Europe. Imagine: In the common European home, all states could live together with goodneighborly relations if they are militarily neutral toward each other, if the factor of force is reduced to such a degree that no state considers the other one a potential enemy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Europe's security problems cannot be solved easily and quickly, no matter how urgent they are, while the security problems which are connected with the German question must be solved very quickly.

[Falin] An example must be given for the convergence of interests—and in Germany's case, a convergence of systems—a model, which can be very instructive for everyone's future.

[DER SPIEGEL] For a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? This solution, which was conceived for the first time by Walter Hallstein 38 years ago, can hardly be imagined anymore today.

[Falin] In the security area it is possible. There we are willing to neutralize ourselves to such an extent that Europe does not feel threatened by the Soviet Union in any way. Of course, there is still the component of our global relations with the United States. But here, too, we are willing to make the same progress. Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons and for qualitative disarmament at sea, on the ground, and in the air is proof of the fact that we are taking a giant step forward. Now it depends on the Americans whether they accept this or not. The leeway for unilateral disarmament, on the other hand, is very limited.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are the Soviet security interests absolutely incompatible with the U.S. idea that all of Germany should go to NATO?

[Falin] Something like this would be absurd.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are they also incompatible with the thesis developed by Mr. Genscher that half of Germany should stay in NATO?

[Falin] If the varieties which Mr. Genscher and Mr. Bush have formulated were acceptable, we could also imagine the development the other way around: All of Germany or one half as part of the Soviet security system. This would also be an attempt to tie Germany down and to prevent it from risking a solo action. We would certainly say: No, this does not work. However, if you expect the other one to approve what you yourself are not willing to accept, this is not a correct attitude.

We need a new way of military thinking. Old terms—forward based systems, etc.—which come from the time of the cold war and have been pursuing us since that time, should long have been put into the archives. In Europe the last war is over forever. Neither a nuclear nor a conventional war is conceivable here—it would be the final disaster.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think that danger would emanate from German soil if part of Germany remained in NATO?

[Falin] We have to remember again and again how the division was brought about: It was intended to establish a new balance of power, and an important, special place was made for West Germany. If today the military institution—no matter what it is called—continues to exist in one part of Germany and disappears in the other, the balance of interests is violated. Then the conclusions are clear.

[DER SPIEGEL] When the Austrian State Treaty was concluded and Chancellor Julius Raab asked: Could we not do the same with Germany, with the part that is left of Germany?, Molotov answered, according to Raab: No, Germany is too big a country to be neutral.

[Falin] Molotov contradicted himself. At the foreign ministers' conference in Berlin in 1945, he himself formulated his government's motion which aimed at establishing a neutral Germany. By the way, Molotov was also against the State Treaty with Austria. He was forced to pursue this policy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Falin, if your concept on German neutrality cannot be enforced either toward the Americans or in the German Bundestag, what else do you have as a pawn, as a means of pressure?

[Falin] I am not calling for some kind of neutrality, but for military neutrality—neutralization if you like. This is not a status but a description of the situation. In this, the German security interests are also to be taken into consideration. The Germans have the right to have a military potential, which facilitates reasonable defense.

[DER SPIEGEL] You mean that you will be able to convince the Americans, the British, the French, and also the majority in the Bundestag of this, and all this very quickly?

[Falin] I think that life will convince the Americans and the majority in the Bundestag. If this is not the case, then it means they are trying to continue the old policy and not to start a new one. The old policy has brought us all so many evil things that it is high time to bid it farewell.

[DER SPIEGEL] Should the four powers guarantee military neutrality?

[Falin] The four powers and the 29 states in Europe. We do not want Germany to be considered as an island concerning questions of security and political, moral, and other questions and to be discriminated against in this way. We want—and I repeat this—a status for Germany which other nations would like to take over within the framework of the European development. I have always—and particularly strongly over the past years—stressed: You, the Germans, can create a precedent of how one can live well without heaps of arms. If as many or as few weapons—in comparable terms—are stationed on German soil as in Spain or in Ireland or in Bulgaria, the situation all over Europe would change completely.

[DER SPIEGEL] We must expect that over the next weeks and months, things will happen in Germany which will seriously touch upon Soviet interests without there being quick solutions.

[Falin] The question is very urgent, but it is also a test to find out who is in favor of what. There are activities for reunification and activities against unification. Those who are for all of Germany going to NATO are not for German unity. those who are for half of Germany remaining in NATO are half-heartedly for German unity. However, such gigantic questions such as Germany's new unification cannot be solved half-heartedly.

[DER SPIEGEL] How specific would the guarantees in a peace treaty with the Germans have to be in order to eliminate the reservations of the Soviet Union and all other neighbors, and which means of verification would have to be contained in such a peace treaty?

[Falin] Permit me to philosophize a bit about how I imagine a common home. Let us say: By the year 2001 we are able to finish a common security system. Then the European states would be interested in verifying each other so that nothing would happen to violates the interests of the neighbor or of any other states.

[DER SPIEGEL] To put it in exaggerated terms: Then we will need four soldiers: A Soviet, an American, a French, and a British soldier.

[Falin] We need symbols like the one that has so far existed in West Berlin. These symbols have fulfilled their task because they were backed up by the determination of the powers.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could you imagine as a faster solution that Berlin's four-power status is extended to all of Germany?

[Falin] Well, this would be one of the modalities, even though this one also needs considerable modernization.

[DER SPIEGEL] Valentin Mikhailovich, did you imagine a few years ago what we are experiencing now?

[Falin] I imagined this 20 years ago. My superiors received from me an urgent recommendation to carry out a qualitative reduction of the armed forces in Europe and a fundamental revision of the political and military doctrines—in the sense that we should begin a new chapter in the postwar development.

[DER SPIEGEL] Here we have a prophet who is not without honor in his own country.

[Falin] There is nothing like a prophet in his own country. At that time the reaction to my proposal was the following: This is very interesting and we have to think about it....

[DER SPIEGEL] But you were not stoned.

[Falin] No, not that. At the meeting between Brezhnev and Brandt on the Crimean Peninsula in 1971, such ideas at least brought about the concept of starting disarmament in central Europe. The Vienna negotiations on force reductions started. Unfortunately, this attempt subsided. And at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, I had the impression that the implementation of this idea would still take a long time.

But then Gorbachev came. And with him came my big, pleasant surprise—changes of profundity and speed

which his policy has initiated over the past year, among others in Eastern and central Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] The delay was due to conservative resistance.

[Falin] In our country, too, there are conservatives who say that it would have been best if everything had stayed the way it was. But it will never stay as it was.

[DER SPIEGEL] Before every session of the Central Committee, the world is hit by fear for the political survival of the general secretary.

[Falin] It is very dangerous not to finish things that have been started. In our country there is a proverb: Not the one who started but the one who finished a matter is the one who acted. This is very wise. History knows many attempts to start something which then did not yield any results or failed somewhere along the path.

Creative action is always far more difficult than destructive action. It is very easy to start a war but much more difficult to end a war, and even more difficult to shape the consequences of the war in such a way that they do not harbor the seed of the next conflict.

[DER SPIEGEL] Just recently, at your Central Committee session, Politburo Member Yegor Ligachev conjured up the danger of a new Munich in the German question.

[Falin] There are people—and there are many of them—who advocate the view: Where the Soviet troops went, they should stay forever. Such people consider postwar Europe as a trophy of the Soviet Union, so to speak, which belongs to us alone, according to the right of the victor. This is the worst possible view.

[DER SPIEGEL] For the sake of justice, one has to note that Stalin treated his Soviet peoples worse than the German trophy.

[Falin] Yes. Stalin's achievement, the last result of his work, was not the building of socialism but the building of anti- socialism. He allegedly acted on behalf of the workers class, but he almost ruined the workers class.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is the affinity to the trophies of the past not increasing just now as supplies are deteriorating and the economic crisis is escalating? May there not be an emergence of the mood: We are miserable, and now even our trophy is given away without anything in return?

[Falin] If the West tried to neglect our interests, the advocates of such a trophy philosophy would say: As long as we advocated our positions in a hard way, they did not dare to use such language in dealing with us, to make such demands on us; this is the beginning of a chain of demands which will finally end in capitulation.

There is such a danger and one must not underestimate it. The only correct answer would be not to play the problem down, not to pretend that we are unable to defend these interests legally—and not only legally.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does the legal defense of the Soviet interests also include the proposal to hold a referendum on the German question in all CSCE states, that is, including Canada and Malta?

[Falin] This was probably more an idea than a practical proposal. I am not sure that such questions can actually be dealt with and, even less, be settled in a referendum. One does not need something like this. Because we recognize the unity of the German nation. In my view, it has always been nonsense to attempt to construct two German nations. I have always firmly stood behind this position and I have had very difficult and lengthy discussions....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...because you know Germany.

[Falin] Because I am an old-fashioned man with principles. And if we recognize this principle—this was expressed in Moscow at the talks with Premier Modrow and Chancellor Kohl—then we have to say consistently in which form the German people are to forge this unity in terms of state and law.

[DER SPIEGEL] Forge—that reminds one very much of Bismarck.

[Falin] Okay, realize. This is the right of the German people. But this is most closely linked with the right of other nations to have their security interests taken into consideration in this new unification. If both components are treated equally, with the same responsibility, I do not see any need to hold a referendum or something else on this question in Europe or outside Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you not fear that malevolent people say: The Soviet Union is so busy with itself—it can hardly ensure calm in Azerbaijan and in other places. Thus, the time is ripe for us in Germany to take what it has deprived us of for such a long time?

[Falin] We know of such considerations. But the following is less known in the West: If Gorbachev had wished to restore calm in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and now also in Tajikistan with the old methods, it would have taken him only one week. And if he wanted to exercise his will in central Europe in the iron way, he, or his successor, would need only a few hours. One has to understand this, otherwise this leads to wrong developments and to new problems. One must not expect the man to prove his greatness in the old form. Otherwise Gorbachev would become a bad repetition of what he himself denies and what we all do not want to see.

[DER SPIEGEL] The world is again and again surprised because it has a hard time becoming accustomed to the idea that the world's most modern statesman is sitting in Moscow.

[Falin] We are seeing this for the second time this century. The most modern man in 1917 was also sitting in Moscow. And the Western world certainly did not greet him with flowers.

[DER SPIEGEL] But you would accept objections in this respect?

[Falin] Yes. A Dutch businessman once told me: It is a paradox that the CPSU introduced the idea of socialism in the world, but distorted it, while in other places in the capitalist world, it gained ground.

[DER SPIEGEL] In part of the capitalist world.

[Falin] Let us say, in the important part of the capitalist world.

[DER SPIEGEL] Let us say, in Europe.

[Falin] This is correct in a certain sense, because here, thanks to the idea of social justice and social partnership, far more productive things were done than in other places. This is what we have underestimated for years, because we were guided by anti-thinking.

[DER SPIEGEL] And now?

[Falin] Now we have the following alternative: The West sympathizes with the democratic revolution in the Soviet Union and is willing to restructure Europe in such a way that the continent becomes a region of peace without violating the strategic and national interests of the USSR and of the other states. Or some politicians in Europe consider the events as a confirmation of the old policy of cold war and want to justify the continuation of this policy under a different name.

This is the decisive question and it is not only a theoretical question. As is known, in the United States there are various groups who think that the Americans won the cold war, are now up on the horse and continue riding. The two nations, which have suffered most under this damned cold war, are the United States and the Soviet Union.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Germans have also suffered.

[Falin] Thanks to this policy, the United States has even lost its superiority in the Western world.

[DER SPIEGEL] There are also realists in America. During the Cuba crisis, Kennedy had to remind Adenauer that the Soviet Union would need only three hours to conquer Berlin.

[Falin] And in 1958 John Foster Dulles tried to convince Chancellor Adenauer to agree to the GDR proposal for a confederation, and that with the following argument, which was typical of his political style: In the confederation the superiority of the FRG would be so great that it would automatically swallow the GDR. Adenauer insisted on his no. As a retribution, Dulles had an article published in THE WASHINGTON POST, which said that free elections are not the only way to overcome the division of Germany.

[DER SPIEGEL] Dulles was indeed a man who was able to ride two horses at the same time. If it was necessary, the lawyer Dulles was able to change sides even in the court room.

[Falin] Politics is distinguished from a circus by the fact that in politics it is not comfortable to ride two horses.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Falin, what will happen if in a few weeks a newly elected People's Chamber agrees to the GDR joining the FRG and NATO does not intend to release this FRG from the Western military alliance?

[Falin] I am not a friend of speculations, but I would like you to take the following into consideration: There is no legal vacuum in Germany. Either the GDR—regardless of which government will be in power there—fulfills its mandate, its treaties, and the obligations the republic accepted concerning the Warsaw Pact and us, or the Soviet Union's latent rights become effective.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think that emergency measures in line with the right of the victor, or even violent actions, can stop the course of events?

[Falin] No. The Germans are intelligent enough to understand that it cannot be in their interest to bring about a confrontation. We do not threaten anyone, but we do not want to be threatened, either. This would be the worst development at a time when the solid, long-term, and most peaceful solution for the German people is in reach—is not only possible but is even already knocking on the door.

[DER SPIEGEL] The man who will probably lead the strongest party in the new People's Chamber, Ibrahim Boehme, has made very sensible statements. But even his West German party colleagues immediately stated that neutralization is out of the question.

[Falin] Well, as you say: Never are there more lies told than after hunting and before the elections. The division of Germany started with the division of security in Europe—not vice versa. If we want to overcome the division of Germany we now have to establish facts which put an end to the division of European security. If we do not find a common denominator for both, if we do not link security and unity, we run the risk of missing this chance again.

In my view, this would be a pity. My friend Rudolf Augstein and I would probably hardly be able to do something to participate in solving the problems, which would then develop.

[Augstein] Valentin Mikhailovich, the two of us have a common friend: Anton Chekhov. Chekhov thought about what things would be like in 200,000 years. I suppose that you are thinking in shorter periods.

[Falin] At the moment it is more important what will happen next week or next month or before the end of this year.

[DER SPIEGEL] Valentin Mikhailovich, thank you for this interview.

Kornilov Comments on German Unification

LD1302160390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1227 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 Feb (TASS)—TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov writes:

Recently, and especially since the visit to Moscow by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a number of articles in the Western mass media, primarily that of West Germany, have been reproducing a thesis that the "green light" has now been lit on the road to unification of the two German states, and that further movement along this path will be virtually automatic. Yes, of course, during the Soviet-West German talks in Moscow, which were without doubt an important political event of our days, it was again reaffirmed that the USSR perceives with understanding the desire of Germans in the GDR and the FRG for rapprochement and cooperation, and that our country is in favor of the creation of a united Germany. Yes, in the course of these talks it was said quite definitely that the question of unity of the German nation should be resolved by the Germans themselves. But can one draw a conclusion on the basis of this that all the problems have already been cleared, and all the questions which have arisen previously have been settled? I think that such a conclusion would be premature...

The question of German unity is the question of the future political outlook of Europe. German rapprochement should not be to the detriment of the positive results which have been achieved on the continent or to East-West relations, nor should it upset the European balance. Questions are being asked in connection with this both in Moscow and in other European capitals—and in fact, what place will eventually be allocated to a united Germany in the military-political structures which exist in Europe today? Some people in Bonn, and not only there, would like to answer this question unambiguously today: a united Germany as a NATO member. But such a "solution" (as many political figures and press organs in both East and West stress) would not create any guarantees that German unity would not in the long term be a source of threat to the security of other states. The negative attitude of the Soviet public, and not only the Soviet public, to such plans is not altered by the "streamlined" formulae being used today in Washington and at NATO headquarters in Brussels to the effect that a united Germany "must be connected to NATO in some form", or be a country where NATO forces are stationed in its western part alone.

Another question is that of the borders of a united Germany. One cannot fail to be put on one's guard by the fact that already certain circles on the banks of the Rhine have set about "playing back" the recording in a decision of the FRG federal constitutional court asserting that the Third Reich continues to exist "within the 1937 borders". The "Reich within the 1938 borders" is also spoken of. Such statements arouse the legitimate anxiety of a number of European states, primarily Poland, Czechoslovakia, and also Austria, the public of which stress quite rightly that however the process of German rapprochement develops, these states should have a full guarantee of inviolability of their borders as formed after the war.

The solution of the German question is inseparable from the success of talks on disarmament in Europe, on the changing role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, and on problems connected with the presence of foreign troops on the territory of European states. But how is one to ensure predictability of the rapid processes that accompany the Germans' movement toward a united fatherland? The concept put forward in this connection by Hans Modrow seems very logical and justified; it envisions stages such as a treaty-based community with elements of confederation, a confederation of the GDR and FRG, and federation of a German union. But after all it is no secret that other political schemes are also being put forward, and other points of view are being made much of.

In short, from whatever angle one approaches the problem of the unification of Germany, it is quite obvious that there are probably still more questions than answers in examining this issue today. The conclusion? It is obvious: Assertions that this problem is all but resolved are premature, they can only sow among the public unnecessary and even harmful illusions. As experience shows, any kind of euphoria is in general difficult to square with serious politics, and what we need at the moment is not hasty, shallow conclusions about a "green light", but energetic continuation of the very responsible, intensive joint search for mutually acceptable solutions. Solutions which while opening up the way to creation of a unified, peaceful, democratic Germany, would at the same time be a contribution to the consolidation of European security.

Moscow Radio Airs German Unity Problems

LD2202091190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Commentary by Konstantin Patysuk]

[Text] No one argues against the inalienable right of the Germans to decide their own future, to choose their own forms of development in the field of comprehensive cooperation and rapprochement, and to tackle the issues of creating a currency union and the problem of migration from the GDR to the FRG. The flood of immigrants into the FRG has already prompted a negative reaction among the citizens right up to extremist circles. In consequence, the walls are covered with signs such as "Swine from the GDR." These and other problems on

the path of Germany's unification are complex. But all of them can be resolved, in my view, on a bilateral basis. However there is another aspect of the unification of Germany, the external aspect.

Recently the two plus four formula has been created. It means that the two German states will not be alone in discussing the German question. After all, other countries, above all the victorious powers, care about the basis upon which the unification will take place, whether a unified Germany will be a threat to its neighbours, whether it will harm their national interests and generally the interests of anyone else, whether the rapprochement will take place in the context of the pan-European process or whether it will contradict it, and whether it might redress the military and strategic equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, whose presence has maintained security in Europe for many years. Together with our country, these doubts and concerns are expressed to various degrees, for example, by Britain and France. Poland expresses special concern about the permanence of the postwar borders on the continent, above all along the Oder-Neisse. The two plus four formula takes into account, among other things, the opinions of Poland and other countries which took part in the war.

But let us take the FRG. There is no consensus in that country as to the future of Germany, and its status. Suffice it to recall the recent speech of Defense Minister Stoltenberg, who advocated the membership of unified Germany in NATO, and what is more, a deployment of Bundeswehr units on the present territory of the GDR. Can this be seen as part of the framework of the present pan-European peace-loving process? I am sure not.

Surely, it is not possible to cherish hopes for the unification of Germany at the expense of encroaching upon the interests of the GDR and other countries. The two plus four mechanism has been worked out. What is ahead is a comprehensive, stage-by-stage discussion—I would say, a discussion carefully considered on the part of all interested countries—of all the external aspects of German unification. After all what is involved is not only the tackling of the German question, although this is also very important, but putting a final full stop to the harsh past, and ruling out the very possibility of a world war being waged from German soil.

FRG, GDR Social Democrats on 'Unification'

PM2102164590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Korolev dispatch: "GDR and FRG Social Democrats' Plan To Unify the Two German States"]

[Text] Berlin—A session of the FRG and GDR Social Democratic Parties [SPD] has been held in West Berlin to discuss questions linked with the unification of the two German states.

The sides noted in a joint statement that currency union—that is, the introduction of the West German mark on GDR territory—cannot be created without simultaneously implementing economic reform in the GDR and without creating social union between the two German states.

The statement says that the Social Democrats' most important aim is to ensure that the introduction of the market economy, the implementation of German unity, and EEC membership are linked to "social security and social justice."

The sides stressed that unification of the two German states should take place "quickly, but without rushing." To that end the GDR initially needs to create a stable and capable government, since without it social protection will not be guaranteed. That is why the 18 March elections to the People's Chamber will resolve the question of whether GDR citizens' legitimate interests will be preserved or whether they will be swamped in an unconditional Anschluss.

Under the plan for unifying the two German states submitted by the joint commission the FRG mark would initially be introduced to the GDR along with a simultaneous economic reform and the creation of social union. This would then be followed by readying state law for unification, by including all the territory of the GDR, FRG, and West Berlin in the EEC, and by preparing through consensus to unify the two German governments' positions before joint talks with the four great powers as part of the preparations for the conference this year of the leaders of the Helsinki CSCE countries.

After the commission session GDR SPD spokesman Hilsberg stated at a press conference that the creation of currency union is one of the most important steps along the road to the unification of the two German states. The workers want "hard currency." Rau, deputy chairman of the FRG SPD, also advocated the speediest implementation of currency union.

Hilsberg opposed the extension of the NATO sphere of influence to GDR territory. He stressed that Social Democrats also see the unification process as a "motor toward disarmament" and that the GDR's inclusion in NATO would lead to the restraining of this process and would thereby hamper unification. All discussions about including all of Germany in NATO or about making it neutral are unrealistic, Hilsberg stated.

FRG's Bahr Speaks to TASS on Reunification

LD1602145590 Moscow TASS in English 1052 GMT 16 Feb 90

[By TASS Special Correspondent Vyacheslav Kevorkov]

[Text] West Berlin February 16 TASS—A reunified Germany should not belong to NATO or the Warsaw

Pact, it should only be an equal partner in the European security system, West German Social Democrat Egon Bahr told TASS.

Intermediary steps towards reunification must not place either side at disadvantage or evoke uncertainty, Bahr said.

He expressed confidence that German reunification could be used in the interests of European unification.

"The reunification idea has turned from a historical issue into a real problem, but this was achieved not by the four wartime Allies and not by West Germany but by Germans in the German Democratic Republic," Bahr said.

"West Germany has shown no haste on the issue. Such haste was displayed by East Germans who showed their strength under the slogan 'We are the people.'

"Of course, both Germanies are concerned by the rapid developments. In West Germany, this refers above all to the social consequences of reunification and related financial losses by West Germans," Bahr said.

He noted that East Germans were afriad of stricter labour discipline and labour productivity requirements and of unemployment and that old people in East Germany were alarmed at what would happen to their savings.

Members of the Social Democratic Party and their families are concerned about their future, too, Bahr said.

"One must also take into account that there has been no tested model of a quick transfer of a socialist planned economy into a social market economy.

"We are not likely to avoid mistakes during this process. However, prospects for the development of the East German economy to a higher and more stable level are very realistic," Bahr said.

"I understand perfectly well the concern of Soviet people caused by hurting memories and shared also by their neighbours.

"I think Germany must not create a new threat to the security of other nations. It must not threaten our immediate neighbours that are weaker and smaller than the Soviet Union.

"This is why a reunified Germany should enter a common European security structure, and this is something opposite to neutrality.

"What kind of neutrality could that be—neutrality towards both blocs? He who wants to build a common European home must overcome both blocs.

"The practical task is to create structures ensuring the security of the common European home from central Europe, that is from a reunified Germany.

"This process must be predictable and controlled. Germans should discuss this problem with the Four Powers, with our immediate neighbours and then at the Gorbachev-proposed Helsinki-2 conference."

IZVESTIYA Queries Bahr on Unification

PM1902144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Egon Bahr, member of the board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, by TASS special correspondent V. Kevorkov: "Egon Bahr: No Threat Should Emanate from German Territory"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] In connection with the tumultuous development of events in Eastern and Central Europe the "German question" has joined the ranks of the most topical and important international problems on the approaches toward whose solution the future geographical and political map of Europe largely depends. How to implement Germany's unification with the least losses to Germans themselves in the GDR and the FRG and also without detriment to the interests of other European peoples—the well known FRG politician Egon Bahr, member of the board of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], touches on the answers to these questions in an interview with TASS special correspondent V. Kevorkov.

[Kevorkov] Mr Bahr, in the early seventies you and Willy Brandt took the first and very important steps in the normalization of relations between Germans living in the FRG and the GDR. Later you made a substantial contribution to the elaboration of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, which served the same aims. I remember that at the time, during negotiations you often had to drive from one part of Berlin to the other through the passage ways made in the border wall. Today you are again driving from one part of the city to the other alongside a crumbling relic which is being taken away to the museums of various countries. What do you feel as a German and as a man who began to "undermine" this edifice 20 years ago?

[Bahr] Primarily I feel joy. The dream has finally become reality. And even today it looks implausible when you look at how people are getting across the wall unimpeded, traveling from one part of the city to the other.

[Kevorkov] And so the question of Germany's unification has been raised openly. Do Germans in the FRG and the GDR feel only relief and joy or are the problems which are arising also causing certain difficulties?

[Bahr] The idea of the Germans' unification has been transformed from a historical question into a real problem. But this has been achieved not by the four victorious powers not by the FRG but by the Germans in the GDR. The FRG has not displayed and is not displaying any hurry on the unification question. But it

is being displayed by the GDR inhabitants, who have demonstrated their strength under the slogan: "We the people!" But there is no doubt that concern has arisen in both parts of Germany in connection with the tumultuous nature of the events which are developing. In particular in the FRG this concerns primarily the social consequences of the unification process and the connected "financial sacrifices" from the West Germans. The GDR is afraid of increased demands on labor activeness and productivity and of unemployment. There are also problems for the older generation in the GDR—what will happen to their savings. Serious thoughts about the future are arising in Socialist Unity Party of Germany members and their families. As we can see, the difficulties are great enough.

In addition it is essential to consider that so far there is no approved model for the rapid transition of a socialist planned economy to the system of a social market economy. Most likely we will not succeed in avoiding errors in implementing this process. But the prospects for the development of the GDR's economy to a higher and stabler level are realistic enough.

[Kevorkov] Only a little time has elapsed since the emergence of the real idea of Germany's unification. A large number of options of all kinds have been put forward. But the keenest debate was generated by the proposal from Hans Modrow, the head of the GDR Government, for the neutralization of a united Germany. The majority of political leaders in West Germany have opposed this condition. You took the same position. Do you personally not fear that this question may lead to a deadlock or at least may considerably complicate a long urgent and desired process—the unification of the two German states? Perhaps you have an option as a result of which this question can be divided into some kind of components: for instance Germany's nonparticipation in blocs or their military alliances?

[Bahr] I fully understand Soviet citizens' concern in connection with the hard memories, which their neighbors also share. I believe that Germany should not again create a threat to the security of other peoples: No threat should emanate from German territory, and that includes the threat to our direct neighbors who are weaker and far smaller than the Soviet Union. That is why a united Germany must merge into the structure of all-European security. And as it happens this is something opposite to neutrality. Being neutral with regard to what—to both blocs? He who wants to build the all-European home must overcome both blocs. The practical task is to ensure that structures ensuring the safety of the all-European home are created from the center of Europe, that is from a united Germany. This process should be visible and controlable. Germans should discuss this problem with the four powers, with our direct neighbors, and then at the CSCE conference proposed by M.S. Gorbachev.

A united Germany cannot be a member of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It can only be an equal partner in a European system of security. We should examine intermediate steps toward this aim. They must at no stage place any of the participants at a disadvantage or make them uncertain. Nonetheless I am sure that the process of Germany's unification can be used in the interests of Europe's unification.

IZVESTIYA Reports on Kohl-Modrow Talks

PM1502142790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Special correspondents Ye. Bovkun, Ye. Grishin, and V. Lapskiy dispatch: "Germans Seeking a Common Language"]

[Text] Bonn—Hans Modrow's talks with Helmut Kohl began in a businesslike atmosphere. As a rule, the importance of a given event can be judged by the influx of journalists—this barometer hardly ever malfunctions. But even old hands cannot recall a press conference like the one held yesterday at the Bundestag press center. Burly policemen blocked access to the hall for a large group of correspondents, and even the passageways were packed. Kohl, Modrow, and several ministers had to climb up a fire escape to reach the hall, entered through a window, and pushed their way to the top table through a crowd of photographers and television reporters. The chairman spent a long time persuading photographers to move further away from the table and give the rest of the audience a chance to see the members of the delegations.

The floor was taken by H. Kohl, who called on Germans to display "sense and understanding" when taking advantage of the historical opportunity to achieve their fatherland's unity through free self-determination. He spoke emphatic words of gratitude to and respect for the Soviet leadership for the understanding it has expressed for the Germans' desire for unification, and gave assurances that the Germans will under no circumstances abuse this, in other words they will not pursue any unilateral national advantages—Germany's unification must be built into the all-European architecture, the process of overall development of East-West relations.

"We respect the legitimate interests of our neighbors and friends in Europe and the world. The solution of the German question will mean that all Europe will gain stability and security," the chancellor said.

He warned against illusions about an easy path to unification. Speaking of the problems which the FRG and the GDR will have to solve before the process of bilateral alignment is complete, the ruling coalition's leader mentioned the growing number of migrants (in excess of 340,000 last year) and the GDR's foreign currency and financial difficulties. Kohl promised Modrow urgent economic aid in spheres where it may be called for by humanitarian considerations. A sum of 300 million marks will be allocated for medical instruments and equipment alone. Plans also include support for small and medium enterprises, the training of managers,

transmission of technology, and measures aimed at environmental protection and the organization of transport operations. Bonn will embark on the implementation of a broader aid program following talks with the new GDR government.

H. Kohl devoted a sizeable proportion of his statement to the topic of forming an economic and currency union with the GDR. A special commission will tackle the elaboration of its structures. The chancellor emphasized again an idea he had expressed earlier: Economic reform in the GDR involving a transition to market economy principles needs social and ecological backup. Only this can provide a sufficient influx of outside private capital in the GDR.

In the context of charges against the FRG about its intention to "swallow" the GDR economy, H. Kohl made it unambiguously clear that the formation of a currency union involves considerable risk also for his country's economy. Bonn is sacrificing its mark—one of the world's most solid and stable currencies—on the altar of unity.

Experts confirm the presence of risk. Tyll Necker, president of the Federation of German Industry, does not rule out the possibility that the creation of a currency union could result in price rises and even a certain amount of inflation in the FRG. In any event, initial news agency reports on reaction to the press conference reflected the world currency market's worries.

At the same time, industrial circles are convinced: If the FRG succeeds in pumping into the GDR even a small proportion of its trading profit, running at about 130 billion marks, and a small proportion of the capital which is exported annually, this alone would stimulate a powerful economic upsurge there.

H. Kohl ended his statement with a call for the human and national duty—to display solidarity—to be discharged. The point is that a united Germany should be an equal member of a united Europe and should serve the preservation of peace all over the world, the head of the Bonn cabinet summed up.

H. Modrow followed him to share his own impressions from the course of the talks, reminding the audience that the GDR people are approaching unification not only with a sense of bitterness caused by the defeat of real socialism, but also with the proud words: We are a people! He expressed the profound belief that these words and their political meaning will never be lost and that the GDR will hand over to a future united Germany the spiritual and cultural values it has accumulated over the decades, as well as the material wealth created by the hands of workers and engineers, peasants and artisans. The GDR has a national wealth estimated at 1.4 trillion marks, including state property worth 980 billion marks.

H. Modrow announced that he and the FRG chancellor had a detailed and, he hoped, constructive conversation on steps toward a single German state. But the question of how consistent and well considered these steps will be remains open. It became clear that both governments, of the GDR and the FRG alike, deem it necessary, first, to keep unification in step with the all-European process; second, to do everything possible to ensure that the process of alignment in the direction of economic and currency union could begin immediately following the 18 March elections for the People's Chamber; and finally, certain social guarantees must be provided right away to alleviate the position of pensioners and certain other categories of the population. The peasant also needs guarantees because he should not worry about his land. Modrow emphasized that he perceived his duty as being to safeguard GDR citizens against losses.

The prime minister recalled his recent visit to the Soviet Union where, during a conversation with M.S. Gorbachev, they arrived at mutual understanding that unification is the Germans' right in harmony with the demands of the present. The GDR proceeds from the premise that it is and will remain a partner of the Soviet Union, which has spoken in favor of deepening relations with the currently existing two German states and intends to maintain relations with a united Germany in the future. In Modrow's opinion, the international environment must always be taken into account in the process of this development. It is to be welcomed that the federal chancellor outlined his ideas about the process of the German states' unification in Moscow and took note of the well-known Soviet positions.

H. Modrow prompted H. Kohl to confirm that the Oder-Neisse border was recognized during his conversations in Moscow and in the statements made there, and that a united Germany will not make any claims against neighboring states or demand any border changes.

The chancellor responded with this rejoinder: "I want to avoid misunderstanding. While in Moscow I said what I usually say. The question of the Oder-Neisse border will be decided by an all-German parliament and an all-German government."

The FRG and GDR leaders had to answer numerous questions by correspondents. A good half of them concerned the future status of a united Germany and its role and position in Europe. These sentiments graphically demonstrate the tremendous responsibility being borne by the two states' leaders. Their actions affect the interests not only of the German people but also of all their neighbors in the continent.

The exchange of opinions in Bonn is continuing. But this can be said right away: A new chapter is beginning in German history. The FRG and the GDR can and must make a weighty contribution to peaceful cooperation. There are favorable prerequisites for the accomplishment of this responsible task. German soil, from which war has sprung twice this century, can become a laboratory for the shaping of new-type interstate relations. The sides will be the first to tackle the resolution of completely new tasks—the creation of confederate structures

between the two systems. It is clear that the experience they accumulate will be important for subsequent and even greater steps along the path to a Europe of peace and cooperation. It is also clear that the new approach can have a chance of success only in conditions of stability. This is precisely why now it is more important than ever before to display statesmanlike wisdom and the ability to maintain a balance between caution and daring.

Latin America & Caribbean

Castro Addresses Cuban National Assembly

LD2102135190 Moscow TASS in English 1235 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Havana February 21 TASS—By TASS correspondent Sergey Sereda:

An extraordinary session of the Cuban National Assembly of people's power elected Juan Escalona Reguera, 58, chairman of parliament. He was an active participant in the struggle against the Batista dictatorship, held executive posts in the Revolutionary Armed Forces and has served as minister of justice for the past few years.

Speaking at the closing meeting, Fidel Castro stressed that Cuba would never change the Communist Party's role as the only guiding force in society. After the victory of the revolution there were several parties and revolutionary organisations in the country. They merged into a single one, because it is necessary to ensure unity when confronting imperialism.

We regard the party as the only instrument needed by the revolution to build socialism in extremely difficult conditions, 90 miles away from the most powerful empire in the world. We must not permit even the slightest decline in the party's prestige. On the contrary, during the correction of past mistakes and the elimination of negative trends it is necessary to enhance its prestige, the Cuban leader said.

Fidel Castro stressed the urgent need to improve work methods and structures of the party, the state, the government and public organisations in accordance with resolutions by the recent extraordinary plenum of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee.

Cuba Fears Growing 'U.S. Military Threat'

LD1902125490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Correspondent Viktor Gorbachev report from Havana]

[Excerpts] In Cuba it is customary to formulate major tasks in brief slogans. One major slogan is: Socialism or death. Cubans now consider that the U.S. military threat to their country has grown. Cubans count on smashing U.S. interventionists without outside help. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of the Cuban leadership, the U.S. military threat to their country has significantly increased. This is connected mainly with changes in Eastern Europe. The main arguments are that the socialist camp no longer exists. Peace is being threatened by the hegemony of U.S. imperialism. The United States, assessing that communism has suffered an historic defeat, is in a state of euphoria. While negotiating on disarmament with the Soviet Union, the United States is at the same time becoming more aggressive toward Third World countries. The intervention against Panama was perceived in Cuba unequivocally as confirmation of this. The argument that in 1983, when monolithic unity existed in the socialist camp, the United States made short work of the Grenada revolution, is not discussed here. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that over 30 years the Cuban revolution remains the object of hostile acts on the part of the United States. Cubans have no security guarantee, and they are forced to prepare for the worst.

Defense Plan Against U.S. Reported

LD1902201190 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Report by Havana correspondent Viktor Gorbachev]

[Text] A major slogan in Cuba today is socialism or death. The Cubans believe that at the moment the United States war threat to their country has heightened. Our Havana correspondent, Viktor Gorbachev, describes how the Cuban people are getting prepared to rebuff the possible aggression.

The Cubans hope to crush U.S. invaders without outside aid. Since the regular army will not be in a position to defeat U.S. Armed Forces for the obvious reasons, Cuba is making preparations for its defense on the basis of a national war doctrine. The people's militia has become, along with the regular army units, a major military force. Defence days are held once a month and on those days militiamen, wearing blue shirts, can be seen in all parts of the country. Their regiments are equipped not only with firearms but also with anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, artillery pieces, and even tanks.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ruben Cabrera), militia chief of staff in the city of Cienfuegos, believes that despite outdated military equipment his tank battalions are superior to the regular army battalions in some respect.

None of the troops on the active list did their internationalist duty outside of their country, said (Ruben Cabrera). They haven't been engaged in fighting, they haven't seen the enemy. Meanwhile in the militia all [word indistinct] have served in the army. Almost all of them did their internationalist duty fighting in Angola or in the Ethiopian deserts.

In Cienfuegos, 94 percent of both men and women older than 16 and fit for military service are on the militia list. Adults who do not belong to these lists for one reason or

another are members of defense production teams. They'll fight or work at their facilities depending on the circumstances.

PRAVDA on Problems of Food Supplies to Cuba

PM2102115190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by own correspondent A. Moiseyev: "Without Blaming the Partner"]

[Text] Havana—A commentary entitled "Necessary Measure" was published in PRAVDA on 24 January. It was about the increased prices for certain foodstuffs in Cuba and also about delays in Soviet grain supplies. The item referred to an official Cuban Government document published in the Havana press on 23 January.

On the next day the local papers published further information on the matter. It showed that although Soviet grain deliveries had been delayed by several weeks, two ships with more than 42,000 tonnes of grain purchased by the Soviet Union from the West for its Cuban friends had already been in Cuban ports for some days.

The PRAVDA correspondent in Havana asked P. Kormilitsyn, USSR trade representative in Cuba, to clarify the grain delivery situation:

[Moiseyev] Petr Ivanovich, how is our country coping at the moment with its commitments regarding supplies of foodstuffs, in particular wheat, to Cuba?

[Kormilitsyn] We have always kept a special eye on foodstuffs supplied by the USSR, which, incidentally, constitute approximately 10 percent of our exports to Cuba. I have on the table in front of me a chart which clearly shows that Soviet commitments are being fulfilled. See: In 1989 they were all effectively fulfilled. In every detail. There was a small delay with the transportation of fats because of a shortage of refrigerators and with advance supplies of grain. I must explain right away that advance supplies are a manifestation of our goodwill, an act of international solidarity with Cuba. There is no mention of them in any treaty.

Part of the wheat the Soviet Union bought for Cuba has now been unloaded and the rest is on the way from ports in Canada, France, and Belgium. So despite the difficult economic situation in our country and in Cuba, all partners must be more benevolent toward one another and remain realistic, without looking for someone else to blame.

[Moiseyev] I thanked P. Kormilitsin for his reply but I could not agree that one should not "look for culprits." Sometimes this is essential, in fact. And as quickly as possible. The country is losing foreign currency in the meantime. Surely, one would be angry to hear, for example, that three of our ships, with 30,000 tonnes of rice on board, have lain for a whole month in the roads off the port of Havana. We have sustained massive losses in the form of penalties. The thing is that Soviet specialists bought this batch for Cuba in Pakistan. However, harmful insects—weevils—were found in the rice. The Cuban side refused point-blank to take the rice (strictly in accordance with international rules). But our seamen cannot return the contaminated product to the Pakistanis. They cannot, because there is no relevant article in the contract.

It was decided to poison the weevils. When this had been done the international commission deemed the product fit for use. But the Cuban side still refused to accept the ill-fated rice. Again the Cubans were within their rights. But who, one wonders, will take responsibility for the losses?

Cuban Ambassador Interviewed on Departure

LD1602153990 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] The level of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union has always been high. This has been said by the Cuban ambassador in Moscow, Julio Camacho Aguilera in an exclusive interview with Radio Moscow at the end of his tenure and departure for home.

The Cuban diplomat told the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, recently bilateral cooperation had good prospects.

Julio Camacho Aguilera wished the Soviet people success in all their undertakings.

Ambassador Receives Award

LD1702172890 Moscow TASS international Service in Russian 0917 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 Feb (TASS)—Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of the Union and a candidature member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, has presented Julio Camacho Aguilera, the Cuban ambassador to the USSR and a member of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee Politburo, with the order of Friendship of the People for active work in developing and strengthening friendship and coopearation between the Soviet Union.

Supreme Soviet Session

Secession Procedure on Supreme Soviet Agenda

LD2102122290 Moscow World Service in Russian 1041 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From the "Interfax" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has submitted for consideration at the third session of the Supreme Soviet a draft USSR law on the procedure for resolving issues relating to the secession of a union republic from the USSR. This has been drawn up in accordance with Article 72 of the USSR Constitution, and taking account of the will of the peoples both of the seceding republics and of other union republics of the USSR as a whole. The draft law states that the means of demonstrating the will of the peoples of a union republic on the issue of secession from the USSR is a referendum conducted by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the union republic, or on the demand of one third of the citizens of the USSR resident in the republic in question who are over the age of 18. The referendum is to be held no earlier than six months after the decision has been made to raise the issue of a union republic seceding from the USSR. The referendum is valid if no fewer than three-quarters of the citizens resident on the territory of the republic and over the age of 18 take part in it.

Supreme Soviet Bodies Discuss Bills on Agenda

LD2102154890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 090 GMT on 21 February carries a six-minute report by parliamentary correspondent Vladimir Markin from the radio unit at the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions.

Today is virtually the first full day of work for the committees and commissions at the third session of the Supreme Soviet, he says. "For the rest of this week, including Saturday [24 February], the commissions and committees will discuss and revise the drafts on the agenda of this session. Today, for instance, right now, the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations is discussing a draft law on the procedure for resolving issues connected with the secession of union republics from the USSR. The Planning and Budget and Finance Commission is discussing a draft law on taxation. In addition to purely legislative activities, the commissions and committees are also dealing with issues relating to monitoring the work of the government."

Markin interviews Anatoliy Vasilyevich Reshetnikov, senior secretary of the Commission on Issues of Development of Industry, who explains that only 80 percent of the demand for passenger transportation is being met in the USSR today. On 26 February Reshetnikov's committee will examine, within the Soviet of the Union, the legal conditions of the state of emergency and the obligations of the internal troops.

Railways Minister Comments on Wagon Shortage

LD2102234190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1715 GMT in its program entitled "In The Commissions and Committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet" carries a poorly-received correspondent's 8-minute report on a joint meeting on 21 February of the Transport, Communications and Information Technology Commission and the Development of Industry, Energy, Machinery and Technology Commission. The report includes recordings of speeches by Railways Minister Konarev, Yevgeniy Primakov, and Transport Commission Chairman Tetenov.

The correspondent begins: "At their joint session today, the commissions for Transport, Communications and Information Technology and for the Development of Industry, Energy, Machinery and Technology discussed problems to do with the technical conditions of passenger wagons and with increasing production of them. A report from the deputies' group that prepared material for the session points out that Ministry of Railway's enterprises have a shortage of 14,000 passenger wagons today. In the last 25 years, passenger traffic has roughly doubled, but the wagon fleet has increased by just a third. That is, almost a quarter of the wagons that are being operated have completely outlived their useful working life. In periods of large-scale passenger traffic, particularly in the summer, the trains are overcrowded and are frequently late. Standards of comfort are not even worth talking about. All this leads to justified complaints from passengers. The situation that is developing with the supply of electric and diesel locomotives for the 13th 5-Year Plan is particularly alarming. Soviet industry can only supply railwaymen with them to the tune of a little over 50 percent by 1995. In view of all this, the commission regards the situation today and for the longer term as far as providing rolling stock for passenger transportation is concerned as an emergency situation."

USSR Railways Minister Nikolay Semenovich Konarev in his speech talks about a "colossal error on a state-wide scale." Soviet industry does not produce electric locomotives for passenger trains, only freight locomotives. "The Czechoslovaks are now, in the full sense of the phrase, twisting our arm and the arm of Gosplan. On the one hand, they constantly fail to meet the deliveries that we need, from the point of view of our requirements, and on the other hand they hike up the price. Today electric locomotives (?—with minor modifications—) cost in effect two and half and almost three times as much as 15 years ago, say. Our country is being ruined by this stand, you see. Our own electric locomotive construction industry has not developed our own Soviet electric locomotives, and no one is even considering developing

them. This matter must be addressed. The second question is passenger wagons. More than 40 percent of deliveries, approximately, were effectively to have been met by the GDR (German Democratic Republic). [sentence indistinct] At one time Hungary used to send us some of the wagons and Poland used to send us some of the wagons. Now Hungary doesn't send any, the Poles haven't been sending any for a long time and the Germans have been cutting down deliveries from year to year. So our country has ended up in this predicament as far as passenger wagons and electric locomotives are concerned. Our own industry is not being developed and it is not increasing deliveries. As for the plans for deliveries from abroad, we see the same thing—a reduction is under way, and the cost of wagons goes up and up. (?I'm not saying this just for the sake of it.) I realize how strongly I'm wording this, but in fact I think I'm putting it mildly. No one is tackling this problem the way it should be tackled, and that is why we have today found ourselves in this situation and that is why Soviet people today are dissatisfied with the way passenger services are provided. But a fine overall policy has been worked out: The Ministry of Railways alone is responsible! We have long disagreed with this. It was convenient for many people that the Ministry of Railways should be blamed. But we never hear it asked what the Ministry of Heavy, Power and Transport Machine-Building, Gosplan and the Council of Ministers and everyone else involved, have been doing, because passenger wagons, I stress, are for Soviet people, not for the railway workers. So today I'd like a decision to be made, very responsibly, bearing in mind that the 13th 5-Year Plan is currently being elaborated. This matter is not being tackled in the 13th 5-Year Plan, it is not being tackled. The way it is being tackled does not meet the requirements of the people."

Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, in a very poor quality recording, says that the problems on the railways center on the quality of track, rail traffic control and repair and manufacture of wagons.

Valentin Afanasyevich Tetenov, chairman of the Commission for Transport, Communications and Information Technology, says that a new law on railway transport is to be submitted to the relevant bodies and commissions and that the railways must be involved in the economic reform being introduced in the economy.

Yerevan Reports Closed Session of Supreme Soviet

NC2102130090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From the KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN review]

[Text] The [word indistinct] developments and the prevailing complex situation forced the USSR Supreme Soviet's Third Session to reconsider the Transcaucasian developments by holding a day-long session behind closed doors. The reporters and television crews accredited to the session were kept out and had to be content with news they got while staying in Moscow Hotel.

The Armenian deputies who appeared at the hotel for lunch were in high spirits. They were pleased with the course of debate on the issue. However, some distressing hours awaited them.

A few hours into the debate, the Azerbaijani deputies suddenly appeared at the hotel, and the reporters surrounded them. What transpired was that the Azerbaijani deputies were unwilling to hear Yazov, the USSR defense minister's, justified condemnation, and left the session. After an hour, our republic's deputies also arrived at the hotel. This time they seemed confused and disullusioned. What happened is that during his closing speech, Gorbachev stressed the inviolability of Azerbaijan's borders, and the meeting's participants considered it appropriate to submit the relevant draft decision on the issue under consideration at one of the forthcoming meetings of the session. That is, the problem remained open and [words indistinct].

Following the closed session, the paper's correspondent Kasparyan interviewed USSR People's Deputy Grigor Khandzhyan on the results of the meeting. The [words indistinct] published on the front page refers to this matter.

Armenian Deputy Sarkisyan Inteviewed

NC2102181290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Interview with Armenian Deputy Sos Sarkisyan by Karo Atayan, Yerevan radio correspondent, in Moscow on 19 February—recorded]

[Text] [Atayan] On Monday neither Soviet nor foreign reporters were allowed into the USSR Supreme Soviet session or the conference building's lobby. I cannot recall doors being closed like this to reporters in the last two years—reporters could at least be in the Supreme Soviet building lobby and converse with deputies during recesses in closed sessions. The Supreme Soviet session devoted to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], the tense relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia resulting from that problem, and the Azerbaijani protests over the declaration of a state of emergency was held yesterday in strictest secrecy. I stayed at Moscow Hotel all day waiting for the session to end. Afterwards, I asked some of our deputies about the session, and Sos Sarkisyan expressed the greatest willingness to provide details.

[Sarkisyan] It is difficult to describe the entire session in one sweeping statement. One needs time to recall the speeches. However, I can say that the Armenian deputies who spoke today delivered very brilliant, correct, and self-assured speeches, and this time around all had speeches ready. I am familiar with some of these well-written speeches. In general, one must state that today was a day of defeat for the Azerbaijani deputies group. It was a major defeat.

[Atayan] Apparently, it was the first defeat.

[Sarkisyan] Yes, it was the first defeat. Although they are defeated, we have not attained victory. But it is commendable that they were speaking the truth, which they had not done so far. In particular, the Russian deputies and ministers, such as Yazov, Bakatin, and Ryzhkov made very profound analyses and stated boldly and unsparingly what had happened in Baku. And despite the efforts of the Azerbaijani deputies over the last few days to confine the debate to what happened from 15 to 20 January, the debate covered the period starting 13 January. Very truthful and clear talk covered everything that was done on 13 January, including the slogans uttered and the scaffoldings taken to the rallies as symbols of terror. That is, everything was in essence stated correctly [words indistinct]. As you know, a few days ago old Armenians killed and buried in Kirovabad [word indistinct]. All these facts (?were recounted here).

Also, some proposals were made at the session by the non-Armenian deputies like (?Prishkeviche)—now I do not remember some of them. They were demanding—proposing, rather—that the NKAO problem should be solved, at least temporarily, by making it subject to central authority or placing it under a [word indistinct] presidential rule.

I have conflicting feelings. While one feels satisfied at hearing [word indistinct] the statement of truth, it was also clear that the leadership is extremely afraid of the Islamic (?world). The [word indistinct] was even confused today and said that a draft must first be prepared and that it needed work and time. I cannot picture what sort of draft could be formulated and what decision could be made about the NKAO problem. Anyway, [words indistinct] I entertain no hopes.

[Atayan] Why? What is the fundamental reason?

[Sarkisyan] As I often repeat, the fundamental reason is the Islamic factor. As you know, (?regrettably) the Azerbaijani delegation left the session today. They walked out declaring—actually one of them shouted—that the Moslems will defeat the Christians, and another shouted (?jihad), that is, holy war. Such calls and statements (?were made) in the halls of the Supreme Soviet [passage indistinct].

[Atayan] Is that the only factor? [passage indistinct] Naturally, that is a very important and powerful factor. Is it not another factor that our country's leaders fear to take concrete measures in the face of many such unsolved problems?

[Sarkisyan] We know that there are such convoluted problems in the country. What is more, new complex problems pile up, and it appears that the leadership is not in a position to solve all of them. However, solving them must start somewhere. I think that we should not stop the struggle for NKAO for even a moment, despite the statement made today to the effect that Azerbaijani emissaries have also appeared in Kazakhistan and are instigating anti-Armenian sentiments there as well. Today we met the Tajik [word indistinct]. They are very touched, sad, and guilt-ridden. They are trying to absolve themselves by saying that it was not their doing and [words indistinct] that Azerbaijani People's Front's emissaries have left Tajikistan [words indistinct].

[Atayan] What do you think of the deputies' work?

[Sarkisyan] I appreciate it very much. However, what is strange is that though the Azerbaijanis were defeated because they were guilty, this is not in itself a victory for us. However, it is always pleasant when the truth is stated [words indistinct]. The Russian deputies and ministers were long silent and finally were forced to speak truthful words. This is some sort of moral victory for us.

Further on Closed Session

NC2102135090 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The papers report that the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 19 February was entirely devoted to the debate over the prevailing Transcaucasian situation. Mikhail Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, chaired the closed session, and 25 deputies addressed the session. Most of the speakers condemned the Azerbajani extremists' barbaric acts against the Armenians, Russians and other Russian-speaking peoples, and their acts at the Soviet-Iranian border.

Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the start of the the session on the prevailing situation in the region. Union, government, and state officials as well as people's deputies from the various union republics exchanged views. Viktor Ambartsumyan, Zori Balayan, Vagan Gabriyelyan, and Mikhail Minasbekyan spoke on behalf of the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast delegates.

Despite the heated debate, adopting a decision was postponed until the 21 February session, which will formulate a relevant text on the basis of the proposals presented.

Mikhail Gorbachev summarized the meeting. Part of his speech concluded that the two neighboring republics themselves must find ways to resolve the situation and that their decision must be compatible with the existing constitution.

Political & Social

Party Expels Investigators Gdlyan, Ivanov

LD2202122190 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Two senior investigators of the USSR's Prosecutor's Office, Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, have

been expelled from the Communist Party by a decision of the party organization of the Prosecutor's Office. As a secretary of the organization, (Aleksandr Razanov), told our correspondent, Gdlyan and Ivanov, who investigated serious cases of corruption, were expelled from the party for violating the law and the party rules. They did not attend the meeting which discussed their case despite an advance invitation. Both have been elected people's deputies. The expulsion decision will become effective only after it is endorsed by higher party bodies.

It is also reported that during the meeting of the party local which decided to expel Gdlyan and Ivanov from the party their supporters picketed the building of the Prosecutor's Office against expulsion.

Moscow Permits Rallies on 25 Feb

LD2102185290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1808 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—The Moscow city Soviet of People's Deputies (the city authority) has sanctioned the holding of mass rallies in the capital on Sunday, 25 February. This decision was adopted at an extraordinary session of the soviet today after two public organizations—the Moscow Voters' Association and the United Council of Russia—had applied to the city authorities for permission to hold the rallies. The organizers declare that their aim is to demonstrate support for the reforms being implemented in the USSR.

Smolenskaya Square, where the USSR Foreign Ministry is located, the Luzhniki park and an area outside Moscow University have been proposed as the venues for the rallies.

The application to hold the rally organized by the Moscow Voters' Association was signed by, among others, USSR People's Deputies Yuriy Afanasyev, Boris Yeltsin and Gavriil Popov, the cochairmen of the Interregional Group of Deputies, which is usually called an "opposition" by Western journalists.

As Vladimir Kamchatov, a spokesman for the association, has stated, the rally might attract up to 300,000 people. In this connection, spokesmen for the city authorities stressed the importance of maintaining public order and ensuring the safety of the participants in the rally, since they do not rule out the possibility of the demonstrators being joined by forces which have an interest in destabilizing the situation in the city. [passage omitted]

Organizers Say Peaceful Demonstrations Planned

AU2202093090 Paris AFP in English 0105 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, Feb 22 (AFP)—Pro-reform demonstrations planned Sunday in Moscow and other Soviet cities will be peaceful ones, although there may be isolated incidents, liberal politicians said Wednesday. Arkadiy Murachov, a parliamentary deputy, told Agence France-Presse that the capital's authorities, Mossoviet, were still having talks with fellow Deputy Sergey Stankievitch [spelling as received] over whether a rally would be authorised here Sunday.

Demonstrations are also planned elsewhere to press calls for rapid reforms and the opening of "round-table" talks between the Communist Party and the burgeoning unofficial groups here. [passage omitted]

The Supreme Soviet voted a resolution Tuesday stating that Sunday's gatherings, aimed at marking the start of the Russian revolution, must be authorised or they will be dispersed by the security forces. Mr. Murachov said that "if these demonstrations are authorised, nothing will happen", though he added that, "unfortunately", there was the possibility of counter-demonstrations which could trigger incidents. Permission to hold demonstrations would eventually depend on local authorities, who often react very coolly to the idea of public gatherings, observers said.

Vasiliy Shakhnovski, a member of "Communists for Perestroika (restructuring)" which groups radical Communist Party reformers, said that Sunday's protest here would simply be the "logical follow- on" of a pro-reform demonstration here on February 4 which drew 100,000 people. Mr. Shakhnovski said that the rally would be a peaceful one, as had been the case with the early demonstration. But he added that certain Russan nationalist groups, such as Pamyat, also planned to hold demonstrations. "They do not have the support of the population", he said, saying that a pro-Russian rally which Pamyat organised last week outside the television headquarters here drew only 2,000 people. But that is enough people to cause trouble, he added. The talks here on Sunday's demo are focussing on where the rally ends up, Mr. Shakhnovksi said. Mossoviet wants it held in the usual place, Lujniki, while the liberal MPs want marchers to converge on the Kremlin. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Writes to Adopted Children in Stavropol

LD2102161690 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Stavropol February 21 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev has sent a letter to Stavropol resident Tatyana Korganova and her large family. Korganova is the first woman in Stavropol to adopt 17 children and they wrote to Mikhail Gorbachev about their gratitude to their new mother.

"The noble act of your mother and her care of you moved me to the depths of my heart," Gorbachev said in his reply to the children. He urged them to constantly enlarge their knowledge from their young days, develop an interest in work and cultural values, study the history of their homeland, perform useful deeds, fight for the ideas of humanism and truth as well as to be kind, merciful and considerate to people.

With the letter Gorbachev sent a parcel with books and other presents for the children.

The family of Tatyana Korganova lives totally at state expense in a multi-roomed cottage. The furniture, toys, clothes, shoes, tableware and kitchen equipment have also been paid for by the state.

Korganova has two children. Her younger son goes to school. The elder one has served in the Army and now helps his mother bring up the children together with his wife.

The idea of setting up families like the one of Tatyana Korganova has been launched by the Vladimir Lenin Children's Fund. Such families and family children's homes have been established in many Soviet cities and villages.

TV Commentator Favors U.S. Presidential System

LD1702155790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2135 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Fesunenko commentary from the late night newscast]

[Excerpts] After that news summary, let us discuss a problem that has been causing us concern over the past few days. The debate at the USSR Supreme Soviet session that opened in Wednesday, and the discussion that is unfolding in the country on the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress have brought to the fore a problem that has been maturing for quite a long time. The need for the urgent resolution of this problem, to use bad journalese—I do not like the phrase resolving problems, but you have to use it sometimes—the need for the resolution of this problem has become particularly obvious lately, with the exacerbation of the situtation in our country, with the unrest occuring in a number of regions in our country, and with the complication of the economic situation. I am referring to the need for a cardinal strengthening of central power by means of introducing and establishing the institution of presidential power. [passage omitted]

Indeed, perhaps the majority of public opinion is disposed to the idea that it is time to bring order to the country. Strong, energetic, resolute—well, even stronger and more resolute central power is called for. I will say immediately that I am for this. [passage omitted: Fesunenko adds that this is not because of a love for ceremony, illustrating his reasons by showing footage of the Kennedy assassination and underlining that under the U.S. system Vice-President Johnson automatically became president]

Perish the thought, as they say. I do not want to be a gloomy prophet; I do not want to scare anyone, but, well, I have been thinking: What if, at some time, at some time in the foreseeable future, something similar happened to any one of the leaders of our state—I mean the top people, the head of state, the president—to any one of them, some kind of misfortune, so he could not carry out his obligations. In the final analysis, we are all mortal; a serious illness, an accident, all sorts of things can happen.

In this situation, in the system established in our country at present, what should happen? Either the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee should gather for a sitting, discuss for an unspecified period of time, and write up some sort of option. That is the way it has always been in our country: The Politburo determined the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who over recent decades has been the top person in the country. Or, with due regard, so to speak, for the the fact that we are building a law-governed state, then perhaps in this situation it would be necessary urgently to convene the Supreme Soviet, or even the Congress of People's Deputies for the election of a new head of state. But you could not convene this sort of body within a couple of hours, you could not even do it in a day. Furthermore, our people's deputies, as we see literally every day now, show that they are far from always inclined to decide the issues under discussion with any rapidity; sometimes debates, even those on the agenda, go on for a day or two. So where is the guarantee that they would be able cope rapidly with the search for a new head of state?

Now, just imagine that at this most dramatic moment, when the country is left without any supreme authority, something unpredictable happens, some sort of tragedy. I do not necessarily mean the threat of war, of invasion, or intercontinental missiles targetted against us, but some sort of of catastrophe, even more serious than the earthquake in Armenia or an outbreak of violence and disorder in some area of the country, something of the sort that demands immediate decision-making at precisely presidential level. What a fine mess we would be in then!

In a word, I needed to go into these considerations in order to try to convince you and to explain my idea; namely that in addition to a strong presidential power, we also need a system of passing on this great power. We need either a vice president elected alongside the president, or a procedure precisely set out in the Constitution for inheritance, so to speak, for who should take over, either the speaker of our parliament or some other person, but it absolutely must be designated.

Take the Americans. After the vice president has entered office, the precise period for which he will be president is known. It is already known that the next presidential elections will be held, say, on precisely the first Tuesday, after the first Monday of November of 1992, or 1996, or 2000, and so on and so forth. With us, the periods for which our top leaders hold office have not yet been properly laid down. I would not like you to think that I am an apologist for and uncritical supporter of the U.S. principle of organizing the highest bodies of state power, and so on and so forth. No, I simply draw your attention to the fact that both in the United States and in many other civilized states a system like this has already been worked out and it is in operation.

As we discuss our new constitution and the principles of the construction, the creation of new top-level bodies, we evidently should make a close study of foreign experience and borrow its most useful and valuable elements, those things that correspond to the greatest degree with our experience, our traditions, our convictions, and our state system. It seems to me that first of all, we should bring in some kind of precisely defined cycle of presidential terms, as in the United States, for instance. It can be five years instead of four; no doubt the presidential election cycle should coincide with our parliamentary election cycle, but it must be precisely and categorically stipulated that the president can hold office for one term or perhaps two, and on no account a day or a year longer.

Then the president should be elected by universal, direct, and secret ballot. This is my conviction, and I am voicing my own views, and neither state television and radio nor anyone else should take any responsibility for what I am saying. I am simply telling you what my own thoughts are. What I think is that the country's president should be elected by universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot, conducted on the basis of alternative candidates. That should always be the case. Perhaps at the present moment, given the difficult situation in the country, the Congress of People's Deputies perhaps should be entrusted with electing the first president, as an exceptional case, but in general, the president should be elected like this, by the entire people. He should receive from the people a mandate to rule.

Nevertheless, we do not need just a strong president. We also need a strong parliament. We need a strong Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet. Whatever the manner of electing the president and whatever procedure we establish, we must, without fail, agree and establish a constitutionally enshrined principle that the president must be accountable to our parliament, and parliament must have the right to scrutinze the president's actions and periodically to require him to give an account of himself. In the event of a proven violation of the Constitution or of the laws, the Supreme Soviet should be able to remove the president from office. This is known as impeachment.

I have mentioned already that I believe that the president should have just one, or at most two terms in office. We also need that because strong rule in our country runs the risk of producing consequences of which you all will be very well aware. Somehow we have a very great facility for creating more and more new cults. I do not know, perhaps I am wrong, perhaps I am exaggerating, but its seems to me that our people have in their blood some sort of predilection for creating cults. Pretty well since the time of Ivan the Terrible we have had a certain facility for putting or faith in Father Tsar, a president, a strong rule, some sort of great man who will completely solve all our problems, help us, deliver us from our difficulties, and lead us to a bright future. We submit to these illusions with shocking ease, and what I would go so far as to call a certain irresponsibility. We joyfully put the latest leader on a pedestal, be he Stalin, Khruschev, Brezhnev, or whoever. Then we just as easliy dethrone him and knock him of his pedestal. This faith in a strongman, in order, in a personality that will set the country to rights is touching perhaps, it is explicable, but it also is extremely dangerous. It is high time to realize that the phrase—the people make history—is not an invention of propagandists, but the truth. No great man, no leader, no premier, no chairman of the Supreme Soviet, no general secretary will solve our problems for us, or get the country out of its impasse, or make us happy. Only we can do this, only we can achieve this, for ourselves—we, the people.

It is time, finally, to reflect on the wisdom of the lines of that great revolutionary hymn that remains and always should remain our anthem, comrades:

No saviors from on high deliver,

No trust have we in prince or peer;

Our own right hand the chains must shiver... [lines from the "Internationale"]

Goodbye, comrades.

Idea of Presidential System Termed 'Premature'

PM2102120990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter from Associate Professor Colonel A. Kirguyev, candidate of philosophical sciences, under rubric "We Discuss CPSU Central Committee Platform for 28th Party Congress": "It Is Important To Stop Uncontrolled Development"]

[Text] Western Group of Forces—I will be blunt and say that as a Communist of 30 years standing I am by no means indifferent to my party's present and future. You do of course think about a great deal when studying the CPSU Central Committee plenum material and the draft platform.

Take the question of a multiparty system. Whether we want this or not, a multiparty system exists de facto given the clashes between and consolidation of various public organizations of an explicit political hue—be they people's fronts, informal groups, associations, or varying unions. I am convinced that there is no need to dramatize the situation—this is a reality in our lives.

At the same time, I cannot refrain from saying something else: While supporting the idea of political pluralism, I am resolutely opposed to surrendering positions in the ideological sphere. We made our ideological choice in 1917. While tolerating the existence of various parties that aspire to the role of ruling parties, I believe that they must all stand on the socialist platform; this will prevent a recoil toward capitalism in all its manifestations. It is no coincidence that I underline this point. The speeches given by the plenum's participants indicate that there is no clear unity as yet on this question. And I was unfortunately unable to find even any sentences in the

draft platform about communist ideals. I believe that this deficiency must be repaired without fail. After all, it is a question of a new concept of socialism.

There is no unity as yet in society in the view of democratization. Some people see it virtually as anarchy, a kind of "absolute freedom." We are already aware from the sorry examples in various regions of the country where people tried to turn perestroyka into a battlefield over the results of democratization in conditions of an extremely low level of political culture.

In my view, it is important to close the floodgates to unplanned, uncontrollable activity. Hence, I conclude that if our party is the ruling party and bears responsibility for the state of affairs—and at present there is no real alternative to it—its task is to control the development of the renewal processes, which are taking place in society, with supreme resoluteness. Otherwise, the future may be unpredictable.

I consider the idea of a presidency to be premature. I believe that this is not completely politically sound. After all, we are only taking the first steps within new political structures. In my view, we must not try out everything straightaway. Moreover, if you look at the Constitution, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet has sufficiently extensive powers to govern the country effectively. I consider it to be hasty and premature to raise this problem under present conditions.

MVD Defends Investigation of Anti-Semitic Crimes

LD2102131190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1111 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb TASS—An official report on the USSR Interior Ministry [MVD] has been distributed here today, which states:

"Various sections of the mass media have recently been persistently voicing the notion of cases of pogroms and violence that have allegedly taken place or are imminent against Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality. In particular, central and departmental newspapers reported on "a pogrom committed in the Central House of Writers by thugs of the PAMYAT society" and on the irresponsible attitude toward "those who carried out the pogrom" on the part of the law-enforcement bodies. A video recording with comments on the incident at the Central House of Writers was correspondingly shown on the television program "Vzglyad." TRUD's own correspondent informed readers on 13 February that in Kharkov "several violent attacks were carried out on apartments inhabited by Jews."

"In connection with these and other similar publications, the USSR MVD considers it necessary to report that rumors about Jewish pogroms being circulated in the mass media are unfounded. Moreover, they misinform the public and can objectively promote the whipping up of interethnic strife and the destablization of the situation in various regions of the country.

"The procuracy of the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon of Moscow has instituted criminal proceedings concerning the January incident at the Central House of Writers, and the case has been submitted for further investigation to the city procuracy."

It is also reported that in January the internal affairs bodies in Kharkov exposed two criminal groups which had committed violent attacks, including those against two Jewish families. The investigation established that these crimes were committed on the basis of mercenary motives and were not ethnic in nature. Thirteen criminals were arrested.

Criminal Proceedings Brought Against PAMYAT

LD2102112290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0924 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—The Moscow Public Prosecutor's Office has instituted criminal proceedings against the PAMYAT society under Section 1, Article 74 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which provides for deliberate actions aimed at "arousing national or racial hostility or disagreement," the newspaper LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reported today.

The grounds for this was the publication in the newspaper of the Moscow power-engineering institute, ENERGETIK, of the society's program which is aimed at the "dezionisation" of the country. It says in part: "Jews and individuals related to them should not be allowed to defend dissertations, to receive titles and scientific degrees, and to enter the ranks of the CPSU... they should not be elected to soviets, and to leading party, soviet, and other offices."

"The position of the newspaper ENERGETIK is clear: The editorial office condemns the appeals of PAMYAT," the report says. "Moreover, the publication allowed the public once again to see the true face of this chauvinist society, speculating on people's patriotic feelings".

"This step, in our view, testifies to the fact that the public prosecutor's office of the city has recognized the full danger and the illegality of such extremist actions," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA writes. "Let us hope that their authors and heralds will finally answer to the law."

Split in CPSU Seen as 'Inevitable'

PM1602152990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by CPSU Member K. Zhigalov under the "Discussion Pamphlet" rubric: "Open Discussion: In Order To Unite...."]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The barometer of the party's situation is not only the decline in its prestige and the departure of disillusioned members, but also the extreme philosophical diversity of its multimillion-strong army, which makes inevitable the political and organizational demarcation (split) of party ranks. In my view, a split is

unavoidable. We have brought this on ourselves by inflating party membership to 20 million, turning the vanguard into the mass, and often distributing membership forms to people who saw them as the gateway to a career and prosperity. You do not have to be a Solomon to see how diverse members of elected party organs and apparatus officials are, not to mention the party as a whole.

The CPSU's heterogeneity is obvious. This is confirmed by the regular calls for the party to be purged, party cards to be exchanged, and communists to be subjected to certification, and other measures. All this is intended to cleanse the CPSU of obvious dross and scum. But, figuratively speaking, how many leeches suck on the party body? Half a million, 1 million? They are the ones you can actually identify. What is to be done with "gifted duplicity?" What is to be done with those people whose philosophy provokes one constant feeling—nostalgia for the past, for the times of Stalin and Brezhnev? What is to be done with the dead wood which never has an opinion of its own? The party's prestige is determined not only by its leadership tier, but also by the vital stance of every communist. Where are the scales to measure how much the party has lost and is losing owing to hangers-on, careerists, and timeservers who entered the CPSU not so much because they wanted to as to "strengthen its worker nucleus?" No purge of party ranks, no exchange of party documents will help get rid of them.

So let us theoretically leave only those people who are in the party out of sincere conviction. This can only be done one way—by ridding the CPSU of all constitutional and traditional privileges. After this two groups of people will be left within the thinned ranks of the CPSU: People who realize the need for party reform and those who reject it. The first group will also be extremely disparate, including supporters of cosmetic repairs, radicals, and various kinds of "centrists." Positive consensus is only possible between "centrists" and radicals. Many communists are prevented from realizing this by the fixation with unity in party ranks. Most party members regard the words "faction" and "split" as militant opportunism. Although many have read Lenin and his calls for unity after demarcation and defended Lenin's implacable stance on the Mensheviks, with whom the Bolsheviks formed the single Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party before the split.

CPSU unity is seen as a guarantee of the success of perestroyka. In principle that is so, but the question is whose unity and on what political platform? The monolithic unity of today's 20 million CPSU members constitutes either utopia or self-deception. Demarcation based on different views of the future of the party and the country does not constitute heresy or opportunism. It is not only an objective inevitability, but also the only means of preserving the party's status as political leader in society if a split occurs in the immediate future and on the basis of a radical reform of the CPSU.

However, there are different roads leading to a split. The boldest, least painful, and most productive is reform from above. Differences within the Politburo and the Central Committee have ceased to be a closely guarded secret today. If the most sensible and at the same time radical side, which supports M.S. Gorbachev, is able to overcome the doubts and, possibly, also the prejudices and the stronger feeling of fear (in the face of global political and economic changes), it will win the support of the most farsighted, revolutionary, public-minded, and mostly young reformist politicians. This is the very force and mainstay which our leader lacks catastrophically today.

If the Politburo and the Central Committee continue to engage in cosmetic repairs until the 28th CPSU Congress, a split may occur from below, until the party is deprived of the role of political leader of a different political structure. This option is worse than reform from above, but is preferable to a split after the party's removal from power, after which the CPSU may not split but disintegrate. Of the three aforementioned options for demarcation within the party ranks, the second and third are the most feasible although the first is the most desirable.

The main reason preventing the implementation of the first option is the presence of conservative forces within the Central Committee elected by the 27th CPSU Congress. Such forces are certainly also strong within the union republic communist party central committees, which were elected back in the first year of perestroyka. This is more than predestined. We received additional confirmation of this conclusion in February 1989 when we opened the second issue of IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS, which printed brief biographical details (including naturally their age and post) about the members of the party's central elected bodies. In the fourth year of perestroyka and glasnost rank-and-file communists learned the composition of the CPSU Central Committee, which was previously seen as a single monolith. They learned it, fell to thinking, and were horrified.

Members of the government (for most of whom, judging by the "achievement" of our economy, departmental affiliation clearly took precedence over party affiliation) and leaders of ministries, state committees, and ispolkoms [soviet executive committees] represented the most sizable group. Party officials and pensioners formed another two equally sizable groups. Then there were workers, diplomats, military men, leaders of public organizations and elected soviet organs, scientists, leaders of enterprises, associations, and press organs, and teachers. By April 1989 the number of pensioners had sharply "increased" (83), only to fall equally sharply (on their "own initiative") at the Central Committee April plenum. Party officials took the lead within the Central Committee while the number of representatives of government establishments and military men somewhat decreased.

The age of the Central Committee seemed even more depressing (and still does, moreover). It compels us to doubt that the party's central elected body is made up of the worthiest and most competent communists and has worked with maximum efficiency during the period between the 27th and 28th CPSU Congresses.

Without any doubt, office was the guiding principle in the formation of the present Central Committee. If you face up to the truth, it will undoubtedly predominate in the upcoming election campaign unless the procedure for electing congress delegates is changed. Then it will indeed be a case of "Abandon hope all ye who enter the congress" when it comes to bold, original thinkers. Direct elections to the 28th party congress constitute the only real opportunity for most speedy and effective reform of the CPSU.

The direct election procedure is simple and varied, and has already been proposed in the press. It could happen like this, for instance. Major party organizations elect their delegates according to a norm of representation. Others (teachers and medics, for instance) nominate representatives from their own profession at general meetings. The remaining delegates are elected from electoral districts. The main thing is not the form but the result of the direct elections. To ensure that questions relating to the congress (the future of the CPSU) are resolved by people who represent the intellectual nucleus of the party and are capable of adopting decisions and having the maximum positive influence on the development of the party and society.

Moscow's Refugee Problems Examined

PM1602170090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 5, 4 Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Dmitriy Sidorov report: "Moscow Echo of the Conflict. Refugees in the Capital"]

[Text] Now Moscow too faces the problem of refugees: thousands of people; Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Russians arrive daily by air and rail... Let's see what's happening.

The Moscow Soviet

A group of about 60 Russian refugees flew from Baku to Domodedovo Airport. The controller sent them to the Moscow city Executive Committee which was empty except for the official on duty. At midnight the militia guarding the building of the Executive Committee admitted them. They had at their disposal one of the halls of the Moscow Soviet where they were given food, after which a film show was arranged for them. While they were having a rest Viktaranov, a department head, spent 15 minutes making arrangements to provide the refugees with acommodation in hotels and guesthouses, and trying to get buses.

People flatly refused to grant interviews or be photographed: many of their relatives were still in Baku. They also feared for their children who had arrived in Moscow with them. For this reason we shall not mention the hotels where the refugees are staying.

"There is already no room in Moscow hotels," says Viktor Taranov. "The city is having a hard time. There are constant scandals because guests have to be moved and reservations for rooms cancelled. The refugees keep arriving but honestly I don't know where to house them. According to the forecasts of the permanent representative of the Armenian SSR, about 20,000 Armenian refugees will probably arrive in the city this year. The Moscow hotels have already lost 350,000 roubles: naturally, the refugees live in them free of charge. Even before this, about 40,000 Azerbaijanis and 60,000 Armenians lived permanently in Moscow. Now the concentration of refugees whips up tension between the two groups."

The press-service of the KGB Administration for Moscow and Moscow Region has reported that for the time being there have been no serious conflicts on ethnic grounds in the city. However, the districts where large groups of Armenians or Azerbaijanis live are being closely guarded.

Representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan have reported that there has been no sign of any aggravation of the situation, apart from a few threatening telephone calls.

There is no mass influx of Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia into Moscow. At the government commission for the registration of refugees, the applicants are mainly Armenians, and the reception centre of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, which organizes the registration of Russians, recorded a total of about 15,000 refugees at the end of January.

According to the report made by a press spokesman at the Ministry of Defence headquarters, military people all over the country have received and accommodated about 35,000 members of servicemen's families from the troubled area. They are paid allowances by the Defence Ministry.

According to information obtained from the reception centre at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the number of families of Russian refugees registered in recent days has achieved 1,500. A total of 740 families have alredy been sent to the guesthouses and Young Pioneer camps in the Moscow Region and in other regions of the Russian Federation.

So far there are no overall coordinated figures concerning the number of refugees.

The Government Commission on Refugee Problems

It operates round the clock. Petr Rudnev, head of the migration service department of the State Committee for Labour, says:

"By a government decision all refugees have been paid allowances of 100 roubles each and everyone may take clothing and shoes worth 200 roubles. The main problem is to settle them. There is a long queue in our registration centre on 16, Chernyshevsky street. We are trying to give shelter in the first place to those who, after the January events, have come without money, those who have children and are without winter clothes. The situation is aggravated by the fact that to this day we have no information about vacancies in hotels in the city. At present ten buldings belonging to Moscow hotels and 1,500 beds in Moscow Region guesthouses have been placed at the disposal of refugees. But this is not enough. A few days ago the government passed a decision giving refugees another 1,000 places in departmental hotels.

"Many refugees who have settled in Moscow do not want to leave the city. The State Committe for Labour offers them from three to four opportunities of work in different cities of the Russian Federation, where they will be provided with flats, but people refuse. Out of about 8,500 refugee families that arrived in September only 47 have left the city. It cannot continue like this. The government is not able to support thousands of healthy and professionally trained people, all at the expense of the state. If after two months they continue to turn down the offers of the State Committee for Labour, Armenian refugees will probably have to be sent to their Republic, the Russians—to the cities of the RSFSR. This issue is now being discussed by the government."

Question to P. Rudnev: What is the attitude shown by the inhabitants of Moscow and Moscow Region to refugees who live in their districts? Is it really their wish to return Armenians "to their Republic"?

"Their attitude differs. Some actions of newcomers arouse the indignation of people. For example, a few days ago 100 people sent to the Borodino settlement made an attempt to occupy a house just built in Mozhaisk. The militia put a stop to this."

"Is it true that the State Committee for Labour sent many Russian refugees to the permanent representation of Azerbaijan for compensation?"

"Yes, it did. And there was a reason for this. These people actually lived on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic, so the Republic must help them."

This stand seems completely unacceptable: each Republic must look after its own citizens, Armenians must be returned to Armenia.... When such statements are made by people representing the central authorities, should we be surprised at the growth of separatist sentiments in the republics?

The unofficial organization set up under the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation is also trying to help refugees. It includes those who have come from Baku but whose relatives are still there. These are mainly Russians. They spend the night in the building of the Supreme Soviet. The guards give them food and are trying to maintain order.

"We have demanded," one of the members of the pressure group says, "a meeting with the representatives of the USSR or the RSFSR government. But nobody has come to meet us. We wrote a letter, too, to Vorotnikov, Vice-President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the main demand being the following : that the status of refugee be granted to all.

The Kazanskiy Railway Terminal.

A train with refugees from Baku arrived in Moscow's Kazanskiy railway Terminal from Makhachkala on the night of January 26. The services of the station prepared to receive them. Women with children and old people were accommodated in the hall for official delegations, porters provided their trolleys without pays, and, as Aleksandr Yakubov, the official on duty, says, an understanding has been reached with the restaurant and their co-op suppliers to provide the people with a free meal. The train contained about 350 members of servicemen's families and 203 people not connected with the army, among them 26 pensioners and 122 children. There were militiamen in each coach. The track on which the train arrived was cordoned off to avoid conflict or provocation. The Defence Ministry Headquarters for refugees prepared to meet the families of servicemen. Twelve buses were sent for this purpose. As for the rest, they took their places at the railway terminal. No representative of the government commission came to the station that day.

"We were moved out of Baku by ships," says Tatyana Zhuravel. "Twice we put to sea and only under the protection of two military launches did we manage to get to Makhachkala. The ships that attacked us at sea opened fire."

About 700 refugees have been staying for several days in the permanent representation of Armenia. People lie side by side, there is a shortage of foodstuffs.

"The permanent representation of Armenia," says Valeriy Mirzoyan, chairman of the pressure group of Armenian refugees, "cannot in any way help us to resettle people. In fact, it has no right to accommodate refugees in local hotels and guesthouses."

Thus, Moscow has proved unprepared for the influx of refugees. Many times our country has shown lack of preparedness for extreme situations (only the Defence Ministry has been at its best in this matter). This unpreparedness is complicated by the aggravation of social tension, although it concerns the fates of thousands upon thousands of people who have escaped from the area of conflict.

Penal Colony Official on High-Ranking Inmates

OW2202073590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Correspondent Sergey Chernov video interview; from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] Mikhail Alekseyevich Zagora, acting head of the Nizhniy Tagil strengthened regime colony, was in transit in Moscow. Former high-ranking officials of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], KGB, the courts, the procuracy, and party organs are maintained in this colony. Among them, for example, are (Broyn), Brezhnev's former secretary; Kornoukhov, former chairman of the Krasnodar CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee; as heard] party commission; and Churbanov, former first deputy minister of internal affairs and Brezhnev's son-in-law. [Video shows correspondent talking to a major of Internal Troops]

[Begin recording] [Chernov] Tell me, what do they do there?

[Zagora] What do they do? They are engaged in labor, like in any other colony in the Soviet Union.

[Chernov] What, for example? It is interesting to know.

[Zagora] Very well, for example. First of all they are engaged in metal-work, and (Broyn), in particular, heads a team—rather he headed it, he has now been promoted, so to speak—he headed a team assembling (?water pressure valves).

[Chernov] What about Churbanov?

[Zagora] Churbanov, well, Churbanov is making ice cream dishes, or vases for ice cream, as they are also known, (?Primanka). He makes them himself.

[Chernov] Does he like this work?

[Zagora] You know that, as a conscientious person, he makes them very artistically and well. As a matter of fact, Churbanov is not the sort of person who could be made into a scapegoat. But, he was made one, and I do not know whether this was right or not. It is not for me to judge. I am not a judge or prosecutor. He was made...[changes thought] this individual, in order to use it to shield other odious figures that exist. [end recording]

Mikhail Alekseyevich Zagora invited correspondent Sergey Chernov to visit the colony, together with a film crew, in order to see how some top high-ranking officials live and work. So, maybe we shall see a reportage of this soon.

Political & Social

Concepts of Socialist Society Discussed

PM0202102190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor M. Baglay under the rubric "Questions of Theory: Debating Platform": "Freedom Plus Common Sense"]

[Text] I see the main shortcoming of many concepts of socialism already set forth in various publications in the fact that they do not reveal the primary humanist foundations of the society toward which we should strive. Arguments which seemingly address man often lead imperceptibly to the establishment of a new administrative-edict system and only to good intentions.

I see the only point of searching for a new model in the rejection of statist or bureaucratic socialism, in the explanation of the fact that it is not the state system but man himself who should safeguard man's interests, albeit with the aid of this system. From this viewpoint I am not afraid to say that man is not only the end, but also the means of social progress. But for that we must place freedom, viewed as man's natural and inalienable state, at the basis of all spheres of society's life. Freedom must be the main principle of the organization of the economy, the political system, and spiritual development. The state's precisely delineated functions plus self-governing public life free of state interference—those are the initial principles of the socialist society of the future.

History and continuity. During the construction of the new vision of socialism we have to answer a difficult question: Are we creating in our writings a fundamentally new society or, to use the language to which we are accustomed, is it a "natural stage" on the path toward...? In other words should we recognize the continuity of development from October itself or is it better to break that thread? A difficult question because everyone feels here a kind of invisible "taboo" which, as is well known, always deforms the logic of scientific cognition. But there should be no "sacred cows" in science.

As there penetrates into the complex situation generated by our revolution an understanding of the profound initial misconceptions of its leaders, it becomes clear that the revolution provided a by no means homogenous moral and political impetus to the creation of socialist society. It is difficult, very difficult, to ascribe to Trotskiy alone the full horror of war communism and to ascribe the civil war to the "white generals." It was not Stalin alone who created the theoretical base for his bloody rule. Brezhnev and Suslov did not invent their "developed socialism" stupidity out of thin air. And so? Should all these peculiarities which cost our people dear be regarded as "models" or stages of socialism?

It is worth recalling that quite recently there existed in East Europe immoral dictatorial regimes which called

themselves Marxist-Leninist and socialist. Honecker, Ceausescu, and Zhivkov were among the "leading lights" of the builders of socialism.... That means that we must also recognize these regimes as another "model of socialism," that is as our "kin"—that is the conclusion if you follow the logic of the supporters of "diverse models of socialism." But the only thing which is left obscured is that these "ties of kinship" embodying the magnificent genealogy of Stalinism discredit the genuine socialism contained in our plans and again organically mesh its essence with violence and the rejection of freedom.

In light of what I have said is it not better to create a new society based on new moral, social, and political values according with general human, and not class-based, ideas from today and not yesterday as to what is good and what is bad?

In their anxiety unfailingly to find a doctrinally "pure" basis for the new vision of socialism theorists often resort to the formula of "a return to Lenin's model." I think that is a futile undertaking. First, no individual quotations can conceal the obvious fact that V.I. Lenin did not have time to create a detailed study of socialism except for its initial stage—the dictatorship of the proletariat. Second, this formula (which is absolutely unrealistic inasmuch as history does not go back) discredits us—the conclusion is that a mature society cannot elaborate a realistic political theory according with the present-day stage of the development of its own people and the surrounding world.

Third, it is already possible to cite many examples of how we, proceeding from today's conditions, are doing what directly contradicts V.I. Lenin's statements. It is time we understood that the ideological and political baggage of the classic writers of Marxism-Leninism, however great historically, must sooner or later run dry, leaving us only an undisputed philosophical method of understanding reality with which, if we master it correctly, we shall never be lost.

Socialism and capitalism: Antipodes in every respect? It is well known that the theory of socialism grew from the denial of capitalism. But what capitalism? The capitalism of the 19th century, which no longer exists. According to the logic of things present-day socialism should be the antipode of present-day capitalism. Why? How can it prove its superiority? Our theory and still less our practice does not know the answer to this question. In the past there were "trump cards" like the claim that there was no unemployment under socialism, that the economy was developing better, that the working people's welfare was growing, that democracy existed for the working people and not the rich, and so forth. What is left now?

Life has obliged us to recognize the real evolution of capitalism. The category of the "overall crisis of capitalism," the "formalism of bourgeois democracy," the "clogging up" of production forces, and so forth has disappeared. The economic and political system of Western society, while by no means ideal, nonetheless suits the overwhelming majority of people, who have no serious revolutionary sentiments. Democratic rights and freedoms have become reality, the living standard has improved and culture is developing. Capitalism has substantially outstripped us in scientific and technical development and proved our incorrectness in denying freedom and human rights. It is notable that we borrow all new categories for the future model of socialism from the arsenal of an "alien" society—the market, parliamentarianism, the rule-of-law state, human rights, and so forth.

The majority of our theorists and propagandists consider the two most important vices of modern capitalism to be man's exploitation of man and the acute inequality in property (of course, the system has more shortcomings but as a rule they are also inherent in socialism). But criticism of these innate vices of capitalism has recently become increasingly less specific, as it were. First because the working class itself in the capitalist countries does not consider exploitation sufficient grounds for revolution, because as the living standard improves the negative manifestations of exploitation are dulled. Second, because it has emerged that exploitation also exists under socialism in the form of the uncontrolled arrogation [prisvoyeniye] of surplus labor by the state, bureaucracy, and underground business. In any case it has become very difficult to prove that an American worker, who gets $2,000 a month, suffers from exploitation while a Soviet worker with a wage of R237 is happy because of the absence of exploitation. You still have to look at theoretical postulates through the prism of normal human awareness sometimes.

But the question of the acute inequality in property and consequently the principle of the distribution of wealth does indeed comprise the essence of the differences between socialism and capitalism. The point here is not the oversimplified idea that under capitalism distribution is allegedly replaced by overt, unrestricted arrogation of other people's labor—that has long ceased to be the case because there is progressive taxation which in some countries removes up to 70 percent of profit and there is a high inheritance tax. In addition high incomes are basically spent on the development of production. So we must still answer honestly the question: Is such a high price paid by a society which allows a small stratum of rich men if that society receives in return real incentives to economic progress and consequently to the gradual improvement of life for all?

But our society totally rejects that idea, placing moral considerations above economic ones. This society was formed on the basis of the denial of any degrees and forms of parasitic consumption (although it has been unable to fully exclude such consumption in itself) hence such keen interest among the people in social justice. It is true that it is precisely this very important question which is not being properly developed by our theory in all its aspects—moral, legal, economic, and psychological. That is why it is so hard to find real criteria for a

modern socialist society and to answer the question: In what specific ways should this society be the implacable antipode of capitalism? And should it be?

The main thing in socialism. The modern understanding of the goals of socialism cannot fail to consider historically justified general human common sense. It is absurd now to counterpose the basic laws of capitalism (obtaining high profits) and socialism (the steady improvement of the people's life). The former and the latter are important features of both systems. The same should also be said of the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor." It is hard to agree that features like the use of the law of cost and commodity-money relations (even if to this is added "within the framework of the state plan and in the working people's interests"), the principles of payment according to the quantity and quality of labor (this long ago became the principle of the capitalist economy), the sanctioning of pluralism in socialist forms of ownership (we still have to define what socialism is and the word "socialism" is already used everywhere), a recognition of the cooperative movement, and orientation toward the diversity of working people's interests and so forth are purely socialist features. That is how many of our theorists define the main features of the new model of socialism, but it is impossible to agree with this specific definition of what is socialist. These are simply features of the universally reasonable in any public organization and it is precisely from here that a practical orientation is born for us: Borrowing everything reasonable and effective in foreign practice.

Pragmatism in forming the new society should also be displayed in one more important respect: Discarding myths, rhetoric, and utopias. Thus, not a single class or social group can be proclaimed as the "leading force" of society—all working people take an equal part in public life and determine its development equally. There is no point in declaring that labor is a matter of honor, valor, and heroism, triumphantly announcing the "erosion of the boundaries" between physical and mental labor, or repeating the abstract idea of "liberating labor"—any labor should give rise to respect and its freedom is determined only by the level of guarantees in labor legislation.

The most important demands made on socialism are expressed in the triple principle: Freedom, labor, and social justice. That means that:

—It is a society of free people in which economic organization leaves freedom of choice for economic activity while the state protects freedom, creates its material guarantees, and does not interfere in social life (civilian society);

—only labor determine the degree of consumption and the opportunity to hold leading posts in society, any elite (political, economic, scientific, or in art) is acknowledged only as a temporary group formed on the basis of labor achievements;

—the distribution of income according to labor and the additional redistribution of income from the state budget is designed primarily to rule out indigence and poverty while wealth should be restricted only in order to prevent it from exerting decisive influence on public affairs, without destroying the incentive to develop production activity; social equality is recognized as equality of opportunity for all and equality of all before the law, totally excluding leveling down and the desire for unattainable actual equality for all.

From this triple principle there stem many important specific properties of a socialist nature which on each occasion are formed from a combination of the individual and the collective, the personal and the public, the private and the social. Man himself—his freedom, interests, initiative and activity, but supplemented and regulated with the minimum strictly necessary public control—should stand at the center of any public institution. In the foreseeable future, with a consideration for our people's level of awareness and culture, there can be no fair and reasonable organization of public life without public control that is just as fair and reasonable through the democratic activity of the state or of public organizations.

Socialist society must not promise to maintain a person completely in all cases. It should clearly orient man toward ensuring his own interests but should give firm guarantees of generous aid when a person is unable to resolve his life problems for himself. Public concern for man—for his health, opportunity for spiritual development and the creation of conditions for the growth of his prosperity and dignity—is one of the main features of socialism.

It seems that it is already clear to everyone that the economy can become more effective if it is mixed, that is if it consists of a state and a private and cooperative sector, if the main regulator becomes the market, that is freedom of interenterprise ties. What is socialist in all this is the labor collectives' decisive participation in the management of production, which should prevent its development to the detriment of social interests and ensure the economy's social orientation.

A mixed economy and market principles cannot permit the retention of the state's former economic functions, they must be curtailed. The sphere of planning, which it is more expedient to transform into targeted programing, should include only the major problems on an all-state scale—control of prices and revenue, export and import, the improvement of the structure of the economy, scientific and technical policy, and the ensuring of the people's ecological safety.

Naturally the hardest thing for socialism is to determine the permissible degree of private ownership and to promote the revelation of its social role. The removal of profits should be implemented on a scale that does not eliminate incentives to develop production. Under no conditions except extraordinary ones can agricultural

produce be confiscated from peasants. The socioeconomic policy of socialism should be guided not so much by concern that no one should earn an excessive among as by concern that there should be no poverty. In a socialist society there should be no poverty, homelessness, or unemployed, elderly, and invalids cast to the whim of fate.

Political organization. Socialism is a society of free people. It is free choice for each generation and not the historical continuity of ideology which serves as the source of the people's socialist choice and the creation of a political system. Like any other society, socialism cannot develop without internal contradictions, without a struggle between different views and political forces. The pluralist democracy of socialism is called on to offer equal opportunities for participation in political life to all classes, social strata, and groups of society.

It is essential to realize that political life based on freedom, pluralism of opinions, and parliamentarianism inevitably gives rise to alternative ways of resolving social problems which may acquire an antisocialist nature. The party of communists, historically formed as the vanguard of the people, retains responsibility for political stability in society and develops cooperation between all forces acting on a socialist platform. But what remains decisive is the people's will, expressed through free elections and public opinion. The socialist orientation of state policy can be ensured under specific conditions by the coalition rule of various political forces. But the personality cult or the regime of personal power with the suppression of political freedoms cannot be recognized in any conditions.

The socialist state can be conceived only as a rule-of-law state which has lost its class nature and relies on equal support from the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. There is no point in socialism inventing its own democratic institutions of power in all cases, basically they have taken shape in world practice and are universal. The state's supreme function is the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms and the creation of material conditions for people's free activity. But it is appropriate to note that the principle of "everything that is not forbidden is permitted" is being introduced only feebly into our practice—it is being impeded by people's dependent mentality and the development of legislation mainly along "authorization" lines.

It would be naive to suppose that socialist society, even ast the developed stage, could rule out social conflicts (labor, interethnic, and political). Such conflicts grow out of objective contradictions and the level of culture and awareness of people and social groups. Society must provide for a specific mechanism for the social prevention of conflicts (mainly through public organizations and the press) and also for their solution when they still arise (through a developed network of state mediation, arbitration, and, in extreme cases, coercion). Unfortunately, so far the theory of social conflict and the corresponding social activity is showing absolutely no sign of development.

Understandably, socialist society is by no means anarchic. Society forms in people responsibility for their actions and an aware attitude toward their civic obligations. The humanist values of socialism can be achieved only on the basis of a high degree of organization among people and the inextricable unity of freedom and discipline.

Man's spiritual progress and his access to the benefits of culture (artistic, political and everyday) is the supreme goal of socialism. It is worth recalling that the spiritual development of society and of each individual can be effected only on condition that freedom of thought, conscience, and creation stands outside any bureaucratic control. The culture of socialism is designed to form in man a firm allegiance to democracy, the preservation of peace on earth, the friendship of the peoples, respect for human dignity, ecological discipline, social justice, and other things.

A democratic and humane socialism has only begun to take shape. Its first shoots are being laid by perestroyka and economic and political reform. Socialism of this kind is not a utopia, it is feasible, although it in no way promises to rid us of all problems and difficulties. There is not and cannot be an ideal society. But people will agree to any discomforts if they are convinced of the genuine nature of freedom and social justice.

Conservative Member Protests, Quits Party

90UN0941C Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 2

["Letter" of resignation from CPSU by Ye. Kamenshchikov, 30-year party member, followed by "commentary" by Department of Party and Soviet Construction: "I Am Not an Ally of Such a Party...."]

[Text] I have submitted my resignation from the party. Here is its content:

I request that you not longer consider me a member of the Communist Party of this period. A period when humanitarian and general human values are being violated, when an antisocialist society is being restored, when the union of republics, the union of socialist countries is perishing, when our land and our natural wealth are being sold, when people are defaming Lenin and cursing Stalin, when people are regretting that there was ever a need for the 1917 socialist revolution, when the blood of innocent Soviet people is being spilled, when we have no clothing or shoes and nothing with which to feed or bathe our children, when the leaders are taking bribes, when the number of rapes and murders is increasing, when one cannot see the light at the end of the tunnel.

The historical need for perestroyka arose after the Khrushchev-Brezhnev eras in order to increase the authority of the party. But now the Russian people have been turned into occupation troops, the fascist system has been equated with the socialist system, private ownership is being practiced, and millionaire swindlers are proliferating. The party of Lenin, the worker and peasant party, has been split into various fronts, factions, and groupings so that it is easier to design one's own anti-Leninist line.

The working class has no power, it has been given a bribe—strike and we shall help you crawl into the yoke of capitalist oppression. Now capitalist socialism is being professed, a hybrid of a lamb and a wolf. It is being beaten into our heads that there are no alternatives. Is this the kind of perestroyka the people dreamed about?

I am no ally of such a party and I have neither a spiritual nor a material desire to support it. I do not want to be hypocritical. They have not taken away material goods from our generation, they have taken away our soul; they have destroyed tens of thousands of people like myself who cannot be tempted by a car, a garage, or a dacha. My withdrawal from the party is my protest against this kind of perestroyka.

For 30 years I have paid dues, believing in the ideals of the CPSU, for the party program had goals and tasks that were more humane than those of any other party in the world. No other party has had or ever will have such a program. There were large tasks. There was the goal of making a happy life for each person without dividing them into factions, without breaking them down into classes. Everything I learned in school, in the technical school, and in the university left me with no doubts about what would happen. As a boy in the forties when I woke up in the morning I considered myself to be the happiest person in the world because I was born in our country.

In 1945 I entered the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. The years were not easy. My father, a communist since 1924, continued the war in Japan as a commissar. There was nothing to wear, nothing to eat. But we Komsomol members worked on Saturdays singing songs, knowing that this was our city, that we would be living in it, and we worked without having to be pushed.

All this has now been obliterated. It is as if it had not happened, people do not remember it. But Natalya Makarova, who abandoned the Leningrad troupe and remained in London, we greet today with flowers and praises written by Platonov. What are his works "Chevengur" and "Excavation" worth and was it not these Komsomol members whom he described in his works who restored the cities? If so, then why are we now being hypocrites? Yes give us Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag" now, and not a raised fist with the words "none shall pass." Every publishing house and every magazine is hurrying to sing praises of former dissidents. But where are our Soviet writers; have they run out of talent or are they unable to raise the heavy banner of perestroyka?

Oh, how we love to shift from side to side, everything that was previously impossible is now possible; everything that was previously possible is now impossible.

Let us brand the anti-perestroyka forces! But who are they? Khrushchevs, Brezhnevs, Romanovs, Rashidovs, and people of their ilk?! Yes, they were the ones who used the base for their personal ambitions and needs, manipulating with slogans. Even at the beginning of the seventies a worm of doubt made its way into my soul when the stars of heroes burned on the armored chests of our leaders. When they spread state bonuses over the "small land" where Brezhnev was sitting in a hut eating American concentrated food. And now old relics are popping up all over the country and we are saying a requiem for the peace of the soul of the assassinated Nicholas II. We compare the red flag and the peasant's hammer and sickle with the fascist swastika, we are restoring private ownership, we are decentralizing national enterprises, we are sowing social inequality, we are leasing our land to capitalist countries for which we and not you functionaries will have to break our backs.

Was it not you, comrade workers, who building nuclear power stations and hydroelectric power stations, who flooded productive land with new seas, and who violated the ecology of the Neva, the Aral, and Baykal, was it not with your hand that these projects were outlined? No, not yours. But today from the high levels they are saying that you are to blame and they are juggling figures about the laziness of the Russian people while praising America, Japan, and others like them.

There is discussion of the need to remove from the USSR Constitution Article 6 which concerns the leading role of the Communist Party and in some republics there is no longer any discussion. Down with the communists! So who then? Mister radical, liberal, democrat, anarchist?!

The communists are you and I, comrade workers, and not the obkoms [oblast committees), raykoms [rayon committees], and party committees. Yes, the leading role of the worker and the peasant should be established by the USSR Constitution. And since we communists are the vanguard of the worker and peasant classes we should have the leading role in the country for we were elected by the people. It is not the party committee that should judge the communist but the general meeting of workers, it should not be two party members who recommend people for membership in the CPSU but the general meeting of workers, and only it has the right to call from the ranks the leading member of the vanguard. The communist must be responsible to the workers and not to the functionaries who lost their authority among the masses long ago. Currently the party is alienated from the people. We are holding closed meetings and reading closed letters. By concealing ourselves we are giving the intelligent appearance that we are doing

something useful but we are actually creating more leaders who have been relieved of their primary duties.

It is time, comrades, to wake up! Do you not see that at the current moment the functionaries are taking over power again? Who speaks from the prestigious forum of the presidium? All the same people: The same Abalkins, the same Sukharevs. And where is the working class, where is the peasantry? They are ganging up on your deputies Ivanov and Gdlyan, thus expressing to you their lack of confidence. We must demand an immediate dismissal of Ligachev and Sukharev until their affairs are finally clarified. Only then will we be able to see the truth. Where are our Pavka Korchagins and the communists Klochkovs, Stakhanovs, and Angelins? Alas, the press is bringing out the heavy artillery against them. And they are killing Pavlik Morozov again with a burst of typewriter fire.

Gidaspov showed initiative and brought the communists out into the streets with slogans about social justice, and he immediately found opponents pointing their fingers: "This is not a plant but a city." And the ripples spread out from the stone that was cast. Today's politics are repressive and we must be on the alert. The elections to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet are quite close at hand. The future of Russia lies in our hands, in the hands of the voters.

It is difficult to recognize a person, who he is. When selecting a wife we sometimes make a mistake. Just as we made a mistake when we selected the Supreme Soviet. More workers in the soviets! We have been convinced with our very eyes how "prestigious" academicians and professors have defamed socialism with the ballot, trying to occupy leadership posts not for the good of the homeland but in their own personal interests. They are the ones who are undermining the socialist economy; they, headed by Abalkin, are ready to overthrow the system and retain the leadership. And they welcome private ownership, and cooperatives...communists, advance! And the so-called communists have gone ahead, "honestly" paying R90,000 a month in party dues. The cooperator with "initiative" was praised by Gorbachev himself who, incidentally, works harder on foreign policy than he does with the country. Let him answer for his business trips to the people and not to the Central Committee. We have had many "peacemakers" and "travelers." We have heard what our national income is and we have even been informed of how much it has risen during a certain period. But nobody knows where it goes or how it is distributed. You cannot get into a public dining room, the polyclinics and hospitals are dirty, specialists are rude and unskilled, the graduate engineer barely knows what a milling machine is—it is the same thing as a lathe but it is installed horizontally. The agronomist puts a cow on her back to mate with a bull. And yet our national income is invested in them, our labor, the labor of our working hands. Today the majority of us do not know where the profit of the enterprises is spent or how it is distributed. But who is the master. Whom can you ask?...

Here your wage leveling, as people like to say, has led the country into an impasse. Now everyone is pointing to the cooperatives where for the same labor as you put in the wages are twice and sometimes three times as high. And do you consider this a normal phenomenon?!

The time has come to take the enterprises in hand, to take strict control, and not to strike. By striking we are admitting that there are masters and small-time bosses in the country other than ourselves, and this is a return to the past. Today everything has been started and the person who used to exploit your labor will rule you again. This is the goal of today's perestroyka.

It is not too late, comrades, to halt this process. Do not give up the power you won in 1917 with your blood, do not believe the present-day Soviet millionaires; money is no longer enough for them—now they want power.

While leaving the party I remain a communist, I am not changing my convictions, I believe in socialism.

Commentary From Department of Party and Soviet Construction

This letter of resignation was sent to the editors by a 59-year-old engineer of the Zarya Association, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Kamenshchikov, who decided to leave the party after being in its ranks for 30 years.

We must honestly admit that it frightened us. And not so much because one can clearly see "Nina Andreyevna" overtones in it. Ultimately every person has the right to think the way he thinks, and life and the entire course of perestroyka have already proved the groundlessness of the position of people who do not wish to "depart from principles" under any circumstances.

Something else frightens us much more: The confusion—excuse us, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich—the screw that is loose in the mind of a person taught by experience, an intelligent specialist and communist, who thinks it is his job to explain the policy of perestroyka to the broad masses.

The simplest thing would be to blame this confusion on the author of the letter himself or even to pin on him the label of "anti-perestroyka." For if a person does not even see the difference between the periods of stagnation and renewal, he is already "incurable" and the party only stands to gain from his departure.

Indeed before angrily and tragically exclaiming "Where are we going?", Ye.A. Kamenshchikov should probably have thought better and more self-critically about the question: "Where have we come to?" during the past decades, including those that are dear to his heart. Then his assessment of the present would probably be more balanced and realistic.

But still we cannot forget about the question "Where are we going?" And the fact that Ye.A. Kamenshchikov does not know the answer (if only he were the only one!), it would seem, is not only his fault but is a misfortune. It is the misfortune of people who have gotten under the flood of contradictory phenomena and information that has fallen upon them and who draw incorrect and one-sided conclusions from it.

When reading Ye.A. Kamenshchikov's letter of resignation one automatically returns to the recent conference in Smolnyy of the aktiv of the oblast party organization which gave a collective order to the Leningrad delegation which will participate in the forthcoming February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Among the suggestions heard here was this one: to pointedly raise the question of the party's ideological activity and the most rapid publication of its political platform concerning the most important problems in the life of the society.

The letter which came to the editorial office convinces us that we must raise a large fuss about this issue. Before the Central Committee, before the ideological aktiv, and before the social scientists. We repeat that we can accuse Ye.A. Kamenshchikov as much as we like but the party is still remaining silent about the most important issues of perestroyka, leaving many communists alone with their concerns, doubts, and complaints.

The easiest thing, of course, is to tell them what we are telling them now—that the party and each individual communist have a common responsibility for perestroyka. But what if everyone is not capable of bearing this responsibility? Is that not why people enter the party, in order to be stronger by relying on its collective wisdom?! Is it forgivable for the party to leave its members alone by themselves and not give them answers to what is gnawing at them and tormenting them?

Even if the answer to the questions "Where are we going, what kind of society are we building, what kind of social justice are we establishing?" does not suit everyone, it must be clear and understandable. It cannot be allowed for people to leave the party not because they disagree with its position in some way (this is natural during a revolutionary period such as our country is experiencing) but because the party remains silent.

And the last thing. It is quite possible that Ye.A. Kamenshikov's letter of resignation will evoke absolutely opposite judgments and assessments in some people. The problem of leaving the party is so complex and ambiguous that we should not pretend to have the ultimate truth. Let us look for it together.

Ideology Commission Rountable Speeches Reported

PM0202163790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report of roundtable discussion at 26 January session of CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission: "Leninism and Perestroyka"]

[Text] As has already been reported, a session of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission was held 26 January to discuss topical problems of the Lenin's legacy under contemporary conditions in connection with the forthcoming 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth.

In a short introductory speech V.A. Medvedev, commission chairman, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that perestroyka has raised in very acute fashion the problem of finding a genuinely creative interpretation of Lenin's legacy and understanding Lenin as theoretician, politician, and man.

For more than half a century Leninism was turned into a dogma adapted to the needs of the Stalinist model of state socialism and designed to serve as a justification for authoritarian methods. A whole system of views and claims emerged which was depicted as the only possible and correct version of Marxism-Leninism, while everything else was condemned as heresy and betrayal of the working class cause.

Some people have evidently decided that the time has come to launch a direct attack on Lenin and Leninism. They have used as their basis the works of A. Solzhenitsyn and V. Grossman, which have generated great public interest but provide subjective interpretations of many historical facts. In the discussions which have been launched truth and common sense by no means always prevail.

The touching unity between dyed-in-the-wool dogmatists and the modern "destroyers" of Leninism is very typical. For both of them often depict Stalin as Lenin's successor and a logical link in interpreting and developing his teachings. Both indulge in an antihistorical attitude and have a tendency to use as arguments quotations shorn of context, to which overwhelming importance is attached.

But Lenin and Leninism cannot be understood, nor can their place in world spiritual culture be properly assessed, without a specifically historical approach. Examining events, phenomena, ideological and political trends, and personalities within the single fabric of the historical process is not just a requirement of Marxist social science, but a common methodological principle of social science in general.

The discussion at the Ideological Commission then began. We are printing materials from it, which are being published in abridged form.

G.L. Smirnov, director of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism:

The situation in which the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth is being celebrated this year requires from all of us Leninist communists particular attention, profound analysis, and an exceptionally responsible attitude to Lenin and the Leninist ideological legacy.

Above all and in the main because in a number of East European countries communist parties, having lost their political influence on the masses and on ideological, political, and state life, have found themselves elbowed aside or backing away from power. A considerable number of these parties' members are leaving. All this is being accompanied by a sharply critical attitude from these parties—or, rather, from most of them—toward Lenin and Leninism. The concept of "Marxism-Leninism" is in practice being left out of party documents and out of the party education and propaganda system.

Anti-Leninist ideas have recently become widespread in our party and country. The so-called "doctrinal concept," under which all the disasters experienced by the country—the fierce class struggle, the civil war, the mass terror, and the people's terrible suffering during industrialization and collectivization—result from one and the same causes: the blowing up out of all proportion of the class struggle and the utopian nature of the socialist aspirations of Marx and Lenin, has become popular.

And all this is taking place at a time when our lips were sealed by the arrogance of the self-styled arbiters of the truth. We have received and are receiving numerous reproaches for this.

Last week a party was set up within our party: the Association of Communists—Democratic Platform. While we are discussing the multiparty system, it has become a fact. I am not yet in a position to fully analyze their ideology, but, judging by its published documents, the platform's aim is to unite party members on an anti-Leninist footing.

Here is how the anti-Leninist essence of this new party was defined by one of its leaders: "The existing party (the CPSU) has no future because it is a Leninist party. It is based on the fallacious Leninist model of imposing socialism from above. Fidelity to the Leninist tradition is an important factor in legitimizing the present-day regime—its last bastion. That is why we must reject all features of a party that traces its origins back to Lenin."

These were the words of Professor Yu.N. Afanasyev. He it was also who said that Lenin had no concept of socialism at all.

In order not to slander him excessively, we would repeat that he describes himself as a socialist, but of another kind. His socialism, he claims, is based on the teachings of Christ, the Buddha, Islam, and certain elements of social democracy.

This means that within one party there are to all intents and purposes two parties, two ideologies, and two main avenues of confrontation in the struggle for power. We need to seriously investigate this and at any cost, all the more so as our scientific institutions and party organs are almost entirely maintaining a not fully understandable silence on the subject—as are the party's leading organs, incidentally.

All this requires clear positions from the party in assessing the aforesaid problems—all the more so as we are in the run-up to the 28th Party Congress, and Communists expect these new assessments from the congress.

I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA:

What should we discuss at an Ideological Commission session and how should we go about it? I think we need to discuss which ideas we need to espouse when preparing for the V.I. Lenin anniversary, and what to do in practice. That is, we must conduct a businesslike discussion rather than a lecturers' seminar or a nostalgic "old-style" meeting. That's the first point.

Now to get down to the crux of the question under discussion. Today you can quite often hear it said that the idea of new thinking was Lenin's, that Lenin formulated the thesis of the priority of common human values, and so forth. But Lenin does not at all need to have ascribed to him things that were unnecessary to pursue under the social conditions of that time. Only the threat of universal annihilation allowed mankind to feel united. And the priority in the realization of that belongs rather to Joliot-Curie and Einstein.

At the other extreme are claims that everything new, including an undistorted interpretation of Lenin's legacy, are allegedly only now being produced. This is wrong. We can rely on the work done, for instance, after the 20th party congress. And remember the preparations for the 100th anniversary of Vladimir Ilich's birth—that indeed was a definite breakthrough, it was indeed a new and wide-ranging view of the theoretical wealth of Leninism, a difficult discovery, and a comprehension of the truth.

Of course, even then certain official and flourishing ideologists attempted to adapt the jubilee to their own political and careerist needs and aspirations. But there were also many scientists (including natural scientists) who did very necessary work—specifically in the sphere of the philosophy of science. That was when the foundations were laid and today it only remains for us to want to rise to the same level of thoroughness and seriousness in our approach to the elaboration of Leninist subjects.

What we have to assess is the stage we have now reached. What we must focus our attention on is the features of current approaches to Lenin and Leninism. There has always been criticism of Lenin and Leninism—it would

sometimes increase and sometimes diminish. Incidentally, this criticism depended on the situation prevailing in our country. But what can we see at the moment, what do we need to combat?

We must realize the real acuteness of the situation—namely, that Lenin and Leninism is being rolled back, and not somewhere in the West but in our country, openly, in many newspapers and journals and on the basis of any standpoints you care to name: from monarchism to anarchism. We must focus on the main point and provide guidance for the mass media in that respect. At any rate, we in PRAVDA are now gearing ourselves in this direction. You know that a number of articles have already appeared—including Roy Medvedev's review of Solzhenitsyn's "GULAG Archipelago," where the reviewer criticized the assessments of Lenin contained in the book.

I.I. Antonovich, prorector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences:

Lenin is the pinnacle of late 19th- and early 20th-century theoretical thinking. Perhaps even one of the most brilliant pinnacles, but nevertheless one of the pinnacles. With time every such pinnacle becomes part of the foundations of a culture and itself serves as a foundation from which human genius can soar anew.

The victory of the socialist revolution did not automatically turn into a victory for the system it proclaimed as its aim. With the rejection of the administrative-edict system socialism turned out not to have the organizational and social foundations on which our own creative and positive socialist work could be continued. The reasons behind this socialist tragedy are understandable, but they are hard to eradicate. Operating within the country are very well-organized forces opposed to socialism, forces so evil and fanatical that the outcome of the struggle is unclear. So socialism has reproduced the threat of its own downfall. How could we have failed to notice this?

The easiest thing would have been to blame it on great figures from socialist history—from Lenin to today's leaders. This kind of simplification of history, however, is nothing more than muddleheadedness and by no means well-intentioned muddleheadedness.

The temptation to reread Lenin in order to find in his works the answer to our current troubles is great. Such attempts, however, are just another illusion. Lenin wasn't thinking about us. But he does have a profound methodology for the analysis of social realities, and a political strategy which can indeed be applied under present-day conditions. The very approach to Lenin from the standpoint of what is and isn't obsolete in his work is determined by the harsh conditions of survival.

M.F. Shatrov, dramatist:

Lenin said that there is no better way to kill a political figure than to turn him into an icon. The entire propaganda machine of the party and the state worked on the basis of the idea of deifying and Stalinizing Lenin. Everything in the country—even things of which we are painfully ashamed today and things with which he had no connection—were associated with Lenin's name.

Undistinguished attempts to defend Lenin today end up merely compromising him. But this is not the main source of anti-Leninist sentiments. The main thing, in my view, is that perestroyka is stumbling and that we are moving ahead painfully slowly, even though so much has already been done that it takes your breath away to think of where we were in 1985 and where we are now. If we are defeated in perestroyka, it will prove just one thing—that we Communists of the nineties are undistinguished people unable to find the right way out of the crisis, to rise above our own limitations and egoism, or to curb our own ambitions.

In 1921 Lenin categorically rejected the proposal that elections to the congress on the basis of platforms be canceled—the argument being that if there is unity there should be one platform: the party Central Committee. But what if there were a repetition of the Brest situation, when most of the Central Committee was wrong? Can you guarantee, Lenin said, that such issues will not arise? Nobody could. If circumstances produce fundamental differences of opinion, can we prevent those differences being placed before the entire party? We cannot!

I am convinced that this is precisely our situation today. It is a fateful situation for the party. This situation requires direct elections to the party congress on the basis of alternative platforms. I am a convinced supporter of Gorbachev. I know that there is a Gorbachev platform. Other leaders have their positions, there is the position of communist members of the Interregional Group. Those are three platforms already—if, of course, Comrades Gidaspov, Polozkov, and others do not present us with yet another platform which, behind the facade of perestroyka phrases, will, I fear, be anti-perestroyka in content.

One of the main issues to which we ought to seek an answer during the discussion of these platforms should be, in my view, the question: What legacy are we rejecting? This is more a question of the future than of the past. The inability to provide a clear, Lenin-style answer to this question has already been the undoing of many East European communist parties. I am convinced that if the entire party had open discussions on these platforms, it would find the right answer and would show everyone that a platform is not the road not to a split but to cohesion—as was the case in 1921 and as Lenin understood.

A.A. Belyayev, chief editor of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA:

While in no way denying the importance of debate on purely theoretical issues of Leninism, I think that the

situation today forces us to devote our main attention to an analysis of specific phenomena and trends of a negative order which are seething in our life, increasingly making their presence felt, and winning over supporters to their side.

Thus, for instance, the literature specialist Kozhinov and a number of others have been trying to prove in their articles that Stalin merely continued Lenin's work in the sense of terror and mercilessness toward the people. And they state outright that the terror of the thirties was allegedly an individual period. The genuine terror was under Lenin. And they quote terrifying figures. Moreover, one writer has even gone so far as to state that there was no intervention by the Entente countries. Falsified figures discrediting October and Lenin have been published in NASH SOVREMENNIK, SLOVO, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and other publications under the guise of candor—vigorously, raucously, and threateningly.

But, for instance, the American historian Philip Foner, who has particularly devoted his work to the October Revolution and its impact on the world, quotes different figures about the Red Terror.

He writes: "In the years of the Red Terror the All-Russian Emergency Commission to Combat Counter-revolution and Sabotage [VCHK] shot slightly more than 5,000 people." And the Americans, incidentally, have far more accurate figures and documents on this question than we do. I myself have seen at Stanford University huge depositories of rayon and local committee newspapers issued in 1918. They have amassed all this, collected it, and now proudly show it off to us. During those years, Foner continues, General Mannerheim in southern Finland alone shot more than 13,000 Finnish workers and peasants in one night without trial or investigation merely for having expressed sympathy for Soviet Russia, Lenin, and the revolution. But nobody in the Western press, Foner writes, noticed this white terror or these victims of Mannerheim's.

Nor did they notice—and they still fail to notice—similar cases in our current affairs journalism. Moreover, with the publication of Solzhenitsyn's "GULAG Archipelago"—which itself is strewn with arbitrary judgments on Lenin, the revolution, and the terror—the author who is resolutely opposed to October 1917 is now being dipictedvirtuallt as one of the chief arbiters of our history. Solzhenitsyn's arguments about the revolution are extremely biased and hostile—which he himself bluntly admits. His assessments of Lenin—blatant subjectivism—cannot serve as criteria in our discussion.

V.N. Kudryavtsev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

I'd like to continue what Albert Andreyevich Belyayev and Mikhail Filippovich Shatrov were saying. We need a new, realistic, and objective view of this whole problem, which we are discussing today.

I think that one example of this healthy, objective, and sober approach is the decision by the Commission on 1939 at the Congress of People's Deputies. This is a very vivid example of how to approach the solution of an urgent problem without being afraid of the truth or even being shocked by that truth.

We need to make Lenin's economic views concrete. It is well known that his initial position on the integrated factory was, on the whole, wrong, and he himself subsequently moved away from it. The idea of the national economy as an integrated factory—an idea formulated in 1917 and 1918—was mistaken. To be fair, it should be said that Lenin was not the only one of this opinion. It was a general position which prevailed at that time.

As is well known, even the ideas of the state which existed under Lenin have undergone changes. The state was initially conceived along the lines of the Paris Commune. But by the twenties people had realized that it was impossible for such a state to function in such a huge country as Russia. The Paris Commune was a police state. But Lenin nonetheless managed to lay the foundations of a rule-of-law state. I'm not speaking as a lawyer. He personally wrote all the first decrees and codes. And, as you known, when the Civil War ended it was his decree that abolished the VCHK. Thus, the path to the new state was not found straightaway. And the main thing which I would like to emphasize in this respect is that life itself made the corrections.

As for such an important issue as the nationalities question, I think that Lenin was indisputably correct in that area. I cannot see a single point of his policy which we could criticize.

The principle of the historical method is also needed in assessing Lenin's foreign policy.

Finally, consider such an important question as Lenin and internal party life. A new view of the party and internal party relations was expressed in Lenin's final works. I think that they also need objective analysis and reconsideration.

R.G. Yanovskiy, rector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

The criticism of the theory of scientific socialism and Lenin's creative legacy which has been launched now is acquiring an increasingly belligerent and, I would say, even an aggressive character.

The transition from the criticism of Stalinism to the criticism of Lenin and his teachings is clearly visible. It is quite clearly the same aim—to destroy and demolish the ideological foundations of our party, to debunk its theory and ideology, and to remove the scientific bases of its activity.

I would also like to draw attention to the definition of the term "Leninism." In the minds of many people, Leninism is associated with the views not of Lenin

himself but of Stalin. Stalin deified Lenin. That Lenin stereotype is preserved to this day.

Undoubtedly Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was right when he stressed in conversation Gabriel Garcia Marquez that while showing the mistakes and tragedies we should not allow disrespect for previous generations.

I believe that we should step up the production of socialist literature, acquaint the public at large with the works of Gramsci, Togliatti, and Mehring, and return to Pleknanov, who was one of the most educated European Marxists who even now has not been surpassed in many respects. It is also useful to return to the ideas of Herzen and Chernyshevskiy. Work is already being launched in that direction at the USSR Academy of Sciences and the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

Yu.A. Krasin, rector of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute.

In my comment I should like to briefly outline three methodological positions which seem to me particularly important today.

The first is the historical method of assessment. In theory we have acknowledged this: Lenin is multifaceted, we have abandoned the ideological preformism, when a Lenin quoteation—no matter what period it is from—represented the whole of Leninism.

Clearly, it is necessary to return to Marx's formula that socialism for us is not an ideal but a real historical movement. And it is from that historical movement that it is necessary to proceed. The stress must be shifted from the mass movement to the accumulation of ideas and to the transformation of parties—I have in mind not just our own but others, too—into a crucible where a completely new historical experience is produced.

In addition, there must be a scientific-critical analysis of Leninism itself. Leninism reflected the political culture of the spirit of class confrontation which dominated the initial stages of society's development when it was a question of achieving the first historical breakthrough and, furthermore, in a poorly developed country which lacked adequate economic and social preconditions. It is right to say now, for example, that democracy is just a form of a state? After all, generally speaking, panhuman values are not connected with the state.

When reflecting on our legacy we should address the totality of socialist ideas in the 20th century. It would be beneficial to reread Kautskiy and Bernstein. For instance, Bernstein was the first to point out the restricted nature of the use of violence and expressed the very interesting idea on personal responsibility in the economic system. He has other ideas which also merit attention and study.

Our main task is to enhance the significance of contemporary Marxist thinking, which cannot be reduced to what Lenin said even if only because entirely new realities exist today which it would have been difficult even to imagine in the first half of the 20th century. A gigantic leap forward has occurred in the development of modern civilization, one which has yet to receive objective assessment.

G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

If you look at the global changes which occurred between the beginning of the October Revolution and perestroyka you will see that the most considered, most serious document providing an assessment of those changes and illustrating the importance of Lenin's ideas is M.S. Gorbachev's report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. I would also add here his article on socialist ideas. They define not only the lines and links but also outline the problems occurring in our conversation: Lenin and perestroyka. In today's clash of opinions both the report and the article help to shape a position and provide evidence because it is only scientific evidence which convinces people.

The second point is the need to use the vast potential of Lenin the Philosopher, a philosopher, furthermore, not only in the social plane but also the natural one. His work "Materialism and Empiriocriticism," which is staggering in its force and foresight, has effectively become a manual for scientists.

There is another question. I recently visited academic centers in the Volga region and I went to Ulyanovsk. A magnificent Lenin center has been built there. But I was greatly worried by the fact that this vast exhibition offered no scientific guidance. The comrades whom I spoke with rely mainly on viewpoints expressed in newspapers and journals. Often those are not scientific opinions but the kind now prevalent in society. We should think about creating an academic nucleus which could help on a serious scientific basis to improve the work of museums and all centers engaged in the study and propaganda of Lenin's ideological legacy.

N.N. Maslov, professor of the Moscow Higher Party School.

Speaking about young people, particularly students, I think that interest in Lenin has declined. This is largely due to the gross error committed when the teaching of the CPSU history course was abolished in higher educational institutions. The party history course was replaced by the introduction of a new subject—"20th Century Sociopolitical History." A subject which is not a science but an eclectic amalgam gleaned from various sciences, which makes it impossible to form an integrated picture of the development of the historical process.

An historical attitude to Lenin is precisely what is needed. The icon that we have turned him into is really viewed in a negative light.

In this connection I would draw attention to just one category: Lenin's understanding of party-mindedness. Many people now, it seems to me, adhere to the view

that the party-mindedness of a work, for example, means how it corresponds to the latest party Central Committee resolution. Yet that is utterly wrong. Lenin viewed party-mindedness as the ultimate form of objectivity. Lenin considered that only a scientific understanding makes it possible to elaborate a party assessment of a given phenomenon or problem. Unfortunately, we are a long way from achieving such an approach to party-mindedness now.

M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting [Gosteleradio].

I want to make three points. Perhaps they will be apposite.

First, our Ideological Commission is not an ideological seminar. Therefore we are interested in what it produces, what recommendations it makes. I do not think that in the era of the spread of democratism we should be afraid of ideological recommendations so long as they aren't stupid ones.

Second, I believe that we are now in ideological confrontation with the opponents of the party and socialism, essentially we are at the crucial point where Vladimir Ilich Lenin is the final frontier. I think that when historians analyze all these years that we have experienced they will characterize them as a period of astonishing ideological passivity and helplessness. And in many instances they will find no arguments to explain this. In any event, sometimes I cannot find them. Perhaps the only argument, which was expressed at the Central Committee plenum, is that all the party's ills stem from the fact that it is too disciplined and organized.

For understandable reasons I am very interested and worried by the question of the party and television, the state and television, and the role of television generally in contemporary society. What is it, this television? Have we fully understood it? There is more than enough criticism around. In some cases this criticism is just, in others not. We intervene when we see a program which is unobjective and sometimes even harmful in character. That is a natural process—that's the job of an editor, to put matters right. Otherwise he it totally redundant.

The main problem for television workers is that of ideological, political pluralism. Youth, workers', writers', and scientific newspapers and journals express the diversity of opinions in society. But Gosteleradio expresses a single opinion. Therefore, there must be an alternative television system. In connection with the preparation of the Law on the Press, we are preparing proposals on a separate law on radio and television.

The third remark. I am worried (as, I think, are many other members of the Ideological Commission, too) by the fact that surprisingly we are constantly late. Since we have created such a structure as the Ideological Commission that structure must act.

V.V. Chikin, chief editor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

When speaking about the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth, there is surely no need for special concern at the fact that we will have some cheap sort of jubilee or that this will be a repetition of the past. I think that we should be worried about something else, the fact that the press may prove unduly inert and may ignore many things.

We hardly need to start everything from scratch now. After all, in the past 30 years and even though this was the era of stagnation, human intellect was working. The 20th Congress, undoubtedly, gave it a considerable impetus. There are many good works in the sphere of science, the sphere of artistic creativity, even in the sphere of current affairs journalism. If we reject that, and if we organize everything anew, so to speak, there will be very considerable losses both in terms of time and of people.

It is my impression that the Ideological Department and even the Central Committee do not see very clearly which forces that they can confidently rely on here. Perhaps it would be a good idea to hold a gathering of such forces? It is necessary to enable us to organize some kind of resistance movement to what is destroying Leninism and socialist ideas. In this respect the role of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism is somewhat different. In the era of stagnation it played the role more of an ideological censor. Now, however, I should like to see it spearheading the consolidation of forces capable of working toward the rebirth of Leninism in present conditions.

V.G. Zakharov, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers.

Within society there is a struggle for political power underway, an open struggle, a struggle between fronts, movements, and so forth. The representatives of certain power-hungry forces realize that they cannot win this struggle unless they debunk the party and Leninism. We sometimes help them in this by our mistakes, including our propaganda mistakes.

Inane propaganda efforts turned Leninism into a faith. But Leninism is a science, not a faith. Quotation-mongering comes into this category. No doubt each of us is analyzing this phenomenon. Whereas before we used to quote whole chunks now we don't even quote phrases or lines, instead we sometimes take three words from a phrase by Lenin and put them in quotemarks even though these words by themselves mean little. We are still doing Leninism a disservice by linking all concrete, practical steps with it. If we introduce a reform it is a Leninist reform, we do something, it is a Leninist action, and so forth. We have to get away from this and become accustomed to answering for our own actions.

V.A. Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda CPSU Oblast Committee.

We are discussing the party organizations' program of work in connection with the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth. But without regard for what is going on in primary party organizations and labor collectives today. It seems to me that we are oversimplifying the situation and to such an extent that subsequent events may take us completely by surprise.

What do I have in mind here? Since arriving from Latvia I had to spend literally 2-3 hours a day the past few days standing on platforms in labor collectives and in front of party and soviet aktivs. And everywhere I have had to justify myself and defend myself from angry criticism, really angry. Because they stem from a concern for the situation. In addition, we underestimate the powerful influence that events in Eastern Europe have had on rank-and-file Communists. A new exodus from the party has begun, representatives of the working class and the peasantry are leaving, by no means their worst representatives.

Here is the remarkable thing. In this situation people, despite all the criticism of the party for various aspects of policy and ideological work, will absolutely reject criticism of Lenin. They will reject it simply from Russian instinct, since I am talking on behalf of a Russian oblast. And we must rely more actively on Communists' belief in the correctness of Lenin and his teachings.

G.A. Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education: One of the speakers here today said the following: The people are beginning to think that we are engaged in reevaluating Lenin. Of course, we are engaged not only in reevaluating Lenin but also in reevaluating policy and elaborating the party's new position. This is a totally inevitable process because the conditions in which the party previously existed have changed. But the people defined their position long ago on Article 6 of the Constitution. The vanguard cannot be the vanguard [merely] because that is what is written in the Constitution. It can and must exercise vanguard functions but they are functions, rather than an article of the Constitution.

I cannot fail to answer N.N. Maslov here regarding the abolition of the teaching of the CPSU history course. We were forced to abolish it because teaching this course was not advantageous but detrimental to the CPSU. Real history cannot be altered, but we are obliged to reevaluate it—and in a broader context than our country's experience alone.

V.A. Medvedev: Effectively everything that we have tackled of late revolves around the subject of socialist choice, October, Lenin, overcoming past alien accretions, and preventing one-sidedness and negativism in assessing the products of the post-October period.

Our dual task is to rid Leninism of dogmatization and all manner of falsehood and creatively develop its vast potential as applicable to changing reality.

We can now see that the process of relieving Lenin of Stalinist distortions is not that simple because the latter have become deeply ingrained in both the theoretical and everyday consciousness. Every time that a new set of problems emerges in the perestroyka process and every time that we more or less begin to have an in-depth realization of various phenomena in public life, we encounter these stereotypes which do not in fact stand the test of logic or theory or—and this is the main point—the test of practice.

Remember our discussion of the ideological aspects of the nationalities problem at the commission session. The Stalinist vulgarization on the nationalities question has still not been substantially revised in literature. The correlation of social and national elements along with the actual definition of the nation were dogmatized and a great deal needs to be reviewed. Take questions relating to the political system. This is where the retreat from Lenin is most serious.

At the same time an increasingly vigorous offensive, masquerading as a struggle to combat Stalinist distortions, has been mounted of late against Leninism. Leninism has been declared to be utopia, irresponsible social experimentation which failed and discredited itself. Lenin has been accused of absolutizing the policy of revolutionary terror and justifying mass repressions. In the version presented by some journalists he appears as a devotee of barrack-room totalitarian socialism and the narrow class approach. Machiavellianism and all manner of human vices—ruthlessness and cynicism—have been ascribed to Lenin, and he has been accused of amorality.

People would take a particular statement out of context, assess it subjectively, and send it on its way. Thus, for instance, a row broke out over the slogan "plunder what's been plundered." Those who began to fan speculation on this question, did not bother to read the appropriate work by Lenin in its entirety, nor did they manage to ponder the historical context. Admittedly, the chain reaction was, in my opinion, severed after the convincing statement by three authors in the journal RODINA criticizing V. Soloukhin's article. This is an example of how public consciousness can really be influenced if one acts in a reasoned and convincing fashion.

The escape from dogmatization must be indissolubly linked with the defense of Leninism against attacks from both Right and Left. This is effectively a single task because Leninism cannot be defended without ridding it of distortions.

Lenin's meaning can be understand only in progression [v razvitii], in the historical context. Lenin's ideas and conclusions which he reached at the end of his life are of the greatest importance for us today. From his views of socialism, which he developed and agonized over on the basis of practical experience we derive many of the ideas

and approaches that are so necessary to define the strategic guidelines in the policy of renewal.

Lenin has no need of apologetics. Incidentally, it was those who dogmatized Lenin who said most about his infallibility. I believe that it was correctly pointed out that Stalin was perhaps the only man who did not formally oppose Lenin on any question verbally, so to speak, and, foaming at the mouth, defended him. Although, in his attempt to impart to Lenin's theoretical views the meaning he needed, he effectively rejected him.

I agree with the statement made here: The advance of perestroyka is the best defense of Lenin and Leninism. I think that we have obtained both new arguments and new food for thought, for active theoretical and ideological work at the impending party Central Committee plenum.

I would approach the subject "Leninism and Perestroyka" from the following viewpoint. Perestroyka is in effect a process of resolving two interconnected tasks.

The first stems from the ongoing development of society, and the world community as a whole. If socialism had not been distorted in our country, life would still confront us with the major problems involved in the transformation of economic, political, and social mechanisms. At the same time the specific nature and substance of perestroyka are determined by the fact that we have to overcome the mistakes that have been committed and abandon the administrative-state socialist model. That is the other side of the coin, which is, of course, closely linked with the first.

Combining both tasks exceptionally complicates the actual perestroyka process, where it is necessary to resolve new questions raised by social progress, answer the challenge of the time, and rectify everything that distorted the image of socialism in the past. In both the first and second respects Lenin is a very reliable and necessary helpmate for us.

Admittedly, I would somewhat alter the emphasis as regards the rehabilitation and reconsideration of Lenin's legacy and as regards returning to the sources. Today in the press writers' attention often confines itself to which elements of Lenin's legacy must be disputed and which abandoned. But I believe that the emphasis must rest on how Lenin helps us. Our stance is important here. It will be extremely one-sided and limited if we only embark on discovering those elements that require revision rather than seeing those elements in Lenin's legacy that serve our purpose.

Of course, under Lenin there was universal labor service, direct distribution, rigid centralized government, mass nationalization, and direct state appropriation, and other features of "War Communism." However, it is well known that Lenin himself abandoned them as soon as conditions changed. It was he who began to develop the ideas of the need for diverse forms of socialist ownership, the combination of personal interest and public benefit, extensive use of commodity-money relations, and development of economic accountability, the lease, and cooperation.

Take the highly acute yet topical problem of the struggle of opinions within the party. We will not advance one step without respect for the minority position. After all new ideas always emerge only in some part of the party, in some section of leadership. Then, as they are discussed, some fall by the wayside, while others win the right to life if they accord with the real requirements of development.

The process of ridding the CPSU of authoritarianism and alien functions which linked the party with the administrative-edict system falls within the mainstream of Lenin's ideas of the party and its role. A renewed CPSU must be a party that serves the people, expresses the latter's interests in its policy, and is democratically controlled by the people. A party open to constructive political debate, creative innovation, alternative approaches and programs, and prepared for fruitful dialogue, cooperation, and agreement with everyone who holds the country's future dear.

Lenin's ideas of popular self-government, sovereignty for the soviets, worker control, and the fight against "bureaucratic banditry" are profoundly topical for us. We are reverting to Lenin's idea of a fully-fledged federation of sovereign peoples, voluntarily associated within the USSR, and nations' right to self-determination. Once again we are getting a grasp of the dialectic of the national and international, trends toward integration and combining forces in the economy, science, and politics, on the one hand, and boosting national consciousness and the peoples' striving for self-affirmation on the other.

We are now reviving Lenin's vision of socialism as a democratic system that embodies the general world humanist tradition, regards lively creative work by the popular masses as being of paramount importance, and sees the aim and purpose of social development as being an opportunity for every individual to realize their potential to the fullest extent.

Today Lenin's teaching of socialism taken overall, in all its depth, also helps us have a better view of the ways to advance and acts as a spiritual force. But for this it must be creatively developed, relying on world experience, profound analysis of reality, and the dialectical method of knowledge, of which Lenin had a masterly command.

This approach has the indisputable advantage of stemming from life's internal dynamics, gearing thought to comprehensive analysis of all life's real diversity and interconnections. This method insures the researcher and the politician against the absolutization of opposites because it initially acknowledges their objectivity, mobility, and relativity determined by specific historical conditions.

When resolving the task of progressing to highly modern forms of socialism, we must put the methodological aspect of Lenin's legacy, its ruthless realism, and fearless progression, into the foreground.

What practical conclusions stem from today's discussion?

In view of the proposals voiced, I believe that it would be advisable to prepare recommendations for party committees on the basis of the material that has been submitted in connection with the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth and also inform them of the main events in Moscow, bearing in mind the businesslike nature of this work and its close connection with precongress debate within the party. [Medvedev ends]

An exchange of opinions took place at the sitting regarding the results of the Ideological Commission's work last year and a plan was outlined for the coming period. A.S. Kapto, head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department; V.V. Karpov, first secretary of the USSR Writers Union Board; and A.Ya. Degtyarev, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, spoke on this question.

It was noted that the four commission sessions held since last January have considered major questions relating to ideological activity. The draft Law on the Press and Other Mass Media has been discussed. Work on it subsequently continued within the USSR Supreme Soviet and it is now under extensive public discussion. Another session discussed the ideological aspects of interethnic relations. The results of the exchange of opinions were used when preparing the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum. In the fall a session was held (in conjunction with other commissions) which analyzed party organizations' work in the course of the elections of USSR people's deputies and elaborated the appropriate recommendations. The draft Law on Freedom of Conscience was also examined. There have been regular working meetings between commission members and mass media leaders.

At the same time the participants in the session made serious comments regarding the commission's work aimed at improving and changing the forms of its activity. In particular, the idea that some commission members should perform their duties on a permanent basis was voiced. This would enhance the commission's effectiveness and its role in resolving complex problems related to the restructuring of ideological work.

Future Policies, Organization of Komsomol Viewed

90US0548A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Zyukin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol: "The Current Situation—A Decision Based on Principle Would Be Sensible"]

[Text]

Models and "Modelers"

Since I am visiting a "debating hall" today, I will not only expound my point of view on the future of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], but I will also partially debate with those who have already set forth their points of view.

Several positions that describe a possible Komsomol model and the youth movement in the country have already been formed in the process of discussing the future of the Komsomol. What is common here is the understanding that the epoch of single, monopolistic youth organizations are a thing of the past. We all realize that alternative structures must perform as fully equal partners in the youth movement. But what the Komsomol should represent in this new environment is interpreted in different ways. To reach more objective conclusions, we will turn to the latest experience of the youth leagues in East Europe. It is most appropriate to analyze the situation in Hungary and the GDR where, as it is here, virtually only one mass youth organization existed.

Radical sociopolitical changes in these countries are wrecking the former model of the youth movement. The first reaction to this was the attempt of the leagues to transform themselves into organizations with practically unlimited political and organizational pluralism. That is, into the kind of organizations that unite youth structures that are drawn up not only according to the traditional social features and interests, but also according to political positions, and, moreover, over a broad range. This made it possible to restrain the centrifugal political processes for only a short time. The entry of societies into a multiparty stage led to a breakup of the leagues that had the character of broad youth fronts. Groups of youth, having different political and economic aspirations and a different scale of ideological values, are being drawn to the political platforms of one or another party.

The intensification of competition for influence over the youth is forcing the leagues to define their place and political position in society. They are already persuaded that a youth political organization cannot exist without close ties with its party, and that it will be squeezed out of public life, if it does not show itself to be a serious political factor in the transition period.

Incidentally, a majority of the newly emerging organizations there are attracted to one or another adult structure.

But let us return to ourselves in this country. As I have already said there are various points of view concerning the Komsomol model and the youth movement. But, perhaps, two are predominant.

And So, the First Model

The first model is a mass youth organization united on a platform of universal human and national values and based on a unification of various political forces. It is

precisely this, as I understood it, that Anatoliy Blyudin proposes in the last issue of SPOR-ZAL (I am not talking now about his second proposal—a federation, about which there will be more below). Here he says that such a decision "will corroborate the sincerity of the intentions of the Komsomol to renounce monopoly in the youth movement." But I think the opposite—it will be a camouflaged attempt again to drag one and all into one organization and to restore monopoly. Since we believe that it is necessary that numerous equal youth organizations exist, then why are we trying again to put the most diverse political forces under one roof (the Komsomol or the FSSSM [Federation of Socialist Leagues of Soviet Youth])? Real pluralism actually presupposes the equal coexistence of communist, socialist, democratic, and other leagues. Moreover, the above illustrates the impracticality of such a structure on the example of East Europe. We can forecast that "adult pluralism" is quite possible in our country as well (and there are already absolutely realistic symptoms of this). Therefore, the attempt to monopolize the various political forces through the creation of a super-tolerant organization, it seems to me, does not have much of a future.

This, of course, does not mean that structures should not be created that would unite various youth organizations and that would facilitate coordination of activity in the realization of common tasks and the protection of the rights of youth. But here it is a question not about organization, but rather about a coalition of youth forces, a youth front, an association. The first real steps in this direction have already been taken—the reorganization of the KMO [Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR]. It is this that we view as a possibility for consolidating youth organizations for joint work.

The Komsomol displayed goodwill—it offered the existing structure with its ties and brought in its own dues for everyone who wants to cooperate. To the extent that the composition of the KMO is expanded, we are prepared collectively to make changes in its program documents and statutes and in its principles of construction and activity.

We appreciate the complexity of forming new youth organizations. And we understand that part of their staff is made up on the basis of current members of the Komsomol. Therefore, I believe it is correct to look into the possibility of support for them by the Youth Commercial Bank, where the basic funds of the Komsomol are accumulated. To examine the possibility of crediting, investment in enterprises and economic subdivisions of new organizations, and the inclusion of shareholders in the bank. To look into the utilization of the educational institutions of the Komsomol, the tourist base, and houses and palaces of youth in joint measures and programs. I think that it is precisely this kind of an approach that is rational in the formation of the youth movement in the country.

Therefore, I think that the model which proposes a reorganization of the Komsomol in an all-encompassing structure of different youth political forces is not acceptable. It will once again attempt to monopolize a great part of the youth. The development of a political position in such an organization (as the experience of our friends shows) will be practically impossible, and as society's political system develops in the near future, the organization can be torn apart.

The Second Approach

The Komsomol, as a youth organization, having a clear political program with a high level of intra-league democracy, is built taking into account the specifics of the state and public structure, and the possibility of self-development, like the CPSU. Recognizing the direct dependence of the future of such an organization on the stability of the positions of the CPSU, the very character of the relations with the party, of course, must be changed radically. The participation of the Komsomol in the formation of the political party must become normal practice. If a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is being prepared, this means that a plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee should consider these questions ahead of time and develop its position and openly declare it and defend it. The practice of only the first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee representing the Komsomol in the CPSU Central Committee (and almost the same state of affairs exists in party committees at all levels) must also become a thing of the past. More than half a million members of the CPSU are in the Komsomol, which is a significant part of the party. Also, it is a young, energetic, and radically inclined part. Therefore, contributing to a renewal of the party, we must campaign for an adequate representation of Komsomol-Communist members in the elected organs of the party.

We must give maximum support precisely to those forces in the party that come out for changes and radical reforms, that assess the situation soberly, and that act logically. And, on the contrary, where there is conservatism, resistance to progressive changes, and violation of the principles of social justice, we must demand changes in positions and, if necessary, also changes in the staffs of elected organs. As happened not long ago in Volgograd.

Priority—One, Priority—Two...

First, about priorities in its activity. They issue logically from the fundamental aim of the Komsomol, which we defined in the published draft of the Komsomol Statutes as—to assist the young person in his development and to unite young people for participation in the building of a socialist democratic society.

The first priority is the political campaign to gain, in the person of its representatives, parts of the authoritative power in the state for implementing its own program tasks, for forming and implementing state youth policy, and for protecting the rights and interests of young people. To achieve its own participation in the activity of the soviets at all levels, in the executive organs of state

authority, and in the self-government of enterprises. To participate actively in the activity of creating legislation and forming plans for socioeconomic development.

The second priority is the implementation of social programs by means of the Komsomol's own organizational and material capabilities. This assumes the development of such directions of activity as the MZhK [Youth Housing Complex], the NTTM [Scientific-Technical Youth Association], youth tourism, and youth centers. The selection of specific directions of activity is up to the Komsomol organization itself. But together with this, it seems to me, there is a kind of direction, the kind of form of work that, under current real conditions, could become the pivotal point in this priority. Here is a little more detail. The basic interests of a young person are education, work, and rest. Of course, the Komsomol cannot resolve these problems with its own resources, and, indeed, it should not. But it can guarantee the prerequisites for the resolution of these problems. We are talking about the establishment of centers of information for young people. Imagine the creation of a whole network of information centers on the basis of the currently existing management structure in the Komsomol (obkoms, [oblast party committees], raykoms [rayon party committees], and primary organizational committees), where a young person could always receive information about training, work, and rest. There is legal consultation here on all production and everyday situations. Of course, this assumes the establishment of a broad modern computer network with a powerful information center and a developed system of information subscribers. But this is absolutely realistic, providing there is a concentration of the organizational and material capabilities of the Komsomol.

I will digress a little—the establishment of a broad network of information centers would put a new formation in the Komsomol model—an information center, i.e., a unique club which, together with the primary organization, would be the basic element of the Komsomol. And to the extent of the development of society and the Komsomol, it could also become the dominant form in the structure of the Komsomol. (The club system of building is typical of a number of foreign youth organizations.)

Maximum Degrees of Freedom

Now about the structure of the organization itself. First of all, I think that to attempt at the 21st Congress to ratify this kind of an organizational model that would be stable for the next five to seven years is a futile undertaking. Today, the state and society are in a transitional period, the political and economic systems are being reformed, the traditional interpretation of federation is changing, and new mechanisms for the cooperation of social structures are just emerging. Therefore, the task, in my opinion, should be set in this way—to propose a Komsomol model that would have a maximum of internal degrees of freedom and that would be capable of self-change equivalent to that which occurs in society. Essentially, we have to create a new type of organization.

In this connection, the following fundamental approaches could be used as a basis for internal Komsomol reforms:

—First, affirmation of the real freedom of members of the Komsomol—from voluntary enrollment in the Komsomol to voluntary withdrawal from its membership; affirmation of the freedom that is dialectically interconnected with the necessity for deliberate adherence to internal league discipline, and the affirmation of freedom from assumed Komsomol obligations;

—Second, the establishment of a real priority of the primary Komsomol organizations, in accordance with which the life and activity of the Komsomol is structured by proceeding from their interests;

—Third, the intensification of the democracy of all internal league relations, and a clear demarcation of the authority of the center and local organizations and the jurisdiction of elected organs and apparatuses;

—Fourth, the elimination of ossification and predetermination in building the Komsomol, and the creation of the necessary flexibility in the organizational arrangement and structure, taking its real needs into account;

—Fifth, the creation of all of the necessary conditions for real independence of the LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] of the union republics, taking into account the peculiarities of the federative structure of our state in the construction and activity of the Komsomol.

In accordance with these approaches, the new Komsomol statutes, obviously, should contain basically those norms which would define the rights and obligations of Komsomol members, the rights of the primary organizations and of the LKSM of the union republics, and also the main comprehensive norms that guarantee the democracy of internal league relations.

I believe that it is necessary, in addition to the traditional rights of a Komsomol member, to ensure his statute rights to the protection of his interests by the Komsomol organizations and organs, and the mass media, and to utilize the political, organizational, and material capabilities of the Komsomol for this.

The priority of the primary organization should be assured by its right to decide all questions of its life and activity without exception, except for those whose resolution it delegated to a higher body. And, of course, the right to be a legal person, to use its finances, means, and property independently, to conduct publishing activity, and to have its own information organs.

Special discussions evoke the basic principles of the life and activity of the Komsomol. As a rule, a debate goes on between the supporters of democratic centralism and

the so-called democratic unity. In both of these principles, a majority of the norms coincide (collectiveness, collegiality, electability, etc.). There are differences on two key principles—the relationships of the higher and lower organs and the rights of the majority and the minority. What to call this collection of norms is not that important—the main thing is that, on the one hand, they assure a high level of democracy, and, on the other hand, that they make it possible to link up and to coordinate the activity of different elements of the Komsomol. And this, I think, can be achieved with approaches like this.

First, the decision of a higher organ is binding on a lower organ, if it is made within the bounds of its jurisdiction, and which was authorized to this organ by the lower organization. The organizations themselves must define the functions and authorities of their elected organs.

The second norm is that respect and protection for the rights of the majority and the minority are guaranteed by the right of the majority to act in behalf of the entire organization and to utilize its resources, by a priority in the formation of elected organs, and by the right of the minority to defend its position by appealing to public opinion and to create its own organization.

The new statutes must ensure a correct resolution of the question concerning the possibility of creating a corresponding structure according to categories of youth inside the Komsomol.

In this connection, it is advisable to provide for the possibility of conducting forums or conferences of students, pupils, and creative young people, etc., in the territories. It would be possible at these to elect their own managerial organs that would work in contact with territorial committees, and that would directly delegate their own representatives to the congresses and conferences of the appropriate Komsomol organizations and to the staffs of their elected organs. In this way, the primary organizations, established on the basis of a community of interests of the Komsomol members, could unite their efforts.

Now about the LKSM of the union republics. It is perfectly obvious that an All-Union sociopolitical organization in a federated state cannot but have an appropriate specific structure. And here I want to agree with the proposal by Anatoliy Blyudin.

Komsomol members, united in primary organizations, afterwards in rayon, city, and so forth, organizations, to a level of union republics, form an independent sociopolitical organization that has its inherent specific character capable of fully interacting with all republic structures. And it is probably improper to talk today about expanding the rights of the LKSM of union republics. To the contrary, the LKSM's of union republics, having their own full rights, join together on a voluntary and equal basis, and they delegate a part of their rights to the central elected organs for coordinating their own activities and resolving common Komsomol tasks, participating in this through guaranteed representation in elected organs.

Of course, all questions of determining the structure of their union, procedures for forming elected organs, determination of the budget, the creation of establishments and enterprises, the compilation of reports, etc., must be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LKSM's of the union republics. But it would be possible to establish the rights of the Komsomol Central Committee and its functions and authorities by a special resolution of the congress. You see, the congress, in fact, is a general meeting of authorized representatives of Komsomol organizations of all of the union republics.

Of course, the implementation of such a Komsomol model presupposes the ability of the LKSM's of the union republics to have their own statutes or normative documents, and it will require a transition period, during which there should be a synchronization of statute norms of the LKSM's of the union republics and the Komsomol as a single whole. Therefore, it would be expedient to introduce changes to the new Komsomol statutes while conducting this work during 1990 and, afterwards, as required.

As can be seen, the proposed model defines the Komsomol both as a single organization and as an alliance of leagues, with elements of a federated structure. And here there are no real contradictions, but rather the complexity of a perception that is conditioned by the either-or stereotypes that have developed in our country. No, a young person joining the Komsomol in Belorussia becomes a member of the LKSM of Belorussia or, the other way around, in joining the LKSM of Belorussia, he becomes a member of the Komsomol.

In summary, I come to the conclusion that it is the second model of the Komsomol that is most acceptable for presentation to the 21st Congress.

P.S. Several words about the problems that did not get into the main canvas. Among the many proposals of the participants in the precongress discussions, there are such as these:

1. Grant the right of a primary organization to exclude a member from its own organization, while not excluding him from the Komsomol.

2. Members of the elected organs of the Komsomol are elected in primary organizations on the basis of a universal, equal, and direct elective right.

It would appear that everything is democratic. But let us look into it.

Regarding the first, in actual fact a mechanism is being proposed to fight against those who think differently. If someone who makes us uncomfortable gets in—kick him out of the organization. Where is the right of the

minority here, and where then will be the source of differences of opinions that force us to search for the most effective way of development?

On the second point. A specific example—in order to conduct reports and elections according to a proposed schedule before the congress, it is necessary to establish five types of electoral districts everywhere—for elections to raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, the central committee of the republic, and the Komsomol Central Committee. Each Komsomol member will be handed five ballots, on which, apparently, there will be five or more names each. He will have to study and compare 25 or more programs and platforms of people with whom it will hardly be possible to meet, get acquainted with, and understand. And afterwards also, perhaps, there will be revoting several times.

And, in addition to the members of the elected organs, it will be necessary also to elect delegates at all of these levels. This is close to being absurd. Not even mentioning the fact that elementary reports say that the expenditures on such elections are in the hundreds of millions of rubles, and, taking into account the changes and recall of those elected, the entire Komsomol budget is not enough.

This does not mean that elections in that manner by electoral districts are impossible on the whole. They are possible and feasible, but at individual levels, and as a one-time but not as a mass practice. Incidentally, the decision of the Komsomol Central Committee on the election of delegates to the 21st Congress and the recommendations to the Komsomol Central Committee provided for such a possibility. To include this norm in the Komsomol statutes as obligatory for everyone, is to end up in a blind alley.

Teenage Crime Rate Increases in USSR

LD2102114190 Moscow TASS in English 0600 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—Some 224,000 crimes were committed by teen-agers in the USSR in 1989, an increase of 21.2 per cent on 1988. Every tenth of all the crimes registered last year was committed by a minor. As many as 111,495 teen-agers were brought to criminal responsibility last year. This is an increase of 22 per cent on 1989. These statistics were cited at a briefing at the Soviet Interior Ministry on Tuesday.

Crimes of minors increasingly affect the criminogenic situation in the country. These crimes show increasingly a mercenary nature. Thefts and robberies make up for 67 per cent of teen-age crime. Organised crime begins to predominate. It accounts for 67.8 per cent of crimes.

The Soviet Interior Ministry has the information that the number of crimes committed by minors when drunk went up by almost 40 per cent, the number of crime committed under the effect of drugs increased by 21.3 per cent. The repeated relapse into crime is not reducing. Teen-agers are involved in crime largely due to the fact that their employment is not ensured, the briefing was told. The Interior Ministry sees a way of remedying the situation in taking urgent measures to overcome serious shortcomings in the activity of Interior Ministry bodies for the prevention, exposure and investigation of crimes committed by minors.

New Aeroflot Routes, Offices To Open

PM2102115990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by V. Belikov: "Airline Tickets To Go Abroad"]

[Text] This year 5 million passengers will enjoy the services of Aeroflot on flights abroad.

The traditional summer air navigation on international routes begins at the end of March but preparation has already begun for this most strenuous period of passenger shipments. Now flights abroad are undertaken by 19 territorial civil aviation administrations, which has made it possible to increase the number of Soviet citizens with communications with abroad and has partly unburdened Moscow of transit passengers.

From our country's largest international airport—Sheremetyevo-II—flights will be opened on the superlong hauls to Shanghai and Seoul and also to the capital of Nepal—Kathmandu. Flights will begin from Moscow to Barcelona, Ostrava, and the main city of Zimbabwe—Harare. There will be an increase in the frequency of flights and more capacious aircraft will appear on the routes to New York, Paris, Tokyo, Frankfurt am Main, Vienna, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Havana, and Warsaw.

A recent study showed that to this day four out of every five people waiting in line in Moscow to acquire a ticket to fly abroad live outside the city. Aeroflot's central international agency proposes in the very near future to open additional ticket offices in several places in the capital for the sale of airline tickets for flights abroad and to specialize them according to categories of passengers.

Those who want to go to the North American countries and Israel will be able to buy airline tickets in the premises on Yeniseyskaya Street, near "Babushkinskaya" subway station. The sale of tickets for flights to the West European countries will be organized in the region of the "Planernaya" subway station. Foreign students studying in our country will start to be served by a ticket office to open in the Southwest, where the P. Lumumba University of the Friendship of the Peoples is situated. Workers of the USSR Academy of Sciences and other scientific specialists will be able to draw up papers for flights abroad on Lenin Avenue. An airline ticket office in the center, on Petrovka Street, will begin work. It is intended for Soviet citizens traveling abroad on official business trips.

The preparation of premises and the fitting out of new ticket offices is no simple matter, but it is extremely

necessary for the thousands of air travelers going beyond our country. Aeroflot has the right to count on aid from the Moscow City Soviet to ensure that work is completed and that the opening takes place within a very rapid deadline which, incidentally, has already been deferred repeatedly.

CPSU Communist Party Consulting Room Noted

LD2102231990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by S. Lomakin]

[Text] [Announcer] If a party member is faced with some complicated problems, which are not being resolved in the primary or oblast organizations, he can appeal directly to the Party's Central Committee.

[Lomakin] I think that I will not be disclosing secrets if I say that the address Moskva, Ulitsa Kuybysheva 23, is well known to many of our fellow-citizens. It is the consulting room [spravochnaya priyemnaya] of the CPSU Central Committee. Last year over 26,500 visitors passed through it, each one with his troubles and concerns, often despairing of receiving from local soviet and party bodies no longer even assistance, but simply a kind, sympathetic word.

There are still quite a few people who believe that the CPSU Central Committee is the highest instance. If they don't help here, where can one turn to then? And they help of course. But one has to resolve for the most part housing and social questions, less purely party matters.

Receiving today were CPSU Central Committee member, team-leader electrician of the Volzhskiy Motor-Vehicle Works Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Malikhin, and CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, secretary of the Central Committee, Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov. [video shows both receiving a visitor]

With the permission of the visitor, Aleksandr Ivanovich Baronenko, who was dismissed from the Army and punished by the party—underservedly according to him—we show you only fragments of this meeting. [Video shows Baronenko, captioned "A.I.Baronenko', chatting to Zaykov, who is seated at desk, Baronenko sitting in front of the desk]

[Begin video recording] [Baronenko]...by the chief of staff.

[Zaykov] You refused?

[Baronenko] [Words indistinct]. I am not registered anywhere. I don't have any housing. I don't have any documents, except my party card.

[Zaykov] Who dismissed you from the ranks of the Soviet Army?

[Baronenko] I was dismissed by the commander of the Anti-aircraft Defense Troops, Army General Tretyak. He signed the order.

[Zaykov] That is to say, the order passed through him.

[Baronenko] Yes, he signed the order. It was he who was given the right. Moreover, he dismissed me under Article 59D, that is to say, unsuitability for the job, that is, without any benefits, without a pension, without an apartment, without anything.

[Zaykov] I shall try to help you in this matter, even if you made mistakes, even if there were some infringements, all the same, to create the opportunity to serve in the Army for an officer, who rose to the rank of major, who is not yet at an age where he is to be written off, who is healthy and wants to continue serving. I think that we must find the truth here. [Video shows Zaykov captioned as "L.N.Zaykov, of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary".]

[Lomakin] For visitors such conversations are an investigation of their requests at the very highest level. And what is there in such meetings for you, as a CPSU Central Committee Secretary?

[Zaykov] There is also another side to the fact itself of receiving petitioners: Looking at how our leaders—be it in the Army, be it in the soviets, be it in the party bodies—be it in the Army, be it in the soviets, be it in the party bodies—how they are changing their style and method of working within the framework of our perestroyka, whether or not they are changing. Here this can be traced perfectly clearly. There are six petitioners [Video shows Zaykov pointing to a paper next to him on his desk] but I picture it as follows: That if people come here and wish to meet me, I will receive all that come along. [end recording]

[Announcer] I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the CPSU Central Committee consulting room has been operating for some 30 years now, but of late visitors there are being received by secretaries and Politburo members.

Regional Affairs

Further Reportage on Central Asian Situation

Tajik Elections To Be Held as Scheduled

LD2102214790 Moscow TASS in English 1654 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Dushanbe February 21 TASS—Life is being normalised in Dushanbe, capital of Soviet Tajikistan. No inter-ethnic clashes were reported in the republic over the past 24 hours, a USSR Interior Ministry spokesman in Dushanbe told TASS.

This morning saw work resumed at 95 per cent of industrial enterprises. Public transport is operating

without disruptions. Classes have restarted in all schools and colleges, with Russian-speaking students still staying away, frightened by nationalist calls and rumours of reprisals against "kafirs", or non-Muslims. Efforts are being made to dispel their fears.

The republican general elections will be held as scheduled—next Sunday, Tajik President Gaibnazar Pallayev told TASS. He expressed hope that people would be elected to the republican legislature, who will represent, protect and defend the interests of people, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds.

The republican leadership, Muslim clergymen and the healthy forces in unofficial associations were susccessful in talking many young militants into waiving their intention to hold another unauthorized mass rally today.

Calls for settling social and economic problems through political dialogue were made by Soviet people's deputies eleced in Tajikistan, party leaders, writers and scientists.

Their appeals were published in today's newspaper issues and broadcast by local radio and television. Calls for averting further bloodshed can also be heard in mosques.

Subversives Go Underground; Area Calm

LD2102190190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] Our correspondents Leonid Lazarevich and Muzafar Madzhidov report on the situation in Dushanbe where, as you know, a state of emergency was imposed 10 days ago:

[Lazarevich] The city looks normal, I would even say serene. At first glance, there seems to be no alarm on people's faces. But just try and start talking to any passerby, and again and again the conversation will be about the tragic events which have passed. Many people are afraid that they could happen again.

[Madzhidov] That is true. Hardly any little children are to be seen as the parents are trying to keep them off the streets. Combat equipment remains on the most important trunk roads and outside government buildings and state establishments.

[Lazarevich] There are rather more of them today than yesterday. This is because, despite the requirements of the emergency situation, an unsanctioned meeting was planned. At any rate, a proposal for such was made. Today we met with Makhmadayaz Navdzhuvanov, military commandant of Dushanbe and the republic's internal affairs minister. First of all we were interested in the question of whether peace and calm was settled in the apartments of the Tajik capital's inhabitants?

[Begin recording] [Navdzhuvanov] We must work on this now and carry on working on it. I am still not certain that everything has quietened down. Certain elements are now operating underground and they will carry on with their insidious deeds. This is the task of the internal affairs bodies and they see as their objective the exposure of these individuals and bringing their case to court. But who they are I cannot tell you at the moment because an investigation is underway.

[Lazarevich] As military commandant you have assumed responsibility for the city's destiny. Tell me, please, what do you believe the party and local soviet bodies and all private individuals in general should do to ensure that peace and quiet return as soon as possible?

[Navdzhuvanov] I would say that party workers should not be sitting in their offices but going out to meet the people, the working people, the working class, the intelligentsia, and the collective farmers and explaining to them what is going on, under whose leadership this has happened and the reason why it has happened. [end recording]

[Madzhidov] The report of the press center of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] internal affairs ministry reports that over the past 24 hours things were quiet in the city. Ninety-five percent of industrial enterprises, establishments, and organizations were working. Transportation is working normally.

Rumors Called 'Main Trouble'

LD2202114390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Despite the abundance of information on the situation in Tajikistan being received by the inhabitants of the republic today—apart from the local press, two press centers are operating here and there is a telephone help line—rumors continue to multiply. Fuel was thrown onto the fire by a piece published in one of the central papers that the Afghan mujahidin are supplying weapons to Tajikistan. Such reports sow panic among the population. However, Major General Martovitskiy, deputy chief of the Central Asian Border District troops, stated that of late there has not been a single case of individuals crossing the border, not to mention armed groups. Our special correspondent Leonid Lazarevich reports from Dushanbe:

[Begin Lazarevich recording] Rumors are the main trouble in Dushanbe today. The tragic events have left deep scars and profound anxiety in people's hearts. Many bells are ringing during this time in the party, local soviet bodies, and the Interior Affairs Ministry, but the signals coming in by telephone are not being confirmed.

The possible holding of an unsanctioned gathering, which had been arranged for yesterday, gave rise to serious concern. But it did not take place. The presence of combat equipment and military patrols on the streets and self-defense detachments in the micro-rayons has had a sobering affect on the worst of the hotheads.

The situation in the city is completely under control, but the people are asking a lot of questions, first and foremost, who was the true organizer of those events that

occurred 10 days ago? At the moment, one thing may be said: An investigation is underway, and people have been held and arrested. At the moment virtually all enterprises and offices in the city are working. People want order and peace most of all, at least that is what is wanted by the overwhelming majority of the population of the Tajik capital. [end recording]

PRAVDA Reports on Dushanbe Scene

PM2102143790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Special correspondent N. Sautin dispatch: "Emergency Situation. Rallies Again"]

[Text] The night of 17-18 February was uneasy. A tense silence hung over the empty city during the curfew, sometimes broken by the noise of combat vehicles—used by Soviet Army subunits and internal troops to patrol the streets—rushing past.

I drove through Dushanbe with inspectors of militia posts. I saw four elderly women in a doorway in Ayni Street. What had happened? We are messengers from the self-defense detachment, they said. About 20 men came up at this point. One of them had a cudgel, another a metal bar. Members of the local defense forces.... But armed militia details have been sent in to all neighborhoods. The inhabitants, however, having survived a pogrom, are not letting the bars and sticks out of their hands.

Unknown individuals are going around apartments and whispering: When the soldiers leave, you'll be in for it.... I saw a list of inhabitants of one of the neighborhoods. Their representative was saying in the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]: Help us leave Tajikistan. After all there is no guarantee that our families will not suffer.

The population is agitated by the rumors. Fear is constantly being increased. First there was the provocative report about the poisoning of the Dushanbe water supply, then a lie about three Ukrainian schoolchildren apparently hanged by Tajiks in school No. 19. Then there is the persistent rumor that says: Just you wait until the militants come in buses from the kishlaks. Leaflets saying "Central Asia for the Muslims" are being circulated in Russian-speaking districts. And so it goes, day by day. Whose nerve will hold out? The inhabitants, afraid of being caught unawares, are ready to throw themselves on any suspicious person. But the provocateurs need this, too, apparently. It is easy whip up an incident and an answering wave of violence may sweep over the city.

...At midday a huge crowd of people, coming up against ranks of soldiers, blocked Lenin Avenue. The fact that informal organizations had scheduled a big rally for Sunday was known to the communist party and government leadership. The law unequivocally prohibits meeting in groups while the state of emergency is in effect. But there was no order to disperse the people. There was also no permission for the rally.

Soldiers and militiamen blocked the path of those going to the rally. The situation became more tense. Banners appeared above the heads of the protestors saying "We support Gorbachev, friendship with the Russians forever." There were others, too. "Leave your offices, 12 February may be repeated." This is an allusion to the day when extremists started a pogrom at the republic Communist Party Central Committee building. Senior Lieutenant I. Martynov, commander of one of the subunits, believes that extremists have gathered together again and that their assurances of their love of perestroyka are just a cover-up. If you let them into the center, the pogroms will start again. I ask the officer to order the soldiers to draw back their shields and I step into the crowd.

Mirza Akhmedov grabs hold of my shoulder. He comes from the settlement of Sharoran. His house was destroyed in the recent earthquake. He lives with his three children and his wife, who is expecting another child, in an abandoned trailer. He has no work. His father and brother give him a certain amount of money. And Maya Grigorievna Platonova's brother-in-law was brutally beaten, but no investigation is being carried out. She is holding a photograph of her injured relative above her head instead of a banner.

Shavkat Khalilov, secretary of the Union of Tajik Theatrical Workers Board. He was brought out onto the street by the conviction that "we obtained the status of the Tajik language by means of rallies, and we will thus obtain the fulfillment of other demands." What demands? Khalilov believes that the republic government's policy with respect to young people is wrong. Shavkat affirms that he and his comrades support the CPSU Central Committee platform on the nationalities question. But the Communist Party and the Government of Tajikistan only vote for it verbally.

The head of the Tajik Muslims arrived here. The soldiers dispersed and the people moved to the outskirts of the city. There were no troops or militia on the demonstrators' path. The convoy of many thousands of people was headed by a group of USSR people's deputies and people's committee representatives. Order was enforced at the rally by former internationalist soldiers in field dress, wearing their military decorations.

At the rally the leaders of informal organizations again appealed for political and economic changes in the republic. Representatives and leaders of Tajik organs delivered speeches. The rally was peaceful. It stands to reason that it did not resolve the problems facing the republic. If anything, it illuminated even more sharply the difficulties which will have to be overcome jointly: By the very same mercilessly criticized apparatus and the people in the rally, who want a new quality of life, and not in the rosy future but today.

Indeed, there were no excesses. Reason prevailed. Indeed it may be time to transfer from rally democracy

to concrete constructive actions and practical work at enterprises, organizations, and institutions.

Investigation Into Unrest Begins

LD2102221290 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Dushanbe February 21 TAJIKTA-TASS—A special commission of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee has begun an investigation into the activity of a group of communists alleged to have planned an unconstitutional overthrow of the government in Tajikistan.

It was intended to topple republican Prime Minister Izatullo Khayeyev and elevate his deputy Buri Karimov, who headed the so-called Provisional People's Committee that was set up on February 14 to rally the forces of Tajik unofficial organizations.

This was revealed in the local press today by the republican party chief Kakhar Makhkamov.

Allegations about the involvement of some communists in high government and party posts in an attempt of unconstitutional overthrow were first voiced at the emergency plenary meeting of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee on February 16. It was said, among other things, that a group drafted a decree of the Presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet on a new Council of Ministers.

Taking part in the work of the special commission are representatives of the Party Control Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

"The matter calls for a very thorough analysis of all circumstances, this is why we should not like to jump to conclusions," Makhmatov stressed in his address to communists and all citizens of the republic.

Kazakh Party Plenum Opens in Alma-Ata

LD2102213590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 21 feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An extraordinary plenum of Kazakhstan Communist Party [CP] Central Committee opened in Alma-Ata today. Its participants are discussing the CPSU Central Committee's platform for the Party's 28th Congress. They are also to examine the measures connected with preparing and holding the 17th congress of the Kazakh Communist Party and the report-back and election campaign within the republican party organizations.

Nazarbayev Speaks at Kazak Plenum

LD2102162490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] There was a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in Alma-Ata today, which discussed the results of the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Comrade Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republic, gave a report. It was noted that in this difficult time for the country, clear guidelines and the consolidation of healthy forces in society on the path towards emerging from the political, social, and economic crisis that has developed are particularly necessary. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is to work out its own platform and discuss it. It was decided at the plenum that the report-back election campaign in the party organizations of the republic on the principles of alternative, direct, and secret ballots will begin in February. It will end before the opening of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, which is planned for 7 June.

Uzbek Secretary Views Arrest, Acquittal

90UN0809A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 5, Jan 90 p 5

[Report on interview with R.Kh. Abdullayeva, former secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, by V. Kapelkin: "800 Days in Custody"; place, date not given]

[Text] After examining the case of R. Abdullayeva, former secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet issued an acquittal on 15 January 1990 "for lack of criminal wrongdoing." So the accusation of corruption leveled against her by the USSR Procuracy and 800 days in pre-trial confinement constitute a dramatic mistake. How this happened and whether it can be corrected comprise the subject of a conversation between our correspondent and Rano Khabibovna herself, released from custody in the hall of the Supreme Court.

[Kapelkin] How did your case arise? It is said that you, as secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, wrote Moscow to lodge complaints against former first secretary Usmankhodzhayev, sentenced the end of December of last year to 12 years confinement for bribery.

[Abdullayeva] Yes, I thought he should not be the person heading the republic party organization. He is a spineless individual and a poor politician. Perestroyka was being held back in Uzbekistan because of this. Rashidov cadre remained in power here and there. But I had no need at that time to address complaints to Moscow—all doors were open to me anyway.

[Kapelkin] You addressed the leaders of the party Central Committee?

[Abdullayeva] No, the regular organizational structure called for the first secretary to address the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. My level in ordinary official business was with department directors, or more often with section chiefs. I told everything I was thinking

concerning Usmankhodzhayev and the state of perestroyka in Uzbekistan to the section chief of the Department of Organizational and Party Work at that time, K. Mogilnichenko It seemed to me he understood what I was saying. He promised to speak with the leadership higher up. Of course, my demarches were not secret, and Usmankhodzhayev found out about them. The clouds gathered over my head before they did over his. Once when I traveled to Moscow, they all turned their backs on me in the Central Committee. I was there for training—but Beosarabov from the Department of Organizational and Party Work sent me back. I tried to get an appointment with Ye. Ligachev, but was refused.

[Kapelkin] Did Usmankhodzhayev do anything?

[Abdullayeva] At the end of the investigation, when they allowed me to read all 24 volumes of my criminal case file, I came to understand what had happened. On 4 March 1987, the arrested administrator of affairs of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, T. Umarov, after spending a long time in pre-trial confinement in Moscow, suddenly dispatched a statement to the USSR General Prosecutor in which he said he had given me, a Central Committee secretary, at the end of December 1983, a bribe of R30,000 and a box of delicacies. I don't know if the General Prosecutor saw him or not but on the following day, 5 March, his statement was already recorded in the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. Of course Usmankhodzhayev knew what this document was worth—after all, in December 1983 I was still working in the Council of Ministers. Nonetheless, he delivered it the next day to Moscow, to the party Central Committee. Soon afterward, a plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee convened in which I was relieved of my duties as Central Committee secretary.

[Kapelkin] You had the opportunity to explain everything at this plenum.

[Abdullayeva] Yes—and for that reason Usmankhodzhayev cut short my address, not giving me a chance to finish. For the sake of objectivity I will say that no one took exception. Usmankhodzhayev stated that the matter of removing me from my position was coordinated with the CPSU Central Committee. This evoked shock in those who were present. The habit of hanging on the first secretary's every word also played a role. The vote was unanimous. People later came to their senses, but it was too late. I would say at least 70 percent of plenum participants came up to me expressing sympathy. Of course, this is not the same thing as taking the podium when the body is in session. The second secretary of Andizhanskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] (I don't remember his name, unfortunately—he was Russian, sent to us for cadre reinforcement) raised a question after the vote took place: Why now have we actually removed Rano Khabibovna? In a little while he lost his credentials.

[Kapelkin] So, not only did they not extend to you that well-known quality of party comradeship, but showed no corporate solidarity for you either?

[Abdullayeva] After being removed from my job, I spent three months without work. All of my former colleagues—party and soviet leaders—not only failed to offer assistance, but they were not even interested in my situation. Then, as a doctor of historical sciences, I got a job at the historical institute and managed to work there four months prior to being arrested.

Incidentally, I wrote several letters to the CPSU Central Committee during this period. In these I did not request to be reinstated to the post of secretary. I continued to criticize Usmankhodzhayev and Nishanov, at that time chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, talking about the political situation and unresolved national problems. I conjectured that passions might flare up. Had they examined the substance of these letters, it is possible the Fergana tragedy might not have taken place. I did not receive a reply to a single one of them. Now I know that my letters were sent to Tashkent, to Usmankhodzhayev, and Nishanov.

Only my relatives and friends had any concern for me. The party organization turned its back on me. I will not conceal the fact that this came as a severe blow. After all, a plant or factory will not just throw out members of its own collective, especially at a stage when their guilt has not yet been proven. They send character witnesses to a trial. Who is in a better position to know a person than his work comrades? Apparently this never even occurred to anyone in my party collective. By the way, I was a Central Committee member of 20 years standing—longer than anyone else. Could the Central Committee not stand up for me?

[Kapelkin] Do you intend to petition for CPSU reinstatement?

[Abdullayeva] I never signed a statement on leaving the party. I was expelled in connection with a criminal case. All accusations have now been retracted and I have been vindicated. My party organization itself should most likely be concerned with my reinstatement. I have no intention of submitting any requests, at least in written form, concerning this matter.

[Kapelkin] It has been stressed both in court and in the press that you were arrested illegally, in violation of your immunity as a deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet. This was not discussed, either during the session or in conference of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

[Abdullayeva] The decision was made within a "narrow" circle of individuals, and this will rest on the conscience of then Presidium Chairman R. Nishanov. Testimony was given in the trial by three members of the Presidium to the effect that they didn't even know about my case—no one asked their opinion.

[Kapelkin] You spent more than two years in prison, not guilty, as is now clear. Will you be compensated?

[Abdullayeva] I think this question should be resolved automatically. Otherwise, what do you do with the time spent in pre-trial confinement? This is usually calculated into the prison term for the accused. But what about my case?

[Kapelkin] It seems to me pre-trial confinement is not prison. Conditions there must be different from prison conditions—after all, the accused may be acquitted. They say there are cells for selected individuals—with television sets, restaurant food.

[Abdullayeva] I and other arrested Uzbek leaders were kept most of the time in Confinement Cell No 4, which for some reason is called "Sailor's Silence." Imagine a cell with five bunks and open area amounting to the space of about a medium-size desk. The artificial lighting 24 hours a day causes your eyesight to erode. It is stuffy and the walls are covered with dirt. The lack of oxygen causes emphysema. A one-hour walk in the four-and-a-half by two meter stone shaft hardly changes anything.

Television is out of the question. Your window to the world is the radio, turned on from 0600 until 2200, and the newspaper PRAVDA. It was the same way in the Butyrskaya Prison, with the sole exception that you were given a choice of one of four central newspapers.

As far as food is concerned, I would rather not recall. From October 1987 through May 1989, the time I spent in "Sailor's Silence," I did not see a single piece of meat.

As I understand it, they allot about 37 kopecks a day there to feed an individual, while 1 ruble 7 kopecks is provided for each of the guard dogs.

If these are the conditions the elite live under, how must it be for the others? Probably things could be worse. I know that Osetrov, former second secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, sat in a cell with 40 people.

[Kapelkin] Such an equalization of those under investigation with those convicted is probably handed down from the thirties, when any arrested person was automatically considered to be a criminal. If these traditions are still alive, then perhaps following your arrest your relatives underwent some suffering....

[Abdullayeva] That is what happened. No one said anything about this directly, of course, and each instance could be explained through other reasons. But taken together they comprise a composite picture. My sister was removed from her position as chief of the city health department of a city in Tashkent Oblast which had the lowest statistics in the republic for infant and maternal mortality. The reason given was to join the services of city and rayon. My daughter, a doctor, was dismissed from her position at the Tashkent Medical Institute. My son-in-law was removed as a section chief in the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They even showed my son the door—just a foreman doing ordinary work at the motor transport center.

Fortunately, my relatives were able to endure all these trials. They were able to find a capable defender for me—Yu. Ivanov, from the Moscow Oblast Collegium of Lawyers.

[Kapelkin] Did he start working immediately after the charges were brought against you?

[Abdullayeva] No. Perhaps I overestimated my own abilities. I thought I was capable of repudiating all the charges myself. But then they explained to me that if the maximum sentence was execution, a lawyer would be necessary. This is a norm of due process and they would have appointed a state defender for me. Looking at the activities of Yu. Ivanov, I became convinced that consciousness of my innocence alone would not suffice, that special skills were necessary. After studying the matter, Ivanov uncovered quite a few fine points useful in the defense. He also exhibited his oratorical abilities at the trial.

[Kapelkin] What are your plans for the short term?

[Abdullayeva] I intend to write a book about what happened to me and other Uzbek leaders. It will be based on the diary I kept in my cell, which now consists of 661 pages and is being kept with the prosecution materials. If they don't give it back to me, I am prepared to rewrite it. Literary pursuit helped me endure the 800 days in my cell. In addition to the diary, I drafted up a drama piece, wrote three "general sketchbooks" of life memoirs and a fairy tale which my grandchildren like.

More Reportage on Transcaucasus Developments

Foreign Ministry Reports on Area

LD2102142890 Moscow TASS in English 1349 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—The situation in Azerbaijan is being controlled by law enforcement forces, Interior Ministry troops and the Army, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said today.

No ethnic crimes were registered in the past 24 hours, its report said.

Strikes continue however. Twenty-eight people were detained for curfew violations and two for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of January 15, 1990.

A total of 139 goods trains, including 35 bound for Armenia, are standing idle on the Azerbaijani railway, it said.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh remains unchanged. Traffic along local roads is escorted by military patrols.

Strikes in Stepanakert and Mardakert continue. Round-the-clock industries are working. Nineteen people were detained for curfew violations.

In Armenia, one drill Kalashnikov assault rifle, nine self-made grenades, two artillery shells and a car-load of explosives were handed in to Interior Ministry bodies in the past 24 hours.

No ethnic violence was reported in Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe on Tuesday. Public transport and most enterprises and organisations were working. A total of 122 shotguns were confiscated or given in voluntarily in the city. Six people were arrested for taking part in the turmoil and seven were detained.

Ninety two people were detained for curfew violations.

The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers called on the people to stay calm and work to compensate for the damage that has been done.

Tajik party leader Kakhar Makhkamov made an address over radio and TV.

Nakhichevan, Nearby Rayons Viewed

NC2202083290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers have published a report compiled by AZERINFORM correspondents on the situation in Nakhichevan, Gendzha, and Kel'badzhar. The report says that the situation in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic remains complicated. The movement of the trains has not been resumed. The mechanical workers at the Dzhul'fa locomotive depot have announced that they will resume work after the electricity supply lines and [word indistinct], which were disconnected at the railway stations in Armenia's Megrinskiy Rayon, are fully reconnected.

The condition of the tracks has worsened the problems in the social and economic domains. The supply of fuel, including benzine, in the autonomous republic is low. The supply of raw materials and [words indistinct] to the industrial establishments has become difficult. The supply of pharmaceutical drugs in the hospitals is running low. The transfer of seriously ill people from the rayons and the villages to Nakhichevan has become difficult. Shortages in the supply of provisions are becoming more acute.

Nevertheless, the sociopolitical situation is stable. Work in the rural regions has been organized as a result of the effort made by the railway workers. Twenty-four trains were transferred to the Tbilisi department of the Transcaucasus railways network. Twenty-two trains were received. Six trains were sent to Idzhevan and five were received from there. A total of 682 freight cars were loaded and 805 freight cars unloaded at the railway stations. This is four or five times higher than the figure established toward the end of January. The overall situation in the city is generally peaceful. However, the supply of fuel, particularly benzine, to the transportation services is insufficient.

The resumption of movement on the roads in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has had positive effects on social and economic work in Kel'badzharskiy Rayon. Various kinds of freight, including medical equipment, provisions, industrial goods, and construction materials, which had been piling up in warehouses and railway stations in the [word indistinct] zone, are being transferred to delivery centers.

The [word indistinct] health center has begun to receive sick people for the first time this winter.

Situation Generally 'Calm'

PM2102164190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Captain Second Rank O. Odnokolenko report under the "Direct Line" rubric: Azerbaijan: One Day's News"]

[Text] On the morning of 20 February Baku awoke white with snow. One of the first morning reports was that demonstrations to mark the tragic January events were taking place in the city. The situation over the last 24 hours can be described as calm on the whole.

Internal troop staff reports recorded one serious incident. At the P. Shmidt Plant foundry a whole arsenal of explosives and munitions was confiscated from citizen Sh. Aliyev. But the presence of 40 gas masks puts us on our guard most of all. How are we to know whether or not a provocative action was planned here involving toxins?

K. Kislykh, representative of the USSR KGB, pointed out that the investigation into the case of the 12-13 January Armenian pogroms in Baku is continuing. There is still a long way to go before the final conclusions are drawn but even now 56 cases of violent death have been reliably established. Actions by criminal elements were notable for their particular brutality in a number of cases. Organs of law and order and public organizations are carrying out tremendous work to clear up the crimes.

There is something I must mention. At present commanders and political workers from the troops stationed in Baku are the only real force carrying out systematic explanatory work at enterprises and in the city and establishing contacts with the local population. Captain First Rank E. Zakharyash, member of the Caspian Military Flotilla Military Council, announced that some conversations at labor collectives last five-six hours each. People have many questions and many problems. Moreover, I am not only talking about Azerbaijanis. Representatives of the Russian-speaking population also voice

great concern. The general opinion is that there must be no delay in resolving the questions of Karabakh, people's nerves are strained

The local press report that a new party has finally been set up—the Social Democratic Party. The main aim of the Azerbaijan Social Democratic Party, its leaders state, is to create an independent Azerbaijan state. At the first stage it is planned to revise the existing union treaty with the USSR and then leave the Union without severing economic and cultural ties with it after strengthening trade and economic relations with Iran, Turkey, and other countries. That is the kind of future which is in preparation.

40 Percent of Workers Return to Work

PM2102153790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by own special correspondent Captain Second Rank O. Odnokolenko: "Baku, One Month On"]

[Text] It is exactly one month since the tragic events took place on the streets of Baku. Are there marked changes in the appearance of the city? As one traveling companion reasonably observed: "Life goes on, it gets its own way...."

Undoubtedly Baku has primarily to thank for this its own inhabitants—who are by nature good-hearted, sensitive, and affable people. Much is also being done to stabilize the situation by the military. Despite the curfew, there is less combat hardware and fewer armed people on the streets now. But the military commandant's reports still begin with the same sentence: "The situation in the city remains difficult...."

Today half the city's enterprises have still not resumed activity and only 40 percent of workers have reported for work. And the damage from the strike already amounts to more than half a billion rubles [R].

True, there is some gratifying news. AZERINFORM reports that Sumgait's "Khimprom" production association, the country's sole producer of sulfonol—the basic component of washing powder—is establishing a work rhythm. The collective's decision to start work was influenced by the production association's difficult financial situation. Moreover, an increasing number of people who live by their own labor and honestly earned money are coming to see that going on strike is not the best way of solving the problems that have accumulated.

Other enterprises are also experiencing great difficulties. For example, the following figures were cited during a meeting between Army General V. Varennikov and the labor collective of the P. Smidt Plant: The plant is incurring daily losses of around R450,000.

But one is most struck by something else: Fewer children's voices are to be heard in Baku. Some parents took their children away during the anxious January period without even completing documents. The figures for Baku Secondary School No. 153 are that only 560 of the 1,421 children who study there remain. Only 2 of the 19 teachers who left have returned to date.

Unfortunately, there is still no shortage of people who want to leave. This can be seen from the housing exchange notices that appear in the windows of the city information office on Lenin Prospekt and in other districts. It needs to be said that assurances that the Russian-speaking population of the city has nothing to fear are carried frequently in the local press. But other voices are adding to those of reason.

Extremist feelings are not being shown by mere words. According to far-from-complete data, 105 servicemen's apartments have been arbitrarily occupied, 7 officers' apartments looted, and 7 burned down.

On the whole the weekend passed calmly in Baku. But at 0435 hours on Monday a detail of assault troops came under automatic weapon fire on Kievskiy Prospekt from two persons unknown. Fortunately there were no casualties.

Criminal Investigations Initiated

NC2202082390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] We have already informed our listeners about the explosion which took place on the Shusha-Stepanakert road. We reported that a Reys passenger bus traveling from Shusha to Baku was damaged as a result of the explosion. Among the many passangers who were wounded were women and children.

The operations and inquiry group of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry has established that the explosives were placed in three fire extinguishers. According to the head of the operations group, the local militia organs are obstructing the efforts to investigate criminal activities. The employees of the rayon internal affairs organs are not searching for those responsible for this and other crimes. In view of the absence of relations between the [word indistinct] of the two republics, crimes such as the theft of cattle belonging to the people who live in the border rayons are not being brought to light. It can also be said that no work is being carried out in connection with the confiscation of arms. Because of this and other reasons, the operations group can only (?rely on itself).

About 60 criminal investigations have been initiated in the Nagrono-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast during the past [word indistinct]. Serious inquiries are being carried out. A number of cases have been referred to the courts.

Oilmen, Others Resume Work in Town

LD2102223790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Video report by correspondent V. Vengrzhnovskiy in Azerbaijan; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] How many rumors have recently been disturbing Azerbaijan? Perhaps we should at last stop listening to all this gossip. Let us, at long last, listen to some good, optimistic reports and news items. For example, today's news that, in a number of rayons in Azerbaijan, the situation is beginning at last to return to normal.

[V. Vengrzhnovskiy] Today we visited a young industrial center in Azerbaijan, the town of Ali-Bairamly. [video shows street scene through a car windshield; the car's radio antenna bears a black pennant] The people of Ali-Baiamly are suffering together from Baku's black January, but they have found what is, in our view, the only correct way to assuage that grief—ordinary daily work. [video shows more street scenes; three black flags hanging from a post]

The oilmen are now working without disruption. [video shows oil wells] Admittedly, the pace of drilling has fallen somewhat, but, as we were told here, the lag will be overcome as soon as the railways start to operate at a normal rhythm. Things are better with workers at the Ali-Bairamly GRES [state regional electrical power station]. [video shows exterior shot of the GRES, then control room scenes] Nearly 45 percent of Azerbaijan's electrical energy is generated here, and the power engineers are perfectly well aware that very, very much depends on their successful work.

As in any young town, there are quite a lot of problems here. One of them is unemployment. To some extent, the problem is alleviated by the recently-commissioned food concentrate combine. At one of the major enterprises in the oil-and-fat combine, an agrarian workshop has been operating for two years already. [video shows exterior shot of factory, then cows in stalls] Changes for the better can be seen in Ali-Bairamly.

The town soviet has just adopted a decision on allocating 500 families plots of land for building individual housing. It is planned to devote more attention to young people, their work and their leisure. After all, the town that has grown up in the Shirvanskaya Steppe is just 40 years old. [video shows young people; final street scene]

Journal Assailed for Reportage

LD2102133990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0204 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] The 2 February issue of SOOTSIALISTIK LITERATURNAY ROSSIYA includes nearly two pages of materials about events in Azerbaijan, under the heading "Disaster, and what a disaster!" The biased attitude in presenting the materials, unscrupulous exaggeration of the subject of the Russian immigrants of Baku, and incitement of unhealthy feelings can never help to stabilize the situation in the regions or to strengthen interethnic peace in the region.

A group of senior workers of the Nizami Institute of Literature of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences sent a litter to the editorial board of the LITERATURNAY ROSSIYA in connection with one of the articles. Authors gave a copy of the letter to AZERINFORM to be published in the republican press. The letter says that for some reason, many articles by Azerbaijani writers, scholars and historians which are written with healthy thinking and an objective and carefully considered approach to complicated problems such as relations between nationalities cannot get into the pages of the all-union publications so easily. Authors of the letter regretfully point out that an influential newspaper like LITERATURNAYA has with much pleasure extensively published in its pages articles with nationalist tendencies as well as commentaries which incite hostility. Workers of the Nizami Institute of Literature cannot but express their outrage in connection with the position of the newspaper.

Rail Traffic Resumes in Nakhichevan

LD2102211590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] After a long interval the first trains have begun running on the Mindzhevan-Dzhulfa-Norashen-Yerevan line. At the same time traffic has begun running again from Mindzhevan to Kafan and toward Iran and back. Train drivers from the Dzhulfa locomotive depot who have received complete guarantees of satety from the military have given their word that they will help eliminate as quickly as possible the difficult economic situation which has arisen in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR].

In the Nakhichevan oblast party committee a correspondent of AZERINFORM was told that the start of transport on the railways has had a favorable effect on the mood of the inhabitants of the ASSR. Labor collectives intend to make every effort to make up for the millions lost as a result of the blockade. The loading and unloading of trains has been arranged at the stations. On the whole the state of tension in which the population of the Nakhichevan ASSR has been living lately has decreased somewhat. But transport, industrial enterprises, enterprises of the building industry and the agro-industrial complex are not yet working at full strength. Not all schools have resumed classes.

Trains Arrive in Armenia 21 Feb

LD2102215790 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Nakhichevan February 21 TASS—Railway traffic has resumed to Armenia after a long interval. The first trains have gone to Minozhevan, Dzhulfa, Norashen and Yerevan. Traffic has also resumed from Mindzhevan to Kafan and in the direction of Iran and back. Train drivers of the Dzhulfa locomotive shed, whose security is fully guaranteed by army soldiers, are determined to help eliminate the grave economic situation in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

A spokesman for the Nakhichevan regional party committee said that the resumption of railway traffic had improved the public mood in the autonomous republic.

Work collectives will exert every effort to compensate for [words indistinct] which has been estimated at [words indistinct] trains are loaded and unloaded normally.

Although tensions in the Nakhichevan Republic have slightly abated, transport, industrial enterprises, construction sites and the agro-industrial complexes are not working to full capacity.

Not all schools have resumed classes.

Operational Staff Describes Situation

NC2202102090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Visitors to our republic would undoubtedly see that life in Armenia in no way differs from life in other places. Public transportation is working as best it can. Despite the lack of raw materials, power shortage, and the grave consequences of the continuing blockade, industrial enterprises are working at half capacity.

The tension resulting from the interethnic conflict is now only felt in the energetic atmosphere of the meetings of the Operational Staff, which receives full information from various localities, especially the border regions. The incoming information is becoming more favorable every day, evidence that the situation in the republic is gradually, albeit slowly, normalizing.

The summary log of incidents presented by the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry to the 21 February meeting of the Operational Staff, a practice which has become a regular feature of the last few weeks, listed no incidents resulting from interethnic grounds. However, the log did include criminal incidents, including the wounding of a cooperative worker by a Makarov pistol. It can be surmised that that pistol was one of the weapons seized during the assaults made on the rayon departments of the Internal Affairs Ministry. The incident is under investigation.

Health bodies are providing care to the refugees requiring medical attention. At present 235 are receiving medical treatment. Those who are hospitalized are also given any necessary outpatient treatment after being discharged.

In addition to the hospital patients, the residents of the regions under blockade are receiving medical attention. Well-equipped teams of doctors are prepared to go immediately to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and the Armenian-inhabited areas in Azerbaijan by helicopter. Such a team left for Shaumyanovskiy Rayon on 21 February.

It was stated at the Operational Staff that Stepanakert continues to receive the Armenian television broadcasts with poor reception. Communications have been restored with those regions where heavy rains had damaged the communications lines.

Helicopter flights are taking place to the NKAO. Fourteen flights were made to Stepanakert. However, helicopter flights to the NKAO and the Armenian regions of Azerbaijan are not regular. Armenian helicopter pilots have only managed to make one flight to Shaumyanovskiy Rayon.

Armenians Demand Secession Referendum

LD2102120490 Moscow World Service in Russian 1041 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From the "INTERFAX" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] And now for a few reports from the INTERFAX independent agency:

An unauthorized meeting took place in Yerevan on Sunday [18 February], organized by the national Self-Determination Association [natsionalnoye samoopredeleniye]. The INTERFAX correspondent reports that the meeting adopted a resolution on the urgent conducting of a referendum on the issue of Armenia's secession from the USSR.

On Monday, aiming to exert pressure on the republican leadership and to draw public attention to the problem of the referendum a group of activists of the National Self-Determination Association announced the start of a hunger strike in the building of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet.

On Tuesday, Armenia marked the second anniversary of the Karabakh Movement. In response to an appeal by the Armenian pan-National Movement, meetings were held at industrial enterprises and at institutions.

Deported Refugees Arriving in Armenia

LD2102204390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] [Presenter] Armenians deported from Baku to various areas of the country in January of this year are continuing to arrive in Armenia. Our correspondent Khorun Khumaryan reports:

[Khumaryan] As of today, the number of refugees from Azerbaijan to Armenia has already exceeded 328,000 people. New refugees have already joined them from Tajikistan. You will agree that for a republic the size of a little over 29,000 square kilometers—where population density was the highest in the country as it was, in a republic in which even before the earthquake over a half a million people were in need of apartments, or of an improvement in housing conditions—to receive, settle, give shelter, work, means of existence, to such a huge quantity of people, is an arch-complex task. Since the beginning of this year, apart from the structures which already exist in the republic, a specially created state

committee for the reception and settlement of Armenians returning to the homeland, has begun to deal with refugees.

At a recent meeting in the republican operational headquarters for the emergency situation, it was noted that that committee is not resolving the problems which are arising clearly or efficiently enough. The fact was given that as of today, up to around 120,000 refugees have not been settled in a real way. That is really so. However, I have been in that committee, and on more than one occasion. I have seen how people work, how they react sensitively to the misfortunes of each person, and it is hardly their fault that not everything is able to be done as one would like:

[Begin (Petrosyan) recording] Our state committee is called upon to give assistance, give legal protection to give them material aid, on the whole, everything which a person who has lost everything needs. The number one question is the creation of the necessary prerequisites to present to the USSR Supreme Soviet the question of the status of USSR refugees. [end recording]

[Presenter] You have been listening to an interview given to Khorun Khumaryan, our correspondent in Yerevan, by (Gagik Grigoriyevich Petrosyan), deputy chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of Armenia for Reception and Settlement of the Armenians Returning to the Homeland.

Armenian Commercial Bank Begins Operations

NC1802120590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0700 GMT 18 Feb 90

[Text] The first commercial bank in the republic recently began operations, and it is temporarily registered at [words indistinct]. It is impossible to operate a variety of businesses and ownership systems without such commercial banks and joint stock companies whose significance [words indistinct].

The Armenian Commercial Bank, (?which comes under the jurisdiction) of the USSR [word indistinct] Bank, envisages concentrating its operations on [words indistinct] and to pool the financial resources of the various enterprises and organizations in the republic on a current account basis, thus assisting their economic and social development. The bank will offer enterprises, cooperatives, and the public various types of credit.

The new bank is established on a shareholding basis. There are 20 institutions which are founding shareholders. They include the [name indistinct] factory of Yerevan, [names indistinct], Armenian Carpet Production Association, and Yerevan (?furniture) factory. Each shareholder has contributed at least R100,000.

Lithuanian Ministers Discuss Independent Economy

LD2102234890 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] The future functioning of the economy of independent Lithuania was discussed today at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania. The blueprint was worked out by one of the working groups of the Parliamentary Commission on the Reestablishment of Independent Lithuania.

The commission has stated in its detailed analysis of the present economic situation that Lithuania hasn't got an economic structure suitable for an independent state.

First of all, alternate sources of raw materials should be located. It was noted at the meeting that in the nearest future normal functioning of the Lithuanian economy is practically impossible without raw materials coming in from the Soviet Union. A draft agreement on economic cooperation with the Soviet Union should be worked out providing for direct contacts with other Soviet republics.

The issue of developing economic ties with foreign countries was also debated at the meeting. It was decided that export should be expanded from Lithuania and joint ventures should be set up with large foreign investments in Lithuania.

It was also noted that alternate models of the functioning of national economy ought to be worked out.

Lithuanian Pro-CPSU Party Meets in Vilnius

LD2102232890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1950 21 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius, 21 Feb. (TASS)—The tasks involved in consolidating the republic's communists and all healthy forces were discussed at a meeting of the party aktiv of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform, which was held today.

V. Shved, secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee, who spoke, informed those attending the republican meeting about the course and results of the February plenum of the CPSU Central committee. He stressed that the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform was already employing in its activities many democratic standards specified in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

Particular attention was drawn to the fact that the absence of information in the republican press about the course of the plenum and about the nature of the discussions that took place at it about the proposed draft decisions is being used today in the republic for attacks on the interim Central Committee and its secretaries. V. Shved emphasised that the work of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform was also complicated by that fact that the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform was not published in Lithuanian

within the republic. This deprived the bulk of the population of the opportunity to familiarize themselves with it.

Especially sharp was the discussion of the appeal, adopted at the plenum of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania, held the day before, which declared specifically that the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform "is not even a part of the CPSU, which is restructuring itself, but a Brezhnevist conservative grouping within it, the activities of which lead to confrontation rather than consolidation."

Those attending the meeting unanimously adopted a statement saying that such an assessment of the state of affairs cannot be interpreted as anything other than an unfounded distortion of reality, wrong in essence, and improper from a moral point of view. The Independent Communist Party of Lithuania has not been subjected either to attacks or to insults either in any document or in any speech by the leaders of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform.

Lithuanian Secretary on Relations With CPSU

90UN0965 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 14 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Berezov, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, by Tatyana Fast: "Our Platforms Are in Harmony"]

[Text] [Fast] Vladimir Antonovich, how do you, as secretary of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania, assess the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum?

[Berezov] If one is to compare the December Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the current one with respect to the discussion of the new party platform the difference is significant. But when they began to discuss our problem, unfortunately, the balance was not on their side. The first draft of the decree with which they familiarized our delegation was calm and benevolent and many of the wordings in it began with the words "recommend" and so forth. So here one can speak about a victory of the conservative forces of the plenum.

[Fast] In the current situation how easy is it to halt implementation of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania?

[Berezov] This should be decided by the communists themselves. Rayon conferences and meetings of local organizations are now being held in the republic. We are thinking about holding a plenum. One cannot but note that the new CPSU platform is close to our program in many ways.

[Fast] So perhaps they were in too much of a hurry at the 20th Congress.

[Berezov] On the contrary, the things we have in common show that this should have been done earlier. We could not have waited until the dissatisfaction came to a head and people began to burn their party cards. But it seems that we not only were not too hasty, but were quite late. I saw a demonstration in Moscow and hundreds of thousands of people came out carrying signs with slogans saying abolish Article 6 of the Constitution. But when they demand it the reverse process begins. It turns out that the only way to accomplish anything is with force and pressure. The party should be ahead of the process if only by a half step.

It was very difficult for us to make our decision and we were waiting for some changes from the CPSU. It seems to me that our steps accelerated the process of restructuring in the CPSU.

[Fast] But now you risk ending up, as E.A. Shevardnadze said, in the center of the "European troubles." Are you not afraid of similar negative processes?

[Berezov] The problem is that the changes began too late. We have already managed to stabilize the situation. The Communist Party of Lithuania is perhaps the only one in Europe which people are not only leaving, but are even entering. We are even being accused of being excessively democratic. There are powerful intellectual forces left in the Communist Party of Lithuania: Scholars, artists, politicians. We have maintained our positions in both the legislative and executive organs. Now before the elections to local and republic soviets almost two-thirds of the candidates are from our party.

[Fast] Now people are talking more and more about changing the name of your party. Is this a possibility?

[Berezov] That would be speculation. We are still a communist party which maintains relations of equal rights with the CPSU.

[Fast] You can make predictions about the party. But what about the republic as a whole? The session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet made a decision about the legality of the inclusion of Lithuania in the USSR. What will be the consequences?

[Berezov] Through declarations and decrees we have restored state independence and exercised economic independence. In essence all this is pro forma because it has nothing to do with real life.

[Fast] The last question: Do you intend to participate in the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Berezov] It is still too soon to speak about this. Passions must die down. I think this should be decided at the republic party forum if the communists consider it necessary. Mikhail Sergeyevich said that the doors of the CPSU will remain open to us. Whether or not we take advantage of this will depend on the restructuring of the CPSU itself.

Lithuanian Independent Communists To Reorganize

90UN0927A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 6, 10 Feb 90 p 2

[V. Burbulis report under rubric "Problem Areas": "Party Workers Out of Work"]

[Text]**The "privileges" for the workers of the party apparat at all levels of the (independent) Lithuanian Communist Party [LiCP] seemed a little tough this time: More than 4,000 people—senior officials and technical workers of the rayon and city party committees as well as of the Central Committee—received official notification that they are being dismissed on 1 April in connection with the reorganization of the entire party structure.**

Each will have to find a new job on his own. For instance, 73 senior officials and almost as many technical workers are being dismissed from the staff of the Kaunas Gorkom [City Party Committee]. More than 100 people must leave the staff of the LiCP Central Committee. Of course, the process has affected typists, accountants, communications workers, and many others.

But where can they go? The cruel hammer of criticism in today's multiparty Lithuania is falling hardest on communists, especially in the election campaign period. It lands on "apparatchiks," deservedly and undeservedly, most of all: If you have been a party worker, then it is as though you have a brand which is simply dreaded by leaders of institutions and directors of enterprises. Politicized people stigmatize former party functionaries who, in their opinion, earlier enjoyed unlimited privileges in everything. But for some reason nothing is said about the fact that party workers have become the most socially vulnerable category of people today. As we know, the party apparat accepted communists who were, as a rule, good specialists—engineers, agronomists, teachers, and economists. Abandoning their former posts, they became party functionaries. Naturally, diplomas from higher educational institutions, scientific dissertations, and practical work were forgotten. From specialist in their fields they turned into paper shufflers....

I cannot talk without distress about the ruined life of M. Umbrene, Russian-language teacher from Landiyskiy Rayon. She is 38 years old. She is raising a son. After her studies at Vilnius Teachers Institute, she was sent to a remote rural rayon. She occupied herself with teaching and headed the rayon's Pioneer Club. All these years she has lived with her son in one small room of a school boarding house. In time she became an instructor in the ideological department of the Landiyskiy Raykom [rayon party committee]. And now she has received notification of her dismissal. She threw herself into a search for work and has been refused everywhere. The reason is that "we do not need party workers." Her former position has been taken, and there are no vacant positions for teachers of Russian in the rayon. Of course, she is also being evicted from the school boarding house. What else can she do, how will she live, how will she make use of the "privileges" of an apparatchik? She went to Vilnius, to the LiCP Central Committee, for help. In the capital they all sympathized with her, inasmuch as the Central Committee apparat is looking for work for itself, but they were not able to help her.

I cannot understand one thing: For the time being, there is no new structure for the LiCP Central Committee and the raykoms and gorkoms, and no one knows what it will eventually be. A specially created commission is working now. The commission's proposals must be ratified by a plenum of the LiCP Central Committee. One asks why they are in such a hurry to dismiss people and ruin their lives. They say that the republic's independent Communist Party has few resources, party dues are down, and publishing is not going as it should. All this is true. But the fate of the Lithuanian party workers should have been considered earlier—they really are socially vulnerable. Such are their "privileges"....

Troops in Lithuania Fired at 12 Feb

LD2102161190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Summary] The press bureau of the Lithuanian KGB announced in the newspaper RESPUBLIKA on 14 February that on 12 February three shots were fired at a column of soldiers on foot from a passing vehicle. No one was wounded. The number plate of the vehicle and the persons involved have not yet been identified.

The KGB press bureau announcement pointed out that, unfortunately, this incident was not the only one in this republic recently.

The statement also indicated that instances of families of servicemen of the soviet Armed Forces being insulted are increasing. As a result of this, psychological tension has emerged in the military units. There are cases when, in response to shots fired at them, shots are fired in retaliation. Luckily there have been no casualties so far.

The statement warned the public that such instances could lead to grave consequences, and invited people to inform the KGB about possible attacks on Soviet servicemen and military installations.

'Renewed Federation' Group Meets 20 Jan

Participants Exchange Views

90UN0907A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 3

[Report by the press service of the Organizational Committee of the "Renewed Federation" Council under the rubric "Information Report"]

[Text] On 20 January 1990 a consultative meeting of a group of CPSU members took place in Riga. They included representatives of labor collectives, the intelligentsia, social organizations, and party and soviet workers of Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and a

number of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] oblasts. Participants at the meeting exchanged views with respect to the sociopolitical situation in the Soviet Baltic republics and contiguous regions. An appropriate evaluation was made regarding events which are taking place. An organizational committee was formed to establish the "Renewed Federation" council. The declaration of the organizational committee was adopted.

[Signed] **Press Service of the Organizational Committee of the "Renewed Federation" Council**

Declaration Issued

90UN0907B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 3

[Declaration issued by the organizational committee for establishing the "Renewed Federation" Council; place and date not given]

[Text] We, a group of CPSU members, representatives of Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and a number of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] oblasts, evaluate as critical the sociopolitical situation in the Soviet Baltic republics. Well-organized separatist, nationalist-careerist forces have set out on a path of open activity directed towards dividing the Soviet federation and effecting the withdrawal of a number of republics from the composition of the USSR. Analysis reveals the consistency in implementation of the doctrine, drawn up by anti-Soviet centers, to restore capitalism as a platform for subversive activity directed against the Soviet constitutional order. Elections to the local and Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics currently taking place are being used to these ends, as is evidenced by the preelection platforms of a number of social organizations which directly declare their aim to be the seizure of political power through parliamentary means. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the intended economic reform will bring about no actual improvement in the country. The government is not succeeding in creating conditions to protect the constitutional rights of citizens and guarantee their security.

Inaction and connivance on the part of state organs in the center and localities have already resulted in bloodshed in a number of regions of the country.

Serious danger is presented by a CPSU split along regional and ideological principles, and this will be followed by destruction of the system of state authority, as evidenced by events occurring in Lithuania.

This can be countered only by the consolidation of all forces with good sense, forces which oppose the ever accelerating deterioration of the country towards political and economic chaos and the escalation of interethnic strife.

Acknowledging our obligation as citizens and as human beings, and desiring to make a contribution in the struggle against the approaching danger, we have concluded that it is necessary to create the "Renewed Federation" council. The organizational committee has been created.

We appeal to everyone who holds peace and quiet dear in our common home—the renewed federation of Soviet republics, for which common human values come above all else—to rally in support of unified action.

[signed] **The Organizational Committee of the "Renewed Federation" Council**

The organizational committee is located in Room 337, 3 Kr. Valdemar St., Riga, 226010. Tel: 32-22-50.

Regional Affairs

Belorussian First Secretary's Activities Reported

Meets With Radio, TV Workers

90UN0857A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 1

[Belta report: "Meeting of Ye.Ye. Sokolov in BSSR Gosteleradio"]

[Text] In terms of power of their influence on public awareness, television and radio have a clear advantage over other mass media. How does one more effectively take advantage of their rich possibilities in mobilizing workers of the republic to solve the difficult problems of perestroyka? The search for an answer to this question set the tone for the entire discussion at the meeting of Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, and workers of BSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] which took place on 4 January.

The creative and material-technical potential of this collective has become appreciably stronger during the past years. As a result, there are more television and radio programs that leave a good impression on viewers and listeners. Television and radio viewers are undertaking to elucidate more energetically the crucial problems of the republic's socioeconomic development. They are penetrating more deeply into the difficult science of innovative thinking and avoiding uniformity in assessments of complicated phenomena in the life of the society. But, as was emphasized at the meeting, this science is difficult. Journalists frequently do not have the competence or the ability to argue and defend their viewpoint and have not mastered the art of communication in all of its forms. These are things for the leaders of the state committee and party organizations to work on.

In this connection, attention was drawn to the shortcomings in personnel training particularly in the journalism department of Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin. Graduates of this VUZ [higher educational institution], as a rule, are not prepared for practical work.

Manifestations of social injustice toward workers of the branch were discussed at the meeting. Wages, which have not been increased for many years, clearly do not correspond to the expenditures or conditions for their work. The poor material base causes complaints. There is a great need for hard currency to acquire modern technical means.

It is typical that state committee workers participating in the discussion did not restrict themselves to the subject, as it were, of their own home. They showed interest in the problems of interrelations between the party and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], the changeover of the republic to economic accountability, its economic independence, and the cleanup after the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. There was a pointed discussion about the need to immediately impose order at the republic's hematological center for children, which has a bad reputation.

The guests were asked many questions to which those in attendance received detailed answers. Possibly not everyone was satisfied but everyone noted the mutual advantage of such a frank and lively discussion.

Participating in the meeting were A.S. Kamay, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia; V.F. Kebich, deputy chairman of the BSSR Council of Ministers; and department heads of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia: for organizational party and personnel work—V.I. Boris and for ideological work—A.V. Rusetskiy.

Visits Children's Hematology Center

90UN0857B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 1

[Belta report: "Concern for Health of Children"]

[Text] Minsk (BELTA)—Since the recent "Viewpoint" program, the republic's hematology center for children has become infamous. It existed practically only on paper for many years. In crowded, poorly equipped premises, it is impossible to give the full range of treatment even to several dozen children with blood diseases. Only recently through the channels of the charity services has the center received the necessary quantity of disposable syringes and systems.

These and other cases were discussed at the meeting between physicians and parents of ill children and Ye.Ye. Sokolov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, who was visiting the hematological center. Ye.Ye. Sokolov visited the overcrowded wards of this old, prewar building, inspected the equipment, and spoke with the specialists.

Children with serious pathologies should receive the full spectrum of medical treatment and under good conditions—such is the task that was set for the republic Ministry of Health, which is drawing up an immediate and long-range program for the development of the hematology center.

Meets SELSKAYA GAZETA Editors

90UN0883C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "Ye.Ye. Sokolov Meeting With SELSKAYA GAZETA Editorial Board"]

[Text] Readers' letters have for many years served the work force of SELSKAYA GAZETA as a barometer of the social mood. About what are the inhabitants of villages, large and small, writing to their peasant newspaper today? Their attitude toward the party's agrarian policy and the problems of retooling the countryside, how the new shoots are taking root and the kind of people who are coming to manage the kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms]. They are angry: The 100-percent state commission is utterly ruining the peasant, and the honoring of pacesetters has been forgotten; they are pleased: The grain grower is straightening his shoulders for the first time and becoming the true master of the land.

A meeting on 6 January between Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and the work force of one of the republic's oldest papers began with a review of last year's mail and a discussion of the "SG-90" model. Stability—this is what has characterized the work of the editorial office for many years. An intelligent and balanced evaluation of what is happening in the republic's agro-industrial complex is its arterial direction. How to prevent a scattering of its forces in the mass of agrarian problems? The search for answers to these and other questions was the subject of a lengthy discussion during this meeting. A.S. Kamay, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, G.P. Badey, deputy chairman of the republic State Planning Committee, and Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee departments heads V.I. Boris, of organizational-party and cadre work, and V.A. Rusetskiy, of ideology, also took part.

Average indicators of agricultural production in the republic are pretty good. But why are our store counters becoming more impoverished before our very eyes. The Belorussian peasant newspaper cannot brush these issues aside. Articles by scientists have been rare in the paper in recent years. Yet without science today there is no introducing new waste-free technology, no developing the intensive processing of products and no switching to new systems of reproduction in animal husbandry. It is also necessary to help the peasant homestead stand on its own two feet, which will help enrich the collection of products on our tables.

The subject of dead and live land has, following the Chernobyl accident, become a principal topic for many Belorussian periodical publications. But it is particularly serious for SELSKAYA GAZETA: How to grow clean products on contaminated land.

"Facing Man"—this SELSKAYA GAZETA column should define the credo of its staff. This was the conclusion reached by the participants in the meeting in the editorial office, which began, as the journalists themselves believe, a new facet of the mutual relations between the creative collective and the republic Communist Party Central Committee.

Meets With Newspaper Staff

90UN0883B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "Ye.Ye. Sokolov Meeting With Journalists"]

[Text] A rare occasion: Contrary to custom, the journalists of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA were themselves involved in a sensation. Even the old-timers of the work force were unable to recall in the paper's long history an occasion when the leader of the republic party organization had ever visited the editorial offices. And yet last Friday, the staff was visited by Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

From the very outset, there was nothing resembling posturing or formalism. The essence of the almost four hours of ardent discussion may be briefly expressed: No one and nothing today should prevent the paper from being in the thick of events. Bringing to people the good word, hope, and the truth, however impartial and, at times, bitter it may be. The subject range and emotional background of the meeting were such that it was difficult at times to say unequivocally what was taking place in the editor's office: a press conference or an emergency work meeting, a serious dispute or a practical conference. The fate of readers' unusual and "poison pen" letters, the movement of "informals," salient features of the concept of self-management and self-financing in the republic economy, the creation of a stable commodity market, the prospects of scientific and technological progress, the election platform of Belorussia's communists, the training of journalists, the new artistic "Soviet Belorussia" model, the efficacy of publications, the daily routine of editorial life—these and many other questions were also discussed by the journalists and A.S. Kamay, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee; V.F. Kebich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic State Planning Committee; A.V. Rusetskiy, head of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department; P.P. Dubina, deputy head of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; and A.V. Lashkevich, first secretary of Minsk's Sovetskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee].

This serious mutual interest and comparison of viewpoints were not fortuitous. The country, the people, and the CPSU are currently confronted by dozens of problems of socioeconomic, moral, and spiritual life. People's civic self-awareness is making itself felt increasingly assertively, and a struggle against stagnation phenomena and a search for optimum paths of renewal is under way. In such a situation, mutual understanding and trust between the party headquarters and its press organ are simply essential. All events in one way or another intersect in the newspaper column and require a live response. This is sometimes difficult. In December, the editor observed, 19 of the 25 issues were practically filled with official material, which was simultaneously printed in other republic party papers also. Duplication manifestly does not help. In the last four years, the circulation of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA has more than tripled, reaching almost 600,000 copies, and the work force has earned a 2-million-ruble profit, not having supplemented its coffers here by one kopeck even. The provision of the journalists with office equipment and publishing equipment does not withstand criticism.... The editorial office's problems were noted and help was promised.

In conclusion, a mutual desire that such meetings be made traditional was expressed.

(A more detail account of Ye.Ye. Sokolov's meeting with the work force of the SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA editorial office will be published in future issues).

Ye.Ye. Sokolov yesterday met with the collective of the SELSKAYA GAZETA editorial office. An account of the meeting will be published in the next issue.

Nominated for People's Deputy

90UN0883A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "Having Obtained Credit of Trust"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Stolin. Five labor collectives—of the "Pobeda" and Kirov kolkhozes [collective farms], Motor Pool No 12, the Repair and Construction Administration and the Housing-Municipal Service Association—have nominated Yefrem Yevseyevich Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, as a candidate for people's deputy of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. The speakers did not recount his biography, there was no need. Ye.Ye. Sokolov is well enough known and remembered here. Therefore, the refrain of all the speeches was the idea that at the present revolutionary time the active, high-minded position of each party member, and particularly a leading communist, is very important. Everyone could learn from the example of Comrade Sokolov in this respect. Ye.Ye. Sokolov has been nominated as candidate for Stolinskiy Electoral Okrug No 139.

Among those who also received a credit of trust at the meetings were Aleksandr Semenovich Sharukhin, engineer of the Polotsk Station Locomotive Depot; Vyacheslav Ivanovich Cherenok, senior physician of Minsk's Third Clinical Hospital; and other workers.

Moldavian Military Blockade Called for 23 Feb

LD2102154690

[Editorial Report] Moscow World Service in Russian at 1041 GMT on 21 February in the "INTERFAX" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program carries a one-and-one-half minute report on an interview with a representative of the Russian-speaking Unity Interfront in Moldavia, Vasiliy Yakovlev, by an INTERFAX correspondent. Yakovlev is quoted as saying that the Moldavian People's Front platform, as published in the LITERATURE AND ART newspaper, is a threat to the Russian-speaking population as it makes Romanian the state language and claims lands "from the mountains to the sea" as well as turning Moldavia into a demilitarized zone. The correspondent reports that "in connection with this, the Moldavian People's Front has, according to Yakovlev, called for a blockade of military units on republic territory on 23 February, Soviet Army and Navy Day."

Moldavia Union of Working People Founded

LD2102225190 Kishinev Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] A founding conference to organize a new public movement, the Union of Working People of Moldavia, has taken place in Kamenka. Fifteen organizations and labor collectives—so far only from the settlement of Kamenka—have joined the Union. Guests and participants in the conference were acquainted with the program and statute of the Union of Working People of Moldavia. Many speeches addressedf the new organization's function and activity. The assembly stressed that the Union accepts all who want to join. The delegates, proxies, and guests expressed their attitude to the event in the vote: none against, no abstentions.

Moldavian Party Apparatus Adds Subdivision

90US0534A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 23 Jan 90 p 3

[ATEM correspondent report: "At Cutting Edge of Problems of Present Day"]

[Text] A new subdivision has been formed in the machinery of the MCP [Moldavian Communist Party] Central Committee—a political analysis and current information group. A point of considerable importance: It has been formed within the framework of the list of staff members of the Central Committee, that is, without the introduction of additional offices.

At the request of an ATEM [Moldavian Press Agency] correspondent, the aims and tasks of the group were described by its leader, F.I. Khristev:

"The formation of the new subdivision was dictated by reality itself and the process of perestroyka, which have directly affected the party authorities. After all, it is no secret that the current pattern of the apparatus of the MCP Central Committee has largely outlived its time. This became particularly clear following the 16th Plenum of the MCP Central Committee, at which the following idea was heard: In party work, as in science, that which is new is often born when the influences and interests of the communists and the public formations meet.

"The group has been given a number of important assignments, whose accomplishment will make it possible to exert a positive influence on a recovery of the social and political atmosphere and the consolidation of all forces of our multinational republic. These assignments include the study and forecasting of the social and political situation, provision for direct relations between the MCP Central Committee and the population of the republic, notification of the citizens concerning the measures adopted in response to their questions, proposals and observations, and joint work with the media."

"A most important function of our group," I.G. Agareva, adviser to the MCP Central Committee, said, "is analytical. In keeping with Lenin's principle of taking not individual facts but their sum total, we intend to use in our work various types and channels of information reflecting Moldavia's sociopolitical life. On the basis of systems analysis of the available data, the group will regularly prepare the corresponding material for the Central Committee Secretariat with its subsequent publication in the mass media.

"We do not conceive of the group's work without reliance on science, sociological services primarily. In this respect, a certain reorientation of their activity and a movement toward a more dynamic, current system of study of public opinion are required. This will make it possible at any moment and on any issue to ascertain people's opinions and mood and their attitude toward political currents and the realities of present-day life. A council of nonstaff advisers incorporating prominent scientists of the republic has been formed under the auspices of the group."

"An aspect of the group's activity is work with various public organizations and amateur formations, which have many constructive proposals pertaining to the realization of the restructuring processes," A.I. Semeonov, head of a department of the MCP Central Committee, observed. "It is our job to take all that is good in order to use it in concert for the common cause. The analysis of their activity and the search for points of contact should be more profound today also. It would be expedient, I believe, to form similar groups in the city and rayon party committees."

As is clear from these brief interviews, members of the MCP Central Committee group cannot imagine their activity without a connection with all those to whom the fate of the country and the republic is dear. They await, on telephone numbers 23-32-01 and 23- 33-12, new ideas and suggestions geared to a renewal of party work

and an acceleration of the restructuring processes in each outfit and in each city and rayon.

'Rumors Are Flying' Prior to Moldavian Election

PM2102162190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel N. Mulyar report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Moldavia: On Eve of Elections"]

[Text] The streets of Kishinev have been particularly crowded over the last few months : Unauthorized rallies and processions have been held. The last few days, however, have been the exception to this rule.

The outward calm in the city is deceptive. Very many rumors are flying around. The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee political analysis and up-to-the-minute information group had scarcely refuted the "news" that weapons supposedly had arrived in the republic from Romania when another rumor began to be whipped up. Floods of refugees supposedly had poured into Kishinev from the Transcaucasus and had been allocated apartments and places in hostels—naturally at the expense of the local inhabitants. Of course, such talk does not help reduce the tension in the city and is reflected in the course of the preparations for the election that will take place here 25 February.

That is why I first met with V. Kiktenko, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections to the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

"Some 2,070 people have been nominated for 380 seats," Vladimir Konstantinovich said. "Some 1,892 candidates have been registered. Approximately five contenders are fighting for each seat. There is an okrug in Kishinev where 19 candidates will fight for one parliamentary seat."

"Who are these candidates?"

"Mostly representatives of the intelligentsia and creative unions. Four percent are workers, 9.5 percent are kolkhoz workers, and 15 servicemen have been nominated—or 0.8 percent."

How acute will the struggle for local soviets be? Let me cite the figures for Kishinev. Some 1,077 candidates have registered for 195 seats in the municipal soviet. Some 3.4 candidates are competing per seat on the rayon soviets.

It is not only soviet and party organs that are preparing for elections in the republic but also representatives of various public movements.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Discusses Environment

PM2102101190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[RATAU-TASS report: "Ecology— Nationwide Concern"]

[Text] Kiev, 17 Feb—The Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] must be closed down. This is the opinion of the overwhelming majority of participants in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session which ended today. Deputies discussed the ecological situation in the republic and measures for its fundamental improvement.

The report by V.A. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the speeches noted: The Ukraine is on the brink of an ecological disaster. This applies primarily to regions like the Donetsk and Krivoy Rog coalfields, the Dnepr and Dnestr River valleys, the North Crimea, the Black Sea and Azov Sea coastlines and waters, the Lisichansk-Rubezhnoye industrial complex, and, of course, the Chernobyl accident zone.

The population is profoundly perturbed by the state of the republic's land stock. Soil erosion is spreading and now affects almost one-third of all arable land. More than 2.5 billion cubic meters of polluted effluent were discharged into bodies of water in the republic [time span not specified]. The level of atmospheric pollution in 43 cities is considerably above the maximum permissible norms.

The unsatisfactory state of the environment, deputies emphasized, is the consequence of the decades-long buildup of productive forces without proper consideration of possible ecological changes, diktat by Union organs in siting new production units and expanding existing capacities, underestimation of the comprehensive utilization of natural resources, economic mismanagement, and ecological illiteracy. The session sharply criticized the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, the country's and the republic's ministries and departments, and the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies which do not always display principledness and persistence in the solution of questions associated with disruption of the ecological equilibrium and environmental recovery.

There was an especially large number of complaints against leadership officials at central and republic level in connection with the slow elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident. Deputies sent a telegram to the USSR Supreme Soviet Third Session expressing their perplexity as to why the Chernobyl crisis was not included among the most important questions on the agenda of the session's work.

A meeting between Ukrainian SSR leaders and representatives of the rayons which have suffered through the Chernobyl AES accident took place during the break between sittings. Many of the questions which perturb people were answered.

The session participants sent a demand to USSR Defense Minister D.T. Yazov to halt the construction of a radar station in Transcarpathian Oblast until an expert commission has arrived at its conclusions.

The session adopted a resolution aimed at the fundamental improvement of environmental protection, the protection of people's health, and the careful utilization and restoration of natural resources. Specifically, it is planned to work in stages until a complete stop is put to the discharge of polluted effluent into bodies of water by the year 2000, and to implement other specific environmental protection measures.

The session also elected members of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, Ukrainian SSR oblast courts, and the Kiev City Court and ratified republic Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees.

Ukrainian MVD Briefing on Mass Meetings

90UN0973A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 6, 5-11 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by unidentified correspondent: "Law Is Law—Actions of Militia Considered Correct"]

[Text] The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] held a regular press conference that was devoted to public order in the conduct of mass measures.

Major General of Militia A. Borovik, chief of the Political Directorate of the Ministry, Major General of Militia A. Voytsekhovskiy, chief of the Directorate for the Maintenance of Public Order, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Shaposhnik, deputy chief of the UVD [Directorate of Internal Affairs] of the Kiev gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], noted that last year 1,243 mass measures were conducted on the territory of the republic, of which almost one-half—575—were not authorized, 463 were held without submission of applications to the ispolkom [executive committee], and 112 were held following disapproval. This is indicative of the fact that the leaders of independent action associations who are of an extremist inclination are clearly challenging authority, placing themselves outside the scope of the legislative norms that are in force. Extremists are more and more openly choosing direct confrontation with law enforcement organs, provoking various excesses. They threaten militia officials, employ physical violence against them, and they attempt to attract individual workers to their side. Together with this, a significant diversion of forces and means of the organs of internal affairs to ensure the maintenance of public order during the conduct of unauthorized actions leads, in the final analysis, to a critical worsening of the operational situation. The number of only grave crimes verified in the Ministry increased in 1989 by 37.4 percent, and the remainder of unsolved crimes, by 93.4 percent. In Kiev, these figures are 80.1 and 181.3 percent respectively.

The leaders of the organs of internal affairs of the republic dealt in their speeches with the tense situation that has taken hold in some regions of the Ukraine. In particular, Colonel of Militia L. Baranchuk, deputy chief of the UVD of the Crimean oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] talked about the problems of preventing interethnic clashes that are accompanying the process of mass resettlement of the Crimean Tatars, which is not yet supported in the necessary way at the state level. Colonel of Internal Services A. Panikarskiy, chief of the Political Department of the UVD of the Lvov oblispolkom, and Major of Militia P. Marakhovskiy, chief of the Political Department of the UVD of the gorispolkom, devoted a considerable part of their reports to events that occurred in Lvov at the end of September and the beginning of October of last year. They emphasized that the disorders that broke out in the city were the consequence of efforts to block off the UVD building, and afterwards also of threats to storm the UVD building, which were undertaken by extremist-minded nationalist groups. As for the assertions of special cruelty, which was seemingly displayed by militia employees during dispersal of the bellicose crowd, and the "puddles" of blood" that were later washed away by a sprinkler vehicle at that spot—all of these are "forgeries" that are aimed at discrediting the organs of internal affairs and misinforming the public.

Ukrainian Journalists Rebut Resignations Demands

PM2102100190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Nikolay Lisovenko report under rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at Teleprinter": "Journalists' Statement. Demonstrators' Demand for Dismissal of Newspaper Editors Rejected"]

[Text] Donetsk—These rallies took place in certain cities and rayons in the oblast, and in some areas along with other demands the speakers called for individual information organ workers to be removed from their posts. In particular, one resolution demanded the dismissal of the editor of VECHERNIY DONETSK and another the editor of Novoazovskiy Rayon's STROITEL KOMMUNIZMA.

In connection with these ultimatums an enlarged plenum of the Ukrainian Union of Journalists Donetsk oblast organization board was convened. It unanimously adopted a statement which said: "...The points of the resolutions concerning the editors' dismissal are ultra vires. It is not within the remit of rallies to resolve questions of the leadership of newspapers and other mass media and their workers' fate without labor collectives' consent. The plenum stated that in the absence of a press law journalists had been left without political and professional protection and insisted on the USSR Supreme Soviet's most speedy adoption of a law on the press and other mass media. The oblast's journalist collectives reserve the right to strike as a means of

defense against arbitrary rule, lawlessness, and political pressure from any quarter."

The text of the statement was sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Union of Journalists, and to all Donetsk Oblast newspaper editorial offices.

Ethnic Societies Council Set Up in Ukraine

LD2102072190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] In the Ukraine a Republican Council of National Societies has been set up. The constituent conference was held in Kiev and was attended by representatives of Armenians, Russians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Gypsies, and other peoples living in the Ukraine.

A cultural center of Bukharan Jews organized in Uzbekistan will be involved in studying the history and language of their people and preserving their original art. The center plans to set up a ethnographic museum, popular theatre and also to put out a periodical.

Data on Ukraine Election Delayed by Complaints

LD2102161390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0740 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Kiev, 21 Feb (TASS)—TASS correspondents Aleksandr Litvinov and Mikhail Melnik report:

Although the registration of candidates to be deputies of the Ukrainian parliament and local soviets ended on 4 February, the statistics were published only a few days ago. This was to do with complaints by two public organizations to constituency electoral commissions. The "Zelenyy Svit" ("Green World") association and the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society protested because a number of their representatives had been refused registration as candidate people's deputies.

These complaints were examined more than once by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic's central electoral commission. They were recognized as groundless.

In a conversation with TASS correspondents, Vitaliy Boyko, chairman of the republic's electoral commission, explained that only representatives of primary organizations which did not have the status of rayon or oblast organizations failed to received registration. Meanwhile, in accordance with the new law on elections, the right of nomination is granted only to organs of oblast, rayon, or city public organizations.

At the same time Vitaliy Boyko admitted that some constituency electoral commissions displayed formalism in the registration of candidate deputies. This has given rise to a stream of complaints. The republic's electoral commission has met 23 of these, including four concerning the registration of candidates nominated by the Ukrainian Language Society and the "Zeleniy Svit" association.

According to the chairman of the republic's electoral commission, the working people of the republic nominated 3,091 candidates for the Ukrainian parliament. This means an average of seven people for each mandate. In one Kiev constituency 33 people are campaigning for a seat in the republic's Supreme Soviet. The largest number of candidates are from the working class—313. The party apparatus is represented by 298 candidates. There are 394 nonparty people. Public organizations have proposed more than 600 candidacies representing all strata of the republic's population. Some 100 writers are standing in the elections.

The final stage of the election campaign is now on in the republic—meetings between candidates and voters. The 4 March elections will show which of them is to receive a popular mandate.

Chernobyl, Ecological Situation Examined

Chernobyl Society Registered

LD2002225590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] The Ukrainian Council of Ministers has registered the statute of Chernobyl Union an All-Union voluntary society. This mass public organization is intended to defend the rights of citizens who participated in eliminating the consequences at the nuclear power station, who suffered because of this accident, or other cases where ionizing radiation has taken effect. The society will base its work on creative initiative with a motto of humanity and charity.

Plant Closing Demanded

LD1702220990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] The session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet ended its work in Kiev today. Here is what Vladimir Sokolov, our correspondent, reports:

[Sokolov] All the denizens of the Ukraine followed intently the work of this session, which examined the ecological situation in the republic and planned steps to improve it radically. For after all, essentially what was at stake was their health and li. e. It was not for nothing that the delegates arriving for the opening of the session were met outside the republic's Supreme Soviet by pickets sent from many parts of the Ukraine. People turned up with placards demanding that the construction of atomic power stations be halted in the Ukraine and that the existing Chernobyl power station be closed. Meanwhile representatives of those rayons worst polluted by radiation after the Chernobyl accident demanded the immediate evacuation of people from there. Emissaries from

the transcarpathian region arrived with the demand that the construction of a powerful radar station there be halted.

The delegates discussed the basic principles of a comprehensive program put forward by the republic's government to improve the ecological situation in the Ukraine, and in particular to eliminate the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES]. The decision was made to decommission it earlier than intended. However, the deputies subjected the government to sharp criticism—indeed there was a motion of no-confidence in it—for its tardiness in drafting such a program and for the inertia of the decisions made earlier on urgent ecological problems.

So, how do you view the work of the session? That is the question I put to Svetlana Mikhaylovna Kraminskaya, a deputy from Kharkov.

[Kraminskaya] I should tell you that the ecological situation in the Ukraine today is critical. In the past 10 years we have seen 33-percent increase in the number of all sorts of illnesses. Add to that the grave consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy that have accumulated to date. Of course not everything can be resolved through the efforts of us Ukrainian people's deputies. It is for that reason that we asked the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow to give priority to a government program to deal with the aftermath of the Chernobyl AES accident. Here in the republic we have approved the basic principles of the comprehensive program to improve the ecological situation by the year 2005. Clearly, though, it will be up to the new convocation of the republic's Supreme Soviet to make sure that it is fulfilled.

Closing Deemed 'Necessary'

LD1702212390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Feb 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine adopted measures that are important for the republic, and that have been engendered by the fact that the Ukraine is, in the deputies' opinion, on the brink of ecological catastrophe. In the opinion of the majority of the session's participants, it is necessary to close the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station and to halt the construction of a radar station in Transcarpathian oblast until an expert commission has produced its conclusions.

Ukrainian Official Interviewed

90UN0931B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 2

[Report on interview with K.I. Masik, chairman of Permanent Extraordinary Commission of Ukrainian Council of Ministers for Eliminating Consequences of Accidents, Catastrophes, and Natural Disasters and deputy chairman of Ukrainian Council of Ministers, by RATAU correspondent A. Petrunya, RATAU special to PRAVDA UKRAINY: "Chernobyl, Zone of Our Concern"; date, place not specified]

[Text] Chernobyl—the name of this city in Polesye has become the symbol of major trouble associated with the rampaging atom which was generally referred to as "peaceful"until quite recently. The 1986 accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] is still making its presence felt. As scientists maintain, its repercussions will be with us for many decades to come. Much has been done in the years since, and much effort and money has been invested in order to cure the marks left by this tragedy. However, much work still remains to be done. RATAU correspondent A. Petrunya discussed this with K.I.Masik, chairman of the Permanent Extraordinary Commission of the UkSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers for Eliminating the Consequences of Accidents, Catastrophes, and Natural Disasters and deputy chairman of the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

[Petrunya] Konstantin Ivanovich, a commission headed by V.Kh Doguzhiyev, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergencies and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, spent three days in the Ukraine. What was the purpose of its visit?

[Masik] Let me say right away that it is not associated with any emergency. This is scheduled work. The purpose of the visit by this authoritative commission was to study the main problems of the second stage of post-accident cleanup at the Chernobyl AES on site. It was done in order not only to analyze and evaluate what has been accomplished but also to find out what issues trouble the people working at the station and within a 30 km zone and those residing in the adjacent rayons. Ensuring the safety of the "Shelter" facility, commonly known as the "Sarcophagus," is one of these issues. In this reference, a report by Academy members S.T. Belyaev and L.N. Lupichev on scientific and research work at the facility and its further operation was heard.

At present, some people voice the opinion that, supposedly, we need to get rid of the Chernobyl station immediately. However, all of us should understand that the AES is not a switch on the wall that you may come up to and flip and the flow of energy will stop. After all, apart from everything else, products of nuclear decay have accumulated at the station in the years it has been in operation. This is why everything needs to be done in order for the "Shelter" Facility to meet all necessary safety standards and to minimize the harmful influence on the health of the people working at the station and around it.

What is this facility? It is a structure 60 meters tall, that is, as tall as a 20-story house. The thickness of concrete walls ranges between six and 12 meters, and in places up to 18 meters. Cooling, ventilation, and filtering systems are in operation here. At present, a special party from the

USSR Academy of Sciences is conducting research directly inside the destroyed unit where all kinds of parameters are being studied. The main conclusion to which the commission has come is that at present a nuclear reaction in the unit is ruled out; there are no conditions at all for a chain reaction to emerge. However, we should also think about other aspects associated with this unit. After all, there are many constructions inside it which were affected by the explosion. Years have passed, and chemical and thermal processes have been under way which may bring about the collapse of a number of constructions. This means that it is necessary to reinforce them. This is what the drafts proposed by the scientists will facilitate.

[Petrunya] Recently, rumors spread in Kiev to the effect that something very serious had happened at the station, something that can worsen the radiation situation. What can you say about this?

[Masik] First of all, I would like to note that all statements about some discharges, some radioactive substance leaks occurring at the Chernobyl AES, and about radioactive clouds soaring are absolutely without foundation in fact. I say this with complete responsibility. Moreover, our commission has studied virtually the entire territory of the Ukraine and has come to the conclusion that, apart from the radionuclides which already fell out as a result of the Chernobyl accident, no additions are being made at present.

What actually happened at the station? On 2 January, they had what they call an unconventional situation which frequently happens in any kind of production, including the AES. The unloading of yet another fuel-containing assembly with spent fuel was under way. These assemblies are removed from biological protection devices and installed in a special pool with water. So, the case got stuck, jammed, and it did not come out of this system. They had to work in order to separate the case from the rod. However, it poses no danger of radioactivity for the residents of Kiev or for the servicing personnel either.

Incidentally, about rumors, since we are on the topic. In the 30 km zone, so much radioactive dirt has accumulated that many decades will be needed in order to remove it. This is why the concept of building a plant for processing it has appeared. However, someone had to spread rumors that this enterprise will process radioactive waste from our entire country and almost the entire world. Certainly, this is not true. Our government would have never allowed that to happen. Judge for yourselves: At present, there are about 70 million curies of radioactive substances in the zone and several hundred burial sites. We desperately need a processing enterprise for the zone and for no other needs. We have commissioned a number of institutes to develop a design for such a plant. We are interested in commissioning the plant as soon as possible.

[Petrunya] Konstantin Ivanovich, how can you describe the situation in areas contaminated with radionuclides at present?

[Masik] As is known, the Chernobyl accident caused tremendous losses. In the Ukraine, five million hectares of land were contaminated with radiation, out of which 3.5 million are agricultural land, and 1.5 million hectares are forests. Thirty-two rayons in six oblasts of our republic were affected by radiation to various degrees. Within the zone of so-called strict control, 59,500 people reside. These are some rayons of Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts, especially Polesskiy and Narodichskiy Rayons. Some 201,000 people live in areas with loads of five curies and higher. However, we are now expanding this region, not because we want to but because, first, science has accumulated new data on the influence of radiation on man; second, in some rayons, for example, in Rovno Oblast, where the doses are small, the structure of the soil is such that it accelerates the transfer of nuclides from the soil to the roots and thus into foodstuffs and fodder. At present, the residents of 1,028 localities, about a million people, risk ingesting cesium with milk. Our task is to ensure their regular activities, the socio-economic conditions needed, and full-fledged health care which, unfortunately, far from meets all the necessary requirements at present. We study the rayons mentioned comprehensively and continuously. Prominent scientists, specialists, and medics take part in such work. These issues were also the focus of attention of the union commission which visited here.

[Petrunya] Immediately after the accident, 92,000 people were evacuated from the 30 km zone. A recent resolution of the republic Council of Ministers provided for the evacuation of more than 3,000 families from rayons adjacent to the zone on top of it. What caused this decision, and why was it not made sooner?

[Masik] Indeed, we evacuated the people in the initial weeks after the accident. A total of about 11,000 detached houses on lots, 25 high-rise buildings, and more than 600 social and service facilities have been built for them. Decontamination work has been carried out over sizable areas. Still, we have not been successful in ensuring safe living conditions throughout the rayons adjacent to the zone. This is why the government of the Ukraine made the decision to evacuate additional people in the interest of health and taking into account the need to maintain the people's psychological balance of people. Initially, 14 such localities were listed. However, at the last moment we saw fit to include on the list the residents of the urban settlements of Narodichi and Polesskoye as well. Everything will be done so that the people will not only receive housing but will also retain their customary lifestyle: Those from villages will be resettled in rural areas, and those from cities in cities. Eighteen high-rises and more than 2,000 private houses, 11 schools, 16 day-care centers, and dozens of health-care, trade, and service facilities will be built for those resettled. All housing and other priority facilities should be erected as early as this year. I would like to stress that all of these

construction projects are in addition to the plan. Securing additional material resources and manpower will be required. They will be secured because at issue is the health of the people.

[Petrunya] One of the latest resolutions of the UkSSR Council of Ministers involves additional benefits for participants in the post-accident cleanup and the people who have suffered to some degree from the consequences of the accident.

[Masik] Incidentally, we discussed this issue with the union commission as well. Indeed, it so happened that some of these people were undeservedly forgotten. I will note, however, that a lot has already been done in the sphere of benefits. Thus, people residing in the zone of strict control receive 25-percent bonuses on top of their salaries and R30 for acquiring safe foodstuffs. Now they enjoy the right to retire at 55 (men) and at 50 (women). Free foodstuffs are provided for schools and pre-school establishments. Pregnant women are given three months of leave prior to delivery and three years of paid leave for child care. From now on, not only employees but also retirees will receive the 25-percent bonus, and all caps on their earnings in addition to their retirement benefits will be removed. In Kiev, a special center for the protection of motherhood and childhood is open especially for people from these rayons. Two sanatoriums on the Black Sea coast have been reserved for them.

Besides, from this year on, families with children under 14 and pregnant women residing in the areas affected by radioactive contamination will be given the right to be placed on waiting lists for housing with priority in the allocation of housing in any locality of the Ukraine, with the exception of Kiev and resort areas. Aid will be provided for those who do not wish to abandon their native areas. Fifteen rubles per month will be issued to every member of the family for purchasing safe foodstuffs; other benefits have been envisaged.

[Petrunya] What is done in the territory of these rayons?

[Masik] We practice a customized approach there on the basis of the knowledge and research accumulated. We take decontamination measures, as well as those to improve the social conditions for life and medical control and to change the specialization of agriculture. If these measures do not produce the desired effect the issue of mandatory resettlement arises. It is no secret that at present so-called "squatters," 1,078 of them, live in the areas where residence is contraindicated. I believe that leaving them there is plain inhumane.

In a word, a lot has already been done in order to clean up after the accident. However, much remains to be done. This is why the Chernobyl issue remains a zone of our permanent concern.

Radiation 'Victims' End Fast

90UN0916B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by A. Illesh and A. Pashkov under rubric "Follow-up": "People of Chernobyl End Their Fast—But Problems Remain for Those Who Stopped Biggest Catastrophe of 20th Century"]

[Text] The other day our paper (IZVESTIYA, No 33) published some material under the headline, "Medicine's Special Zone". Among other things it dealt with the sick "liquidators"—the name used now for those who worked to eliminate the after-effects of the catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Today there are thousands of such people or those who think their diseases are an immediate result of the radiation. Now several people who were driven to the utmost despair have announced in Moscow and Sverdlovsk hospitals that they have started fasting. What is the present situation with these sick people—former heroes of Chernobyl? What have the doctors and agencies involved done?

The Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] addressed the problem of the eight fasting patients to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] council of ministers. They sent Moscow a demand that a competent commission be sent to resolve the situation locally. The Sverdlovsk Oblast alone has over 3,000 "liquidators." However, we have to admit that fasting is not the best method of fighting for your legitimate rights.

But there was no time to lose over a decision and the oblispolkom used the power it has over its territory and ordered that the same social and life benefits be provided for the people who had received a dangerous radiation dose as had been provided to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

Naturally, the question arises: Why could they not do it earlier? The absurdity of the situation lies in the fact that the "liquidators" cannot be considered patients because they received less than the legal radiation dose. G. Zubkovskiy, the head of the radioisotope diagnostics department of the Moscow scientific research x-ray and radiology institute, chief radiologist of the RSFSR Ministry of Health, was in charge of the commission from Moscow which did come up with the required diagnosis.

"I examined the people who are fasting and they, definitely, have "our" disease," says German Alexandrovich. "The policy of saving money on people's health that reigns supreme in our medicine very often puts them in a desperate position. In this particular case we managed to prove the connection between the people's disease and their involvement in the emergency operations at the nuclear power station. Even that cannot be done easily now; some agencies involved in the event still have not

disclosed information on the real radiation doses. Very often the real doses are ten times higher than the official ones.

One of the leaders of the "liquidators'" team, engineer S. Trofimov, admitted in 1986 that he himself never saw the dosimeter readings as the instruments were taken away right after the work was over. Nobody knows what was recorded later. In any case, one of those fasting, V. Zavarzin, had one set of numbers at first. But after he got sick he demanded a reexamination of his records and the doctors came up with totally different information. The Ministry of Defense, by the way, was absolutely against it: The reexamination became possible only after interference from the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Now all the Sverdlovsk patients have stopped fasting.

"We have drafted some regulations on benefits for the "liquidators" and we have sent the draft to the USSR Supreme Soviet," says G. Zubovskiy. "We are convinced that the benefits should be extended to everyone who was in Chernobyl in April of 1986 and in 1987."

We want to note here that IZVESTIYA several times mentioned the problem of the legal status for the rights of the "liquidators" and of all those who were exposed to radiation. But this will hardly be the end of the story. The state coffers, obviously, are too empty to help hundreds of thousands of people. But we cannot dodge the issue any more either; we need to discuss publicly the problems of everyone in Chernobyl. We need to find a mutually acceptable way out without losing another day. Today the social aid to the victims is being offered by the movement "Chernobyl Union" which has a lot of problems itself—from finances to accommodation. So far, they have not found any suitable premises in the capital. As for S. Shcheklin, the patient who decided to fast in a Moscow hospital, he has ended his action. An independent commission is being formed to assess his state of health.

It seems that we can and should talk about the benefits for all of the immediate participants in the catastrophe clean-up effort. We managed to find out in the USSR Council of Ministers that the state commission on emergency situations is discussing a draft paper dealing with the problem. Don't let us forget now, just before the fourth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, that an old wound might hurt no less than a new one.

Deputies Issue Demands

LD1902120390 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 18 Feb 90

[Text] By an overwhelming majority, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session which has ended in Kiev has voted for complete closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The session asserted that Ukraine has found itself on the brink of an ecological catastrophe as a consequence of soil erosion and dumping of industrial effluent into water compounds. In 43 cities of the republic the air pollution level considerably exceeds the already extended norms.

The deputies issued a demand to USSR Defense Minister Yazov to halt the construction of the radar station in Transcarpathian oblast until the conclusion of the commission of experts becomes available.

Chernobyl's Future Discussed

LD1602143590 Moscow TASS in English 1152 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Kiev February 16 TASS—By TASS correspondent Stanislav Volnyanskiy:

A round-table conference was held in Kiev to discuss the future of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. It was called by the Ukrainian Peace Committee, the republican "Green World" association, the national Academy of Sciences and the Scientific Society of Power Engineers. The meeting was attended by prominent Soviet scientists and experts, heads of nuclear power plants, statesmen and civic leaders of the Ukraine.

It was recalled at the conference that the Chernobyl disaster of April 26th, 1986 was an alarm signal for all the world. Although much work was done to eliminate its aftermaths, there still remain many problems to be resolved.

Member of the Supreme Soviet and writer Yuriy Shcherbak called for the closure of the Chernobyl power plant. He also proposed a five-year moratorium on the building of nuclear power plants in the USSR until absolutely foolproof reactors are developed.

This view was opposed by leaders of several research institutes, officials of the USSR Ministry for Nuclear Power Engineering, and by the director of the Chernobyl power plant. While admitting that the station did not meet contemporary safety requirements, they insisted, nevertheless, on its further operation until the end of its service life, advancing purely economic arguments.

The speeches of scientists, republican ministers for electrification and power-engineering, public health officials, heads of several organisations and individuals were keynoted by the view that despite economic losses linked with the plant's closure, the life and health of people were the most convincing arguments in favour of closing down the plant and subsequently liquidating it altogether.

The conference decided to submit this proposal for the consideration of the Ukrainian parliament which is meeting today to discuss ecology problems.

Sociopolitical Situation in Georgia Viewed

90US0486A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In Central Committee of Communist Party of Georgia"]

[Text] A meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Communist Party of Georgia was held to consider and set forth specific measures aimed at normalizing the sociopolitical situation which has emerged in the republic.

It was noted that the murder of a 9-year-old child in the village of Prisi in Tskhinvalskiy Rayon on 3 January abruptly exacerbated the situation and caused the justified outrage of the public. In Tbilisi, Gori, and some other areas large rallies were held; dissatisfaction was expressed with the publication of nonobjective information on the sociopolitical situation in the republic in some central newspapers.

G. Gumbaridze, other members of the Central Committee Bureau, and leaders of the republic government have been meeting regularly with representatives of the public from Tbilisi, Gori, Tskhinvali, Znauri, Leningori, and some other rayons. Particular facts and information have been clarified, socio-political evaluation of the processes underway has been made, and specific ways for the mutual support of the organs of power and the public and joint efforts aimed at normalizing the emerging situation in a timely manner have been set forth in the course of a frank and principled dialogue.

It was stressed at the meeting of the bureau that party, soviet, and law enforcement organs should take more effective, extraordinary measures to restore complete peace and order in this area, step up preventive and explanatory work, nip in the bud any attempt to violate the law, and rule out any concessions. All people, regardless of what they are, should be held strictly accountable under the law with a view to the population's perceiving peace and social and civic protection in a timely and complete manner. Particular attention should be paid to maintaining the normal sociopolitical situation and normal labor rhythm in the capital and other areas of the republic, and to providing effective and objective information to the populace through television and the press on the existing situation and the measures taken by the organs of authority. Given vigorous support by the broad circles of the public, these measures should ensure stabilization and normalization of the situation in the immediate future.

It was acknowledged that the law enforcement organs have been conducting an investigation of cases of violation of the law very vigorously. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against many violators; additional forces of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] have been dispatched to the area; their deployment has been determined and procedures for actions according to the situation have been established. Specific measures have been set forth and are being implemented with a view to confiscating weapons, disbanding self-appointed headquarters and removing pickets, and so on.

It was also noted that at present, when the organs of power are carrying out effective measures aimed at preventing the spontaneous development of events and establishing complete peace, when the law enforcement organs are fully in control of the situation, when a parliamentary commission for reviewing the issues associated with the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast set up by the last session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is at work, when the situation in the Transcaucasus region where hundreds of kilometers of the border zone with Iran have been violated is extremely tense—under these conditions it is impermissible to go on strike and split the labor collectives and our society along ethnic lines.

Party, soviet, and law-enforcement organs have been given relevant assignments.

Georgian Social Democratic Party Plans Congress

LD2002131890 Moscow World Service in Russian 1033 GMT 20 Feb 90

[From "INTERFAX" feature of "Soviet Day by Day" program]

[Text] An INTERFAX correspondent reports from Tbilisi that it is planned to hold the next congress—the fifth—of the Georgian Social Democratic Party [SDP] there on 24-25 February, after an interval of exactly 60 years. The congress will reestablish the activity of a party which traces its origins from the social democratic organisation Mesami-Dasi, which emerged in Georgia on 7 February 1893 and was founded by Noe Dzhordaniye.

Doctor of History, Prof (Guram Muchavidze) told the INTERFAX correspondent that after 1921, some of the Georgian social democrats emigrated, and some went illegal. The third and fourth congresses of the Georgian SDP were held deep underground in 1925 and 1930.

The underground central committee of the Georgian SDP operated until the beginning of the 1950's on the territory of the republic. However, the party's foreign bureau continues to operate to this day. It runs departments of the SDP in Paris, New York, London, Munich, and Buenos Aires. Preparations for the fifth congress of Georgian social democrats has been carried out in close contact with the foreigm bureau.

The position of the Georgian SDP is to strive for the restoration of state sovereignty of the republic, the passing of an act on its independence, and the creation of a constitution of a Georgian democratic republic.

Georgian Party Adopts Alliance Proposal

LD0302050790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0100 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 2 (TANJUG)—A plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia has adopted a proposal that an alliance of independent Communist Parties of republics be formed within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it has been learned.

The Georgian party plenum proposed that the first secretaries of republican parties become members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It also urged that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in future be called the Central Committee of Communist Parties of the Soviet Union.

The Georgian party leadership agreed that the constitutional provision which guarantees the party a leading role in society be abolished since it believes that authority should be won through actions, not the Constitution.

The Georgian party leadership also believes that the only way towards democratization of society is through a multi-party system.

Georgian Presidium on Restoring Calm

90US0487C Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed statement: "In Presidium of Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] A meeting of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet was held. It discussed the socio-political situation which has emerged in the republic. Measures aimed at normalizing the situation in Tbilisi and Shida Kartli were envisaged.

The meeting of the presidium focused its attention on the need to solve the complex problems now existing in the republic through a peaceful and mutually coordinated dialogue, in a parliamentary way and no other, rather than by force.

It was noted at the meeting that disruptions in the movement of traffic and the operation of Tbilisi enterprises have developed. Certain difficulties with the supply of electricity have also developed which have been exacerbated still further by an accident at a power line in the Caucasus Mountains. All measures have been taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident and to improve the delivery of electricity to the population and the national economy of the republic.

The presidium also discussed the state of the investigation of cases involving tragic incidents in various regions of the republic and their referral to courts.

It was noted that the law enforcement organs do not always carry out measures aimed at investigating crimes and referring cases to courts with the degree of dispatch which the situation would warrant which causes justified dissatisfaction among the populace of the republic.

The Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet instructed the law-enforcement organs to treat this aspect of the matter with great care and responsibility and to take effective measures for the timely solving of crimes and punishment of the guilty parties.

The need to inform the population considerably better about the work performed in this field was acknowledged.

Georgian Central Committee Views Unrest

90US0487A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed statement: "In Central Committee of Communist Party of Georgia"]

[Text] On 11 January, a meeting of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee was held which reviewed issues associated with the sociopolitical situation existing in the republic.

It was noted that the situation in the area of Tskhinvali remains stable due to the swift emergency measures taken. Calls for strikes, picketing of enterprises and transportation, rallies, and the defiling of individual monuments have considerably complicated the sociopolitical situation in Tbilisi. On 11 January, the operation of transportation was mainly restored due to the measures taken by party, soviet, and law enforcement organs. There are no disruptions in the supply of foodstuffs to the capital city and in the operation of vital facilities. At the same time, a number of enterprises are not operating due to the acute shortage of electricity. They have been deliberately closed in order not to exacerbate the living conditions of the populace and not to infringe on its interests.

The law enforcement organs were charged with considerably stepping up their work to reinforce order, prevent unlawful actions and disruptions in the operation of vital facilities and services of the capital city, and ensure that their functions and all law-enforcement measures strictly comply with the laws, instructions, and norms in effect.

It was indicated to party, soviet, and trade union organs that it is necessary to work in labor collectives and at places of residence more vigorously and in a more unconventional manner, to explain to the population the complexity of the emergent situation the way out of which lies primarily through ensuring strict discipline and organization, through the high civic awareness of the people.

At the same time, specific measures need to be taken with a view to preventing the deterioration of the financial status of workers and clerical employees suffering from the power shortage.

The bureau envisaged specific rapid measures for supplying electricity to the republic and its capital. A working group headed by B. Makharashvili, member of the Bureau, deputy chairman of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, was set up for this purpose. Measures were taken to ensure the uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs for the populace.

Georgian First Secretary on Ossetia Events

90US0486B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] In conjunction with new complications in the socio-political situation in Shida Kartli, Tbilisi, and some other rayons, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and chairman of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, G. Gumbaridze, spoke on Georgian television on 5 January of this year.

He stressed in his speech that late last year Georgia won a victory in principle at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies where one more step was taken along the path of speeding up the processes of perestroyka, democratization, and radical political and economic reforms. The spirit of Georgia and Georgians was renewed and elevated, as well as that of the entire population of the republic who had reason to welcome the new year with hope and to wish each other peace, courage, and further victories.

Unfortunately, beginning with the very first days of the new year, the sociopolitical situation has again become extremely inflamed, furthered by a new dramatic event in Tskhinvalskiy Rayon.

Meetings with the population and parents and relatives of the baby who perished, speeches at large rallies in Shida Kartli, Goriyskiy Rayon, and subsequently in Tbilisi, meetings with those arriving from Tskhinvali, Znauri, and Gori convince us still more that unfortunately there are forces which stop at nothing, which do not miss any opportunity to disturb the peace on the soil of Georgia, cause destabilization in the republic, create a critical, catastrophic situation, set the people against each other, and spill blood.

Those who have wittingly or unwittingly assaulted a toddler and reduced to despair his parents, the Georgian father and the Ossetian mother, will not be given any mercy. A special investigation is underway which will determine the truth very soon and will find those guilty; the public will be informed of this.

As far as the present day is concerned, emergency measures have been taken to restore complete peace in the region; a new system for maintaining public order and policing is in effect; additional forces of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Georgia have been put in action; their deployment has been determined; procedures for actions according to the situation have been established; emergency measures for the confiscation of weapons have been planned and are being carried out.

G. Gumbaridze stressed that an end will be put to the spontaneous development of events. Resolute measures aimed at disbanding all self-appointed headquarters and pickets have begun to be implemented.

Normalizing the situation is primarily the duty and responsibility of the state organs. In this sense, no concessions will be made. Such efforts of the organs of power require complete understanding and support from the public.

The republic organs have all the necessary forces for establishing order and advancing the processes of perestroyka and democratization. Regardless of the quite understandable emotions which drive the people, the establishment of order should be completely entrusted to the organs of state power and administration.

In the speech, the thought was particularly stressed that at present, when the necessary specific measures are being taken in the region, when a parliamentary commission for reviewing the issues associated with the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast set up by the session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is at work, when the situation in the Transcaucasus region where hundreds of kilometers of the border zone with Iran have been violated, which all of us should consider seriously, when the process of consolidation of the various strata of society is becoming increasingly profound, the emphasis on forcible methods and extreme radical actions, organizing strikes, and splitting the labor collectives along ethnic lines can hardly be considered proper.

G. Gumbaridze voiced his conviction that our society will not succumb to such provocations which only bring about anarchy and uncontrollable processes and play into the hands of others. The republic has all the resources to establish due order in the republic with the support of the public. Wisdom, balance, and organization may be most helpful in this endeavor. This is necessary everywhere, especially in the capital of the republic. We may only advance along the path of democratic renewal together, verifying every step we take by the real situation and real opportunities, and revealing and unifying the creative and constructive forces of the people on the platform of perestroyka.

Georgian Students Make Demands at Meeting

LD2102150290 Moscow World Service in Russian 1041 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From "INTERFAX" feature of "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] A meeting was held on 19 February at the Georgian Technical University buildings, organized by sociopolitical associations of students. Those taking part advocated the depoliticization and deideologization of the teaching process in the higher education institution and called for the party and komsomol committees there to be disbanded.

The INTERFAX correspondent reports that there were calls at the meeting for the liquidation of the CPSU Central Committee and the Komsolol Central Committee. A group of students burned their Komsomol cards at the meeting. The meeting participants called for 25 February—previously celebrated as the day Soviet power was established in Georgia—to be marked by a ceremony of mourning.

Georgia Forced To Ration Power to Industry

PM2102130590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Besik Urigashvili: "Georgia: Electricity Supply Problems"]

[Text] Tbilisi—A critical situation prevails in Georgia's electricity supply system. A decision has been taken to cut off the supply of electricity to the republic's most energy-intensive industrial facilities. Revaz Arveladze, chief engineer of the Georgian power supply system, commented on this as follows:

We began to feel the power shortage from the moment the Armenian Nuclear Electric Power Station stopped. We presumed that it would be a tough winter. We have repeatedly urged the population and the leaders of industrial enterprises to save as much energy as possible. But one cannot foresee everything. On 4 February an explosion occurred in the second and third power units of the Azerbaijan State Regional Electric Power Station [GRES], and on the same day power line 500, situated high in the mountains, which supplies us with power from Krasnodar Kray, went out of action. As a result the republic has lost around 600 megawatts of electricity from its daily 'ration.' We have had to resort to emergency measures. The Zestafoni ferrous alloy plant has been completely closed down, while the power supply to such enterprises as the Kutaisi automobile plant, the "Gruzugol," "Chiaturmarganets," "Khimvolokno," and "Azot" production associations, and certain others has been halved. As of today the power supply to more than 500 of the republic's enterprises has been restricted. Here I would like to note that everything is being done to ensure the uninterrupted supply of electricity to food industry enterprises, transportation, and consumer and municipal services facilities.

The power supply is cut off for 2-3 hours in the rayons according to a special schedule. The population is notified of this in good time.

Work to restore power line 500 is nearing its end. It is reported from the Transcaucasus joint power systems control administration that the second power unit of the Azerbaijan GRES will be restored in the next few days. This will make up in part for the daily 17 million kilowatt-hours shortfall to date.

Economic

Single Ration Card System Discussed

904D0061A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 6, Feb 90 p 3

[V. Maleyev article: "Card Games"]

[Text] Coupons, "vizitky" [identification cards for purchases in areas of residence], temporary fairs at enterprises, orders, and various forms of rationed distribution cause trade to get out of control. Attempts to stricktly regulate, to calculate the consumption of commodities, and at the same time to utilize fully what we have, thereby leads, as it turns out, to the opposite result. An artificial shortage is created on the market, owing to the withdrawal of funds from free sale for these purposes. In turn, the accumulated reserves are dissolved in a sea of speculative demand, and they become an object of abuse. Evidence of this is the worsening situation in stores and the difficulties with commodities that were readily available not long ago, and the "rich" finds of worker controllers. But, you see, production is not decreasing. For example, the volume of retail commodity turnover increased last year by 37 billion rubles [R].

But, nonetheless, the idea about a single ration card system continues to attract many people who are worn out from standing in lines. It is also proposed and actively propagandized by some scientist-economists and people's deputies. They say that it is necessary to assure each person a minimal subsistence level of consumption with the help of ration cards, establishing a state order for this, and selling the rest according to contractual prices. They say that, with this, we can immediately switch to a free market.

What does it mean—to introduce a single card system? This, apparently, is first and foremost to give guarantees and to provide some kind of a specific and single level of consumption for the entire population of the country. But is it possible to do this?

Let us take, for example, a product such as meat, with respect to which very many people support distribution by cards. It is believed that two kg of meat a month per person can be found. It is clear that this consumption minimum can be guaranteed only owing to that part of state resources which finds its way into market funds. But here is what calculations show. For nine months of last year, supplies to market funds made it possible to have 31.6 kg of meat and meat products per capita on the average throughout the country. Well then, what can be concluded about this level?

It is hardly possible—because this index differs quite a bit in the individual union republics. For example, during

these nine months, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] received 57.1 kg per capita, the Latvian SSR—47.1, and the Lithuanian SSR—46.3 kg of meat and meat products per capita. At the same time, the funds of the Uzbek and Tajik SSR received only 12.5 kg per capita each, the Kirghiz SSR—19.5, the Turkmen SSR—18, and the Azerbaijan SSR—15.7 kg per capita.

Putting it another way, to arrive at a single consumption norm, it is necessary to conduct a redistribution and to take funds from some and transfer them to others; that is, to consider the real production of meat in regions. It is not difficult to imagine that such actions would not only not ease social tension, but would intensify it many times over.

Nor does this proposal, we will be frank, take into account the abnormal situation that has developed in the country in connection with the transition of the regions to economic accountability and the nonfulfillment of the plan of deliveries. Last year, for example, the plan of deliveries to the all-union fund was not met by the Latvian, Estonian, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Belorussian Republics. Under such conditions, how can there be a guarantee of a single ration card norm of consumption? Or, perhaps, without exception, switch all rayons, cities, and oblasts to a rationed distribution? But even so, the very same problems arise in many regions. Because consideration has to be given to the fact that market funds do not entirely end up on store counters. These funds also supply worker dining halls, children's homes and kindergartens, hospitals, sanatoriums, schools... What shall we do, take funds away from them? And if not, then what will be left for distribution under the card system? That which now goes to the stores. It is possible that calculations will be in grams. Moreover, it should be understood that market funds for meat and meat products also include suet, and first and second category subproducts, and bones. How is this to be divided among everyone?

Well, and finally, there is this question, which also cannot be left unattended when speaking about a single card system. How is minimal consumption calculated? Up to now, science, for example, has been unable to provide a precise answer to this question.

"Formally, there can be several approaches here," believes R. Kogay, chief of a sector of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Study of the Demand of the Population for Consumer Products and the State of Market Trade. "One can proceed from physiological norms to calculate a 'ration' that depends on age and professional indices, taking into account the specifics of work, and regional indices associated with national and climatic features. Or to distribute according to the principle of 'everyone gets something.' Theoretically, some basis can be found. But how can such a distribution be implemented practically on a country-wide scale? Because, you see, it is necessary to ensure universal equality both in quality and variety."

And, if you will, what is most important. The average consumption norm cannot be linked to the efficiency of work. Otherwise, both a sponger and a highly skilled worker will have the same rights to a minimum. Moreover, the implementation of this all-union action will require the printing of 280 million cards, the creation of a large-scale accounting system, and the organization of a comprehensive system of control. And the logic of things makes it necessary to suppose that a single card system will have to be introduced not only for meat and other food products, but also for industrial commodities that are in short supply.

"Even without this, the current system of distribution is regulated to the limit," said V. Nefedov, chief of a department of the VNIIKS [All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Study of the Demand of the Population for Consumer Products and the State of Market Trade], on this score. "And if we will continue to talk about ration cards, then we must forget about the development of economic methods of management."

Of course, the problem of shortage can be resolved only by increasing production: In order to share something, you first of all have to have it. But other possibilities of attracting additional resources should not be neglected.

"Today we forget about intensive processing of raw materials," A. Moshkina, a VNIIKS sector chief, directed attention to still another aspect of the problem. "This kind of processing facilitates fuller utilization of resources, and it broadens and enriches variety. It also becomes possible to differentiate price. Today, for example, meat is going for one price, but frequently practically all that is available to the buyer is bones and fat..."

Employees of the institute also mentioned that elementary rational nourishment could resolve many problems. Public opinion polls show that the population would prefer to buy less meat, if there was an abundance of fruit, vegetables, fish, and various dairy products for sale. That is, the question of variety arises once more. And the already existing experience of replacing trade with distribution attests to the fact that distribution by no means contributes to variety.

As we see, the single card system slogan does not respond to many of the questions that are raised. Indeed, it, apparently, is only aimed at the emotional support of people who are exasperated over standing in lines and at gaining popularity through, as it turns out, an ostentatious concern for their needs. This slogan is only a means of political campaigning and an attempt to foist a deliberately losing resolution on the government...

tion for Price Hikes

904A0191A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[V. Mamontov article: "Lesson in Agreement"]

[Text] Let us recall the essence of the dispute: The government resolved to increase wholesale prices for

diesel fuel, freight transportation and electricity tariffs, and deductions for social security beginning this year. This measure caused an extremely sharp response in labor collectives because it will bring about reducing the profits of enterprise and cut into the remuneration, financial incentives, and social development funds.

The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] interceded on behalf of those "wronged," and we should give it credit: The trade unions have shown that they are genuine defenders of the interests of toilers. An interunion commission which was set up issued, putting it plainly, an ultimatum: Either the government revokes its decision or "in the process of signing collective contracts for 1990 the labor collectives will be compelled to resort to the USSR Law On Procedures for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)." This was the resolution, and it was accompanied by 18 signatures of the representatives of trade union committees and trade unions to which an overwhelming majority of the industrial workers of our country belong.

Let us omit from our discussion the issue of whether it is ethical to resort to "the strike argument." We live in a new social and legal environment, and the trade unionists are referring to a quite legitimate right rather than "intimidating." However, the answer is: Are mutual accusations helpful in our case?

At first sight, the answer is unambiguous. Yesterday (10 February), the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers on compensation for the costs entailed by the introduction of the new prices and tariffs was discussed in the auditorium of the AUCCTU Presidium at a meeting of of the inter-union commission. After a most heated discussion, the Council of Ministers acknowledged that it had failed to take all consequences of its price demarche into account. Therefore, did the trade unions "win?"

V. Pavlov, member of the commission, USSR people's deputy, and worker- farrier from Novocherkassk, responded to my question as follows: "I believe we still have something to fight for. Compensation should be full..."

I was tempted to add: "...and unconditional." Indeed, why should some Namanganvodstroy Trust suffer more than 5 million rubles in losses, abandoning the construction of a day-care center, a preventive treatment facility, a pioneer camp? The profits of the Volgogradstroymaterialy Association will decrease so much that the fund of social development will not be accumulated at all. Economic managers are yelling: "Give us compensation" while adding up in the loss column the fines paid for incomplete deliveries and losses due to their own mismanagement. As it turned out in the course of a detailed review, many of the "victims of fire" set their plans too low, refused to accept state orders, and did not sign contracts. Alas, we have to admit that some people decided to haggle for an easy life for themselves in the course of the commotion.

"We are not going to have this kind of life"—this is how USSR Minister of Finance V. Pavlov described the situation in the economy during the discussion at the AUCCTU.

He called the government measures forced, albeit unpopular. The minister interprets them, and for a good reason, as a device for advancing the reforms, a method which makes economic managers save electricity and fuel. He quoted statistics and facts which describe the complexity of the situation in industry, and the audience fell silent. All of those present felt their responsibility and concern for the affairs of the country.

However, this can hardly justify organizational miscalculations: No matter what the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Committee, and the USSR State Committee for Prices were guided by when they considered the price novelties, they carried it out using an old blueprint. The primary miscalculation was in the fact that the trade unions were entirely left out of the development of these measures and did not become the aides and advisers of the government. The minister of finance was right in observing that in the future such issues should be resolved together.

This idea was supported by A. Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, AUCCTU Chairman S. Shalayev who spoke at the meeting of the commission. Reconciling the interests of the state and those of labor collectives is not a simple task. It is one hundred times more complicated if it starts with mutual ultimatums. "This means tripping up the reform"—this is how the trade unionists portrayed the measures of the government. The Ministry of Finance countered: "The issue has been blown out of proportion artificially."

Only a dialogue revealed the truth. The device of prices cannot slow down social development, but it cannot be used to cover up one's own lack of dispatch either. Both the conflict itself and its outcome taught us one more lesson about the value of agreement and a reasonable compromise.

Secretary Stroyev Visits Moscow Fish Combine

PM2102142790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under general heading "Meetings With Workers"]

[Text] Although our country is one of the world's leading catchers of fish, demand for this product is not satisfied. The range of fish products is meager and monotonous and its quality is far from always acceptable to the consumer. Almost 70 percent of fish comes onto the market unprepared and unpackaged.

The question of how to improve work in this direction, which means making our diet richer and more varied, arose during the 15 February visit of CPSU Central

Committee Secretary Ye.S. Stroyev to the "Mosryba" Trade and Production Association's Moscow No. 2 Refrigeration Combine.

Discussions with workers and specialists mentioned the need to create a developed fish processing industry. It is a question not only of strengthening and retooling existing smoking, salting, and canning sections but also of using essentially new processing technologies such as those created at Moscow No. 2 Refrigeration Combine.

At a meeting of the combine's collective the CPSU Central Committee secretary talked about the political situation in the country and shared his thoughts on the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress.

GUDOK Cites January Railway Statistics

Performance Lags

904H0137A Moscow GUDOK in Russian
8 Feb 90 p 1

[Report from Statistics Administration of Ministry of Railways under the heading "Rhythm of Network": "Sector in January"]

[Text] **The operational situation in January remained strained on a number of railroads and for the network as a whole. The freight shipment plan was underfulfilled by 1.7 percent, or 5.6 million tons of freight.**

The above figure includes a lag of 4.5 million tons (more than 80 percent of the total) for the state order products list. Of the 14 state order freights, there were above-plan shipments of coke, flux, paper, grain and milling products, and mixed feed. At the same time, the greatest lag was in timber freight—1.6 million tons; oil and oil products—1.3 million tons; and chemical and mineral fertilizers—1 million tons. Compared to the corresponding period last year, the volume of shipments dropped 11.3 million tons, or 3.4 percent.

The difficulties in the operation of rail transport can be explained to a certain extent by the decrease in the overall level of production at enterprises in individual sectors of the national economy and the socio-political situation in Transcaucasia. Practically all shipments from there stopped in January, and all rolling stock stood still, which brought irreparable damage to the sector.

In the latter half of the month and especially in the last week, they were able to stabilize the situation somewhat and begin fulfilling the daily plan. Fifteen railroads coped with the loading plan. Among them were the Belorussian, Southwestern, Southeastern, and Lvov railroads. At the same time, the Sverdlovsk, Azerbaijan, Tselina, Transcaucasian, Kuybyshev, and South Urals railroads had the greatest lag. The level of rolling stock utilization decreased for the network as a whole and for a number of railroads. All this had a less than favorable effect on the sector's economic situation.

The achieved level of labor productivity exceeded the plan [illegible] by 1.4 percent, but decreased two percent compared to January 1989. Shipment costs exceeded the plan by 2.6 percent. The profit shortfall was 40 million rubles.

Data Published

904H0137B Moscow GUDOK in Russian
8 Feb 90 p 1

[Report from Statistics Administration of Ministry of Railways: "Where the Railcars Got Stuck"]

[Text] In January, serious interruptions in the transportation assembly line were caused by the unsatisfactory unloading of railcars. Consignees alone were to blame for up to 35,000 units of rolling stock not being released daily. This accumulation of railcars, interruptions in train traffic in Transcaucasia, and the delay of shipments on neighboring main lines, extremely complicated the operational situation on the network.

In these conditions, the central and local newspapers, radio, and television assisted the railroad workers greatly by disclosing the reasons for the irregularities. The people's controllers stepped up their work. To resolve operational issues and stabilize the work of transportation, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the resolution "On Increasing the Size of Fines in January-April 1990 for Above-Norm Layover Times of Railcars and Containers." The appropriate local authorities also stepped up their work.

In turn, the railroads took steps to improve the delivery of local freight, provide timely information to its recipients, coordinate the actions of partners, and increase mutual responsibility. As a result, on the Moscow Railroad, for example, the turnover of local railcars has accelerated considerably, and the movement of containers from the stations has increased by almost 1,000 units per day.

A good pace was achieved on the Dnieper, Southeastern, Southwestern, Moldavian, and Belorussian main lines. It is gratifying that the Volga Railroad has overcome the chronic lag. However, the operational situation for the network as a whole is strained. In January, fines amounting to 43 million rubles were levied on consignees for above-norm layover times, including 33.5 million rubles for the second half of the month—after the Council of Ministers' resolution on increasing fines went into effect.

Railroad	Railroad Chief	Actual Unloading (Cars)	Level of Unloading by Local Railcar Turnover (percent)
1.Dnieper	A. Alimov	9,570	106

Railroad	Railroad Chief	Actual Unloading (Cars)	Level of Unloading by Local Railcar Turnover (percent)
2.Southeastern	V. Shevandin	5,239	103
3.Southwestern	B. Oleynik	5,070	103
4.Moldavian	Yu. Gerasimov	2,429	102
5.Volga	Yu. Tsittel	3,593	102
6.Belorussian	A. Andreyev	7,137	102
7.East Siberian	G. Komarov	4,023	101
8.Moscow	I. Paristyy	12,481	99
9.Donetsk	A. Kozhushko	12,636	99
10.Tselina	A. Starodub	5,959	98
11.South Urals	I. Vorobyev	7,768	98
12.Gorkiy	L. Matyukhin	6,949	98
13.Kemerovo	A. Tuleyev	6,036	97
14.Central Asian	N. Belogurov	8,840	97
15.Northern	V. Predybaylov	6,466	96
16.Krasnoyarsk	V. Babenko	3,482	95
17.Alma-Ata	N. Isingarin	4,230	95
18.Southern	A. Puchko	5,162	94
19.West Kazakhstan	Yu. Panov	1,808	94
20.Odessa	M. Guryev	5,535	94
21.Kuybyshev	E. Poddavashkin	6,107	94
22.North Caucasus	F. Kotlyarenko	8,655	92
23.October	A. Zaytsev	9,555	90
24.West Siberian	A. Borodach	5,660	89
25.Sverdlovsk	V. Skvortsov	10,129	89
26.Lvov	M. Grabskiy	7,251	89
27.Baykal-Amur	V. Gorbunov	613	87
28.Far Eastern	A. Ivanov	5,246	86
29.Baltic	O. Moshenko	6,648	84
30.Transbaykal	A. Dovgyallo	2,298	84
31.Transcaucasian	V. Blazhiyevskiy	3,244	79
32.Azerbaijan	E. Abdullayev	1,489	60
Network		191,309	96

The table shows data on the operation of railroads for unloading railcars in January.

Agricultural

Attitudes to Draft Land Law Provisions Examined

PM2102113390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[I. Abakumov report: "Arguments Are Stronger Than Ambitions. The Work on the Draft Land Law Convinces Us of That"]

[Text] Just as you cannot make a starving man feel full without food, you cannot make a man a master without the right of ownership. In a few days it will be clear whether the "peaceful February 1990 revolution" has indeed come off or whether it has indeed been postponed. This will be shown by the results of the vote in parliament on the Land Law. It has taken five years to realize "how to begin" and almost a year to prepare the first law of perestroyka that gives every citizen tangible property, rather than just talk of it.

But do the citizens themselves want this? The last week spent summing up the results of the national discussion of the draft law determined the true value of the arguments put forward by the supporters and opponents of a worker's right to land. A commission formed by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to generalize opinions of the draft held six polls among various population groups and concluded that most supported the published document.

According to the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 50-60 percent of those who are familiar with the draft law approved it by and large, provided that additional work is done on individual articles. Some 10-12 percent of villagers and townspeople did not fully approve it. Three in five support a worker's right to obtain a plot of land when he leaves the kolkhoz. Only one in 10 oppose individual plots. Villagers revealed no clear preferences regarding the forms in which land is to be transferred to peasant farms. Latvia's inhabitants cherish private land ownership, while the preferred form is long-term leasing from the state in central Asia, and people in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and Belorussia prefer inherited ownership for life (incidentally, the draft law gives republics the right to determine the options they find acceptable on the basis of agricultural traditions and experience). On the whole people advocate a reasonable combination of small-scale and large forms of economic activity.

Now the opinion of villagers alone. Three-fourths of those polled pin hopes of economic improvement on the Land Law, while only six percent believe that things will be worse. Some 80 percent are convinced of the need to give people the right to leave a kolkhoz with their own plot of land.

The viewpoint of groups of experts also became clear. Land law specialists mainly reject exclusive state ownership of land. Ecologists, who also support the draft, advocated the introduction of a land tax as a form of payment for land use. Economists voted virtually unanimously in favor of implementing reform of land ownership in the country, most of them do not share the misgivings that the right to leave a kolkhoz will undermine agricultural production. They voiced an extremely cautious opinion regarding the prospects for the private farm method: Only a few economic experts believed that private farmers' plowed fields would form 10 percent of the total area by 1995; most predict no more than five percent of all the country's fields.

All these figures prove the bankruptcy of the claims that the draft law "has been conceived in the concrete jungle" and is designed to wreck large-scale farms. Nevertheless the union Kolkhoz Council continues to assert that the country does not need land reform, citing peasants' opinions here. That is the whole point; this body by no means reflects the general opinion among ordinary workers, just its own fear of losing unlimited power over them. There is nothing for an intelligent and human chairman to fear, but what about the others, who are more numerous? The crux of the matter is that the ground is slipping away from under their feet. Power not granted by the people cannot be just. It can find no arguments to provide it with an honest defense. Either garble about "the peasants' opinion" or... denunciations come into play. One emerged at the All-Russian Kolkhoz Council Presidium and is called "On Mass Media Statements Which Discredit the Kolkhoz System." I will quote the section that resolves: "to ask the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Committee on Agrarian Questions and Food to exert influence via the appropriate bodies on the mass media, who are discrediting the kolkhoz system, the peasantry, and kolkhoz and sovkhoz [state farm] leaders. To ask... that the question of the advisability of using journalist Comrade Yu.D. Chernichenko as a commentator on agricultural questions on Central Television be examined." The text also cites a statement by Academician V.A. Tikhonov, which he never actually published, that chairmen must be overthrown as the landowners were in 1917.

Did the Kolkhoz Council Presidium really hope, by circulating this document, that it would remain secret and and could destroy two people's deputies and their "unsuitable" opinion? I do not doubt that members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, when voting for the Land Law, will resolve to do this by roll-call in order to ensure that the people know who is who.

Military

Yazov Interviewed on Contemporary Defense Issues

Defense Problems

LD1802143190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 17 Feb 90

["Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line"; phone-in program with Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense as guest, and commentator Boris Kondratov—live]

[Excerpts] [Kondratov] At the microphone is commentator Boris Kondratov. Hello there, comrades. We present "Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line." We will be talking today to Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The topic of the program is the contemporary Army, worries and problems. We informed listeners of this discussion last month, and we asked for questions to be sent to us in writing and by telephone. They will be included in the program. If anyone wants to put a question to the minister in the course of our discussion, I will give you the telephone number for the studio: 217-45-93 [passage omitted] Let's have the questions received by telephone.

[Ber] Hello. Leningrad here. Raisa Meryevna Ber speaking. My son [word indistinct] Dmitriy Sergeyevich [passage indistinct] 64004, assault unit. They have all been sent south, to Azerbaijan, to impose order. Did we have permission from the Supreme Soviet to send assault units there? He is my only son. I have nobody else. What guarantees do I have?

[Yazov] Greetings, Raisa Meryevna! We know how events were developing there. It was possible to avoid a major tragedy thanks, above all, to the decisive actions of military units, men and officers, including your son. It was the courage, great self-possession, and display of high sense of responsibility and humanism in putting a

stop to the actions of armed terrorists that enabled the most dangerous focuses of violence to be localized and the situation in Baku to be stabilized comparatively quickly. Life in these republics, both Azerbaijan and Armenia, is now gradually returning to normal. As soon as the need for a state of emergency disappears, the military units brought in to halt the violence will be pulled out of the region. The decisions to bring in troops to perform this task were made, as you will recall, on 15-19 January of this year by the Supreme Soviet Presidium. [passage omitted]

[Sukhovetskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, I am Sukhovetskiy, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, a colonel in the reserve from Kiev and veteran of the USSR Armed Forces. I have a small question, but one which is very important for you and all Soviet people. At present, to judge from the press, an orientation toward qualitatively improving the Armed Forces has been put forward. You have also spoken about this more than once in your speeches. Does this orientation mean an increase in the combat power of the Army and Navy?

[Kondratov] We have understood your question.

[Yazov] Esteemed Aleksandr Vasilyevich, the essence of the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces in conditions of a unilateral cut and reduction in defense spending lies in maintaining them at a level of reasonable sufficiency. Of course, a reduction in weapons and personnel in the Army cannot mean an increase in combat readiness. The fact that the quality of combat equipment and mastery of that combat equipment have to improve, and that the quality of use of the combat equipment in exercise areas and, in the event of war, on the battlefield, has to rise—that is another matter. You, as a colonel and a former military man, know well yourself that in the Army there cannot be quality without quantity, and if the quantity is reduced to some degree, the qualitative state of the Armed Forces is also lost, although certain formations and units which are at their posts will indeed have higher combat possibilities, thanks to being regeared to use new equipment and to more qualitative mastery of that equipment.

[Sukhovetskiy] Thank you.

[Kondratov] Are you satisfied with that answer? [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] A very disturbing letter has arrived. I'll now read an extract and then pass the letter into your own hands, as they say, as requested by the author of this letter: This comes to you from the mother of Senior Lieutenant Makarov, who died in the nuclear submarine Komsomolets. When will the results of the official investigation into the causes of the tragedy and the commission's conclusions finally be published? Why do we not know the guilty men? Understand us correctly: We do not thirst for revenge, but it is demoralizing for the affair to go unpunished. Many of Serezha's friends, courageous, good, and hardworking lads, are serving in the Navy, and we do not want what happened to our only son to happen to them. Roza Alekseyevna Markova, city of Leningrad.

[Yazov] I understand Roza Alekseyevna's feelings and share with all my heart her maternal grief. The commission which is investigating that tragedy is currently completing its work. The investigation has been delayed because the members of the commission are not only determining the causes of the tragedy, but also elaborating specific proposals to prevent a similar thing in future, as Roza Alekseyevna writes. As soon as that work is completed, its results will be published.

[Kondratov] Well, let's wait. This is, indeed, a very serious matter and that commission's conclusions are, of course, of great interest, both for those who died and, indeed, for it not to happen in future. Yes, please—are there any more questions?

[Unidentified caller] Alternative service, service for everybody, including students; otherwise, cancel the law on students. Secondly, apartments for servicemen. This means officers and warrant officers. Apartments are built at the units, that is, in cantonments, and remain the property of the cantonments. Upon demobilization, an apartment is made available within a month in any place according to the desire of the demobbed person. And thirdly, ethnic subunits and units in all the 15 republics according to the principle that each republic allocates a contingent for service in units abroad. If a republic has a surplus among the contingent, then it is allocated in a republic where there is not enough.

[Kondratov] Well, the listener did not introduce himself. Here most likely we have not a question but proposals, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. What can one say?

[Yazov] I wanted to say: What is an alternative? It is the need to choose between possibilities which exclude each other, or, to put it another way, an alternative is a different possibility. The USSR Constitution and the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation envisages that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is a duty of honor for Soviet citizens.

All men who are citizens of the USSR, regardless of their background, social and property status, race and ethnic origin, education, language, attitude toward religion, type and character of activities, place of residence, are obliged to undergo active military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces.

[Kondratov] And what about students?

[Yazov] As for students of daytime higher educational establishments, a decision about this was made, as you know, by the USSR Supreme Soviet, a decision which provides for granting grace from call-up for active military service so as to continue education.

As for apartments for servicemen. Of course, if every military camp had official housing for all officers and warrant officers, then many problems would disappear

by themselves. Unfortunately, there are as yet insufficient resources and capacities for the building of official housing in military camps. The housing problem is also aggravated by the fact that local authorities in some regions do not give housing space to servicemen who are demobbing from the Armed Forces, and to their families in the three-month period fixed by the law. Therefore, many of them are forced to reside in military camps after demobilization. It is not easy for the Ministry of Defense alone to resolve all issues connected with the housing problem, especially if one considers that we have to possess 1.5-2 apartments for every officer. After all, we are carrying out replacements in the Chutkotka peninsula, in the Kamchatka peninsula, on Sakhalin, and in the Arctic Circle. All this evokes a need to have more apartments than there are officers, especially since we have a major contingent serving abroad, and now, given the withdrawal of troops, this problem will become more difficult.

[Kondratov] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, some people ask and propose that maybe military construction teams could build apartments for servicemen, maybe even in each major city.

[Yazov] Our military construction teams do build housing. They do build housing, but, apart from housing, it is necessary to build other installations, too.
[Kondratov] Yes, indeed. It is a difficult question.
[Yazov] I wanted to say a few words to the comrade by way of an answer about ethnic formation.
[Kondratov] Yes, that was the third question.

[Yazov] The exterritorial principle is in force in our country for manpower acquisition for formations and units, which is based on the organization of the Army on the principle of universal military service obligation. I must say that this principle corresponds objectively in the highest degree to the requirements of the defense of the country. I mean our immense territory, the length of the borders, the variety of military and strategic significance of some or other sectors and regions, the difference in the density and multiethnic composition of the population. What is one to do, for example, with manpower acquisition for the two strategic missile troops significance, for the Navy, and for the Air Force? How should command be organized? It is clear that ethnic subunits and units are in no condition to satisfy the requirements of defense. Moreover, the realization of the principle that has been proposed would create objective preconditions for manifestations of regionalism, group egoism, and for the contrasting of (?narrowly-perceived) ethnic interests with the universal state interest. It is also impossible to leave out of consideration the situation connected with the aggravation in interethnic relations and with the emergence of ethnic conflicts.

[Zhulin] Zhulin, Nikolay Nikolayevich, from Maykop in Krasnodar Kray. My son is in the Army. He has a family and a child. I want to ask you if he could serve close to his home. Could he, for instance, be transferred nearer to home and continue his service there? Is it possible at all to serve near where one lives? Moldavians near Moldavia, Armenians in the area of Armenia, and so on; as close as possible to one's home, so that people who live in Armenia do not serve in the Far East, for instance?

[Yazov] The place of service of conscripts who are married and have children is decided in each specific instance by the conscription commissions on the basis of real opportunities and the quantitative and qualitative requirements in personnel replenishment. In principle I cannot agree that someone who lives in Armenia should serve in Armenia and that someone who lives in Moldavia should serve in Moldavia. They should serve where they are sent and where needed. How do you envisage providing personnel for the Northern Fleet, and with what? After all, nobody was born on our ships there. And how are we to provide personnel for the Armed Forces who are located abroad? As for your son personally, I have no objections. Write out an application. Let him file an appropriate report and he might be transferred to the place of residence of his wife and child. [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] Let's have the next recorded question please.

[Prokhorov] Hello, this is Captain Prokhorov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, from Minsk Oblast. I'm a motor transport company commander. My question is whether the cuts will not affect our Army's combat readiness and defense capability?

[Kondratov] That's the second such question, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. As you can see, people are still worried.

[Yazov] Of course they will have an effect, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, what do you expect? I've already said that in the Army quantitiy and quality are exceptionally interlinked; there can be no quality without quantity. The cuts in the Armed Forces are therefore affecting combat readiness, and this will require more intensive work from us, both from the officers and the personnel, and improvement in the quality of training, an enhancement of the level of organization and discipline. These are tasks that we have to tackle, albeit in smaller numbers. And we must not in any event reduce our combat readiness, though in itself, in principle, quantity undoubtedly reduces combat readiness [as heard] that is, reduces quality as well.

[Kondratov] There's another letter here, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, that is actually quite close in subject to the question we've just answered.

[Yazov] Is it from the city of Omsk?
[Kondratov] Yes, Lugovoy, from the city of Omsk.
[Yazov] That's where I'm from.
[Kondratov] Is it?
[Yazov] Yes.
[Kondratov] I see, that's nice. You were born in Omsk, were you?
[Yazov] Well no, not in Omsk. Not far away though, in Omsk Oblast.

[Kondratov] Omsk Oblast, yes. I'll read out the letter. Before the war, practically the entire cadre command personnel of the Army was destroyed. And what's happening now? Once again, the cadre command personnel is being cut and equipment scrapped. Wha are we going to defend ourselves with? Defense sufficiency? Why destroy tanks when they can be mothballed, as the United States has done with its battleships, for instance? As a war veteran I am against what is happening now in our Army. Why have we become so carefree? After all, our enemies have no intention of disarming, particularly unilaterally.

[Yazov] My dear compatriot! I don't believe you should make such a drama out of the reduction in armed forces and armaments. As regards the regular command personnel, the reductions primarily affect only those officers and generals who have reached the top age limit for remaining in active military service. They have the right to a fully guaranteed pension. Furthermore, officers are being discharged who, for one reason or another, have submitted applications or who don't fit into service life. And therefore, the personnel complement of the Army and the Navy is being maintained. As for the reductions and scrapping of military hardware, yes indeed some of the hardware that has seen out its prescribed service life is being destroyed, sent for melting down. But what tanks are these? The T-34, T-54, old models of the T-55, T-10. But, all the new hardware will remain. Moreover, any hardware that is still serviceable is not being withdrawn from the Armed Forces. As you recommend, it is being mothballed and, should the need arise, will be used. We also believe that the solution you suggest is sensible. And we recall Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's behest, his instructions that the time is past when wars are waged by a caste that is semi-isolated from the people. Nowadays wars are waged by people. And to ensure that the whole people is ready to defend the country, there should be the hardware available to that people. And so, we are doing all you suggest. [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] Right, another letter. An excerpt from a letter we have received: I cannot agree with the restrictions governing call-up to the Soviet Army. Who's going to be defending the Motherland? Kids from vocational-technical schools and lads who have just left school, but have not got into an institute! Generally they are from families that are not well-off and have grown up fatherless. Meanwhile, children of the well-off will be ensconced in colleges. Where is the fairness here? Somehow this does not fit in with perestroyka and democracy. Another question hangs over those kids who aren't all that healthy. I believe they should be conscripted: They'll get healthier. They'll be working on the farm—presumably she means the fact that soldiers are put to work in agriculture. For the Army always sends its soldiers to help out in the country. Yes, I thought that's what she meant. It is signed Alla Vasilyevna Ratman from the town of Berdyansk in Zaporozhskaya Oblast.

[Yazov] I would like to thank Alla Vasilyevna from the bottom of my heart for her concern for the Soviet Armed Forces. Indeed, the problem which she tackles in that question taxes many Soviet people, which is only to be expected. It is true that a situation has arisen today, whereby a significant portion of young people are exempt from military service. In fact, from now on it will only apply to those who are not students, or who are not entitled to a deferment for other reasons. And this does provide food for thought—for all, and not least the legislative organs of power. As for compulsory active military service for sickly kids, it probably makes sense to listen to the recommendation of the doctors. We have strict requirements from the point of view of health restrictions, and if anybody fails on medical grounds, then we cannot conscript him into the Army.

[Kondratov] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, she writes that soldiers are enlisted in agricultural work, so anybody with poor health could take part in that. That's the question.

[Yazov] Yes, well, it would seem she is thinking of the way each autumn we send trucks to help in the harvest.
[Kondratov] Yes, yes, yes.
[Yazov] Trucks. Men do work there, too, as drivers, but there is no paticularly physical work for them.
[Kondratov] Yes, I see.

[Passage omitted]

[Kondratov] Our next question will be from a letter, from Comrade Durdykin of Lipetsk Oblast: How is conversion progressing in our country? Is it not worth also making use, for peaceful purposes, of the experience of former military specialists and the skills of military pilots and naval seamen? This is a typical sort of question, similar suggestions are to be found in several letters.

[Yazov] Well, what I would like to say here is that conversion is no simple process. In order for it to develop successfully, we need the coordinated efforts of all ministries and departments involved in it, and also precise planning and well-considered approaches to resolving many tasks which are new for us. Last year, 32 percent of all the equipment for the country's agro-industrial complex, 50 percent—15 percent—of equipment for light industry, and 38 percent for the food and processing industry was produced at enterprises of the Ministry of Defense alone. Production of consumer goods is going up at defense industry enterprises this year.

It is, of course, very important to make active use of the experience of military specialists. In connection with this, the USSR State Committee for Labor, in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense, have drawn up appropriate measures for the retraining in new professions, where necessary, of servicemen discharged from the Armed Forces due to the reduction of the Armed Forces. Their high level of professional training and good organizational skills are particularly valuable now, when the country's economy is faced with resolving very difficult tasks. Whatever sort of conversion we might

carry out, we must nevertheless preserve people's experience in order to manufacture, when necessary, the military output we - I mean the Armed Forces - need.

[Kondratov] And these people, such as military pilots and submariners, must not lose their military experience. They are very high-class specialists, of course.
[Yazov] Absolutely right.

[Oleynik] This is Tamara Arsenyevna Oleynik from Bryansk. I am telephoning about the article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA entitled "Mafia Under the Semaphore." The article is horrible. It caused me to shudder. What is happening? In Novorossiysk 12 railway flatcars with tanks were discovered, with complete armament and equipment. It is not known where some cooperative was sending them and where it got them from. Second, I am alarmed by the speech of the poetess at the aktiv in Lithuania, about which you probably know. She related such awful things about what is happening in our Army, that I cannot agree with it. I was terribly annoyed by it. And how one say such things? I have sons who are already grownup. They served their term in the Army, and I never saw such terrible things. You probably heard her remarks? She alleged that soldiers in the Army are beaten, that they are hungry there, that they are tormented there. [passage omitted]

[Yazov] Dear Tamara Arsenyevna, what is related in the newspaper article indeed evokes indignation. I would like to tell you that the Army did not have, and does not have, anything to do with that. That equipment was ordered by the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry for sale abroad. Therefore, we do not bear responsibility for that. But, as for the principle, it really does evoke indignation and we will draw a definite conclusion from that. Here principle and firmness is needed in the protection of state interests, and vigilance is required. Now to the remarks which you mention. A so-called poetess made them. She spoke about knowing certain facts, and in reality there are no such facts; neither the six Lithuanian troops who perished, nor the blasphemous norms for losses at exercises which allegedly were determined at the Ministry. There is not a single AIDS sufferer in the Army. All this was said evidently on a quite directed wave of anti-Army propaganda. These are attempts to introduce into the minds of people, especially young people, a fear of military service, to subvert the Army's authority, to undermine the prestige of servicemen. And the main thing is for the Lithuanians to serve in Lithuania, the Letts in Latvia, the Estonians in Estonia, and, in any case, when leaving, or rather trying to talk, so to speak, about leaving the Soviet Union, they would already like to have a ready Army. I think that the attempt to shame the Army should remain on the conscience of the poetess. [passage omitted]

[Dausha] This is Nikolay Fedorovich Dausha, a Great Patriotic War veteran. I live in Mytishchi. Dmitriy Timofeyevich, the question that concerns me is what is being done in the Army toward an internationalist upbringing? And can our Armed Forces fulfill the tasks which lie ahead of them without there being a common language for interethnic communication?

[Kondratov] Well, yes, generally there is the Russian language in the Army.

[Yazov] Thank you, Nikolay Grigoreyevich [as heard]. You have raised a question most justifiably and at the right moment. Internationalism is inherent to the very way of life of the Army, and upbringing in the Army is founded upon respect for each soldier, regardless of nationality. We aspire to take into consideration ethnic customs and traditions to the maximum degree in the everyday service and combat training of troops. We hold Days of Republics. We have amateur arts. Periodical publications from all the republics, representatives of which are serving in the unit, are to be found in many soldiers' clubs and libraries. Representatives of the labor collectives, where the servicemen worked before being called up, are welcome guests at regiments and on ships. The parents of servicemen come to the units. And by itself the multiethnic composition of our Army presumes that there should be a common language, a language for interethnic communication. That language is Russian. You clearly know from experience at the front, and I know from experience at the front, that lack of knowledge or poor knowledge of Russian language leads to people not even understanding what command you gave. The Russian language undoubtedly should be the language of interethnic communications and the language in which the Armed Forces receive commands, and train. Thank you. [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] Well, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, the language problem is no doubt really serious for the Army. I mean now, recently, with conscripts from the national...

[Yazov, interrupting] Recently they know less Russian, especially in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and in a number of other republics. Poor knowledge of Russian obliges us to organize special courses.
[Kondratov] And that takes time, doesn't it?
[Yazov] It takes time but how can we get by without organizing Russian language lessons?

[Kondratov] True. Now for two more questions that have come in to the studio. Comrade (Bessmertynykh) from Simferopol asks: Not long ago you visited the United States. How are servicemen, military service and all that goes with it regarded there, from what you saw? And the second note, from Comrade (Zaytsev) in Kaluga. Are any measures being taken against those who are boycotting conscription into the Soviet Army? Well, the visit to the United States and your impressions first, I presume.

[Yazov] I'll say one thing: The army, military servicemen and servicemen enjoy universal respect in the United States and are surrounded by a halo of romanticism and heroism. Newspapers, magazines, television and the cinema provide active propaganda for service with the Armed Forces. Their history, traditions and military rituals are popularized. A national military park has

been created at Gettysburg and is a site of pilgrimage for Americans and tourists where the atmosphere of the deciding battle between North and South in the 1861-65 Civil War has been recreated. How effective inculcation of national pride and patriotism is in the United States is attested by the following episode: At Fort Bragg, home to an airborne division, the Soviet military delegation attended the traditional local celebrations. When the small military choir sang the division's song, the overwhelming majority of civilians stood up in silence as they would for the national anthem. This was no accident: Military and patriotic education in the United States of America is a most important component of national self-awareness.

[Kondratov] No doubt—I'd like to add immediately to that answer—I think that this is an occasion on which we too ought to take the United States as an example.

[Yazov] Sadly, at the First Congress of People's Deputies, the national anthem of the Soviet Union was played and some, deputies remained seated so what can we say about rituals?

The second question: Are any measures being taken regarding those who boycott conscription into the Soviet Army? In every case, investigations are carried out and measures taken according to the law. To my very great regret, there is now a propaganda campaign to get Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians out of serving in the Army. This propaganda is developing in the Transcaucasian Republics too. Many members of informal organizations are putting physical pressure on military commissars and people in enlistment offices, threatening to kill them etc. I think that even as a defender, the Army at the same time is in need of social protection itself.

[Kondratov] And now the spring callup is approaching.
[Yazov] The spring callup is coming and unfortunately there is such unbridled propaganda in the Baltic Republics to the effect that people should not serve in an occupying Army etc. All this speaks of the fact that we have allowed demagogues too free a rein.

[Kondratov] But generally the law relating to the universal duty to serve in the Army has not been repealed, which extends...

[Yazov interrupting] The Law has not been repealed, the Constitution is still in operation. And so we should demand that people be brought to book for anti-Army propaganda, in line with the Constitution. [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] Here is a question from Comrade Morozov in the Moscow region. How can you successfully get rid of bullying if an officer who in good time notes this phenomenon in his subunit and begins openly to combat it, can expect no help from his commanding officers. It is made to look as if he is somehow to blame for the collapse of educative work. This is a very interesting letter.

[Yazov] What I'd like to say about this is that I personally study literally every bullying-related incident. And the people who can best inform us about this are the parents of soldiers.
[Kondratov] Yes.

[Yazov] I scrutinize all letters from parents. I have checks carried out. And to my great regret, or perhaps, on the contrary, my great relief, not all the letters and the facts contained in them can be corroborated. But to my great regret, a certain proportion of the facts set out in the letters is corroborated. I, for my part, have done nothing and am doing nothing to criticize anyone who is trying to combat bullying. On the contrary, we give it so much attention that we do everything we can to back officers who try to combat phenomena like bullying. The greatest proportion of such facts and phenomena are in the construction units and construction detachments—detachments which are not in the Defense Ministry system. They still exist there. Regrettably they have no platoon commanders. The platoon commanders there are either warrant officers, or they don't have them at all. But we are doing everything we can to ensure that this phenomenon which is a disgrace to our Armed Forces is removed as rapidly as possible from the life of Army subunits.

[Kondratov] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, something else we should no doubt reflect on is that we talk of bullying in the context of the Army. But, if I may say so, it starts in kindergartens. This phenomenon is also now to be found in kindergartens and vocational-training colleges. And after all, soldiers are drawn from the vocational-training colleges and the schools.

[Yazov] This is my 50th year of service in the Army. And until roughly 1965-67, nothing of this sort existed in the Army. It appeared in the Army when they started to call up people with a certain criminal record. And it was these prison customs and practices that in some measure began to spread to the Armed Forces.

[Kondratov] There's a phenomenon! I did my own term of compulsory service in 1970, and I don't recall such a thing.
[Yazov] I encountered this for the first time in 1967.
[Kondratov] So, it had already started, had it?
[Yazov] I encountered this phenomenon in 1967, when I was a divisional commander in Dauriya in the Trans-Baykal region.

[Kondratov] Can we at any rate consider that the defense minister is answerable and that he is appealing to officers that if such a phenomenon exists, no one will condemn them for washing dirty linen in public, yes?

[Yazov] No one has regarded this as dirty linen for a long time now. It is a malaise that everyone must try...
[Kondratov, interrupting] By joint efforts.
[Yazov, continues]...to cure by joint efforts. [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] Several telephone calls have come in—from (Kim Nikolayevich Rykov) in Moscow; (Kochetkova), also from Moscow; and (Natalya Andreyevna Shabanova). I don't think you can now answer this question. On 31 January KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried an article about a serviceman in Ulanov, where he was described as a deserter. What has happened to him? Well, I think this is a question that at the moment no doubt we...
[Yazov, interrupting] I can't give an answer now.
[Kondratov] Here's another: What is the present situation on the Iranian border? Well?
[Yazov] That I can answer.
[Kondratov] You can answer?
[Yazov] Yes.
[Kondratov] Hm-hmm.

[Yazov] The situation on the Iranian border is this: We have transferred several subunits stationed in the region to the State Security Committee. The border is closed. People are only being allowed to cross the border legally to Iran and in the opposite direction, but the technical installations that were destroyed along more than 230 kilometers have not yet been repaired. So the border is being guarded mainly just by the method of observation and patrolling.

[Kondratov] That's clear, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. Comrade (Kochekova) of Moscow asks whether there is a law whereby a conscript can choose which service he enters, and if so, what is the procedure.
[Yazov] [sighs] There is no such law...
[Kondratov, interrupting] He might want to join the paratroops, perhaps...

[Yazov, interrupting] There's no such law. The whole point is that he undergoes a medical examination and his state of health is taken into account. The second thing is that he is interviewed by the callup commission, and his interests must be taken into account: Whether he'd like to serve in the paratroops, whether his health allows it; whether he'd like to serve in the Navy, shall we say, and whether his health allows that—whether he has the required qualities. Is he tall enough, broad-shouldered enough and so on. In some cases that comes into it, to some extent.

[Kondratov] And his wishes are taken into account as well, aren't they, if they're reasonable and well-founded...
[Yazov, interrupting] Quite right.
[Kondratov] If he can drive, why shouldn't he make use of that in the Army?
[Yazov] Quite right.

[Kondratov] And share his knowledge and skills. Here's a letter from Comrade Valeriy Dmitriyevich Mogilev of Ivanovo Oblast: Allow me to express in my letter my distress over what is happening in the Army. I have recently talked with two officers who've been affected by the cuts. They're both young, competent, promising. They held the ranks of captain and major, and had graduated from military school with distinction. And I gathered that those who are made redundant are often those who are truly dedicated but have incurred the disfavor of their superior commanders.

[Yazov] Well, what I'd like to say to esteemed Valeriy Dmitriyevich is this: First, I don't know what's distressing him if he spoke with two officers who, in all probability, were dismissed either not at their own request, or in any event not because of the cuts in personnel. [sentence as heard] I'd like to ask him, the esteemed Valeriy Dmitriyevich, to let me know who these officers are: Their surnames and first names and patronymics. I will then look into it, and perhaps there has been some injustice in that respect. We'll try to put that injustice right.

[Kondratov] This is what we were saying at the beginning of the program: Some particular case occurs, and at once people start to generalize.

[Yazov] Generalizations, and he immediately starts distressing himself, you know?

[Kondratov] Well, distress can be a good thing if he's sincerely worried. It's another matter—as long as there's something to get upset about.

[Yazov] He says these were officers with higher education, who graduated from their military academy with gold medals or what not...
[Kondratov, interrupting] Yes.

[Yazov] So don't they know how to appeal at the appropriate levels of command, if they were unfairly dismissed? Can't they go right up to the minister?

[Kondratov] Quite so. Another letter: I have served in Stevastopol, on fixed-term callup, in the fleet air arm. In my opinion, the Army is terribly afraid of inspection—more so than in Civvy Street. When a commission is about to visit, the entire personnel stands on its ears almost—in quotes. In the canteen, forks and knives and flowers appear, even table napkins. But it doesn't last long. On the basis of personal experience, I have three specific suggestions: Men should be called up after the age of 20; fighting men called up for a limited period should work in the canteens and provision stores, so that there's less pilfering; and soldiers should be given more leave and more leisure facilities. Kuznetsov, town of Berdsk, Novosibirsk Oblast.

[Yazov] Well, I'd agree with Comrade Kuznetsov in the sense that more leave should be given, that the seaman or soldier should have access to culture, go to the theater, meet girls—and that should be done. But evidently if we called them up after 20, there'd be more problems. A man usually gets married at 20. After that, we're faced with the problem that he's got a child. What are we to do?
[Kondratov] Yes, he doesn't want to be too far from home.

[Yazov] Yes, not too far from home and so on. And what if he has to serve in the Navy, in the North Sea or the Black Sea or the Pacific. Well, as for using fixed-term soldiers or seamen as storemen, perhaps there's something in it, although the comrade doesn't quite seem to understand that there's more to a store than just issuing items and keeping a record. The store is a place where valuables worth large sums are kept, and someone has to take responsibility for them.

[Kondratov] Yes, and if anything goes wrong, as they say...
[Yazov, interrupting] And then, too, the stores contain items of value which have to be replenished at intervals.
[Kondratov] Yes.

[Yazov] Well, evidently there are some things he's not too well informed about. But never mind. I'm grateful to him for wanting to help the minister with his advice.

[Kondratov] A note has come in with a question which I anticipated. Such a question was due, I think. How do you react, comrade minister, to such an organization as Shchit [Shield], the Union for the Social Protection of Servicemen and the members of their families? That question is from Kharitonov in Perm.

[Yazov] In short, my reaction is negative. Why? Because those who formed that Union are simply speculating on the troubles of people, and they are concerning themsevles merely with the satisfaction of their own ambitions. Recently there was a good article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA where one major, who had been demobilized from the Armed Forces, applied to Shchit for advice. He was advized to refer to such and such a people's deputy. They took five rubles in all for that piece of advice. So what kind of Shield is that? What does it protect? Does this Shchit really think that the defense minister is an enemy of his officers and his soldiers, that certain servicemen have to be protected against him? Incidentally, all those servicemen who one way or another were discharged from the Armed Forces for definite offenses are members of that Shchit. This is the most blatant anti-Army propaganda and the main goal is to subvert the prestige of the Armed Forces. [passage omitted]

[Fedorenko] I'm from Kiev. My name's Fedorenko, Natalya Petrovna. I would like to ask you, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, why it is that officers' pay was increased by 50 rubles from 1 January and they got five service gratuities when they retire on pension, while warrant officers got a raise of only 20 rubles and receive two service gratuities when retiring on pension? After all, warrant officers work with the personnel as well, and do quite a lot or work. These raises widen the social division, since the number of families with the minimum level of provision is increasing.

[Yazov] Esteemed Natalya Petrovna. This is principally because warrant officers and naval warrant officers have had two pay raises during the present five-year period—the first was in 1987, and for the first time the overall increase for the officers was approximately the same. As far as the gratuities are concerned, they are paid out to warrant officers not only on completion of service, as for the officers, but also at specific intervals during their service—every 10 years or 15 years. Therefore, by the time they retire on pension, both warrant officers and officers receive the same number of service gratuities, as you call them.

[Kondratov] Right, we're still getting questions mainly about social—people are worried about social problems. Play the next question please.

[Grobat] Grobat, Lidiya Viktorovna, from (Baladukha) in Kharkov Oblast. Why is it that my son has a wife and child but is not serving in his own military district, as stated in the regulations? He's in Stepanakert instead. That's the first thing. Second, he has not managed so far to get a certificate to obtain child benefit. I've sent three letters already.

[Yazov] Esteemed Lidiya Viktorovna, clearly the regulations haven't been explained to you quite acccurately. They stipulate that conscripts who are married and have children should be sent for active military service, when possible, to formations and units close to their place of residence and conscription. This matter is decided by the conscription commissions on an individual basis, taking all the circumstances into account, and taking into account where people have to serve. As for the certificate, we shall help to get it sent to you. [passage omitted]

[Kondratov] To wind up the program, or for those who tuned in late, I would like to remind you that our program—the program you have been listening to is called "Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line." At the microphone is USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov. You have another five seconds to...

[Yazov, interrupting] Concluding our discussion I would like, in connection with the approaching 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, to congratulate war and labor veterans, internationalist servicemen, the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces and all Soviet people on this nationwide celebration and wish everyone good health, happiness and success in their work, study and service. All the best.

[Kondratov] Thank you, because we might have forgotten that in the middle of all these questions. That's the end of the program. It was organized by the main editorial office for sociopolitical programs and presented by commentator Boris Kondratov.

Foreign Threat, Restructuring

90UM0295A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 6, Feb 90 pp 1, 8-9

[Interview with Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, by Yuriy Petukhov; place and date not given: "Perestroyka in the Country Is a Difficult Process That Has Affected All Aspects of Our Lives and Prompted People To Break With Everything That Has

Stagnated and Is Outdated. Today Radical Changes Are Taking Place Everywhere and a Search Has Been Initiated for New Paths of Development, and There Is a Reevaluation of Many Values. It Is Quite Clear That Perestroyka in the Army Is Also Necessary and Even Inevitable"; first paragraph is PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK introduction]

[Text] Little more than two weeks remain before the 72d anniversary of the country's Armed Forces, but this interview was in no way timed for this wonderful day. And its theme is far removed from the exultant call of the fanfares, the thunder of the orchestras, and the holiday salvos. Our conversation is about everyday military life, about the circumstances that are worrying people as they are illuminated by the light of glasnost through what only recently seemed to be an impenetrable veil of "secrecy," and about the obvious signs of the ills seen through the breaches in the wall, pierced by the salvos launched by the press and the persistent "attacks" from the public. And here to consider all of this, in a terse and clear-cut military manner, without smoothing the sharp corners and without moving into a "solid" defense is Army General D.T. Yazov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and the USSR minister of defense.

[Petukhov] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, today the half-forgotten but terrible words "blockade," "curfew," "refugee," and "evacuation" are again being heard in the country, and in peacetime our soldiers are waging a real battle on their own land. And so my first question: How is the Army operating under the conditions of the extraordinary situation in the Transcaucasus?

[Yazov] In accordance with ukazes of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Army is operating there along with internal troops and KGB units. In such circumstances our mission is clear—to protect citizens, safeguard very important installations relating to the daily life of the population, and end the violence. When our soldiers were fired on they were forced to defend themselves, displaying great restraint and at the same time staunchness when they did so. In my opinion it was precisely the decisive actions of the troops that cut short the actions of the armed terrorists and led to a point at which it was possible to stabilize the situation in Baku and certain areas in Azerbaijan and Armenia rapidly and localize the most dangerous loci of violence.

I do not say that everything turned out as I would have wished. At first one psychological factor that I would call the "Tbilisi syndrome" hampered things and paralyzed initiative. The vacillation associated with it hampered the military from acting in a clear-cut manner according to regulations, according to orders, and, ultimately, according to their duty. This is a new phenomenon. It must be studied. Obviously what is required is a legislatively underpinned mechanism that comes into play in an extraordinary situation. Without the troops this is impossible—as confirmed by these latest events—for only military units were able to stabilize the situation.

Now, I repeat, the situation is gradually getting back to normal, increasing numbers of enterprises are going back into operation, and increasing numbers of people are returning to a normal life. The situation is under control, although it remains complex and contradictory. Much still needs to be done, first and foremost, of course, through political methods and by means that, incidentally, are being used with increasing frequency by our commanders and political officers in their work with the local population in order to restore normal life to the region.

[Petukhov] It is common knowledge that no one likes criticism, but it is also possible to ignore it. How do you perceive the "attacks" on the Armed Forces by the mass media and the public?

[Yazov] In my opinion it is a natural thing that today a great deal is being written and said about the Armed Forces. The Army is part of the people. It is being renewed and restructured along with the entire country. Glasnost and openness in everything that affects military life and activity are helping us to resolve the far from simple tasks of improving military development.

Criticism, too, is useful, although, as they say, the medicine does not taste good. We (by which I mean the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy) hear the complaints addressed at us and we are doing everything we can to insure that not one single justified criticism is not dealt with. I consider it of fundamental importance that for every word, particularly a word of criticism, there should necessarily be a deed, a change for the better.

This is our reaction to criticism. But we also have a question for the critics: Are your statements always justified and constructive and are they businesslike in nature? For in some of the pieces published, doubts are even being cast on even the need for an Army. And, moreover, with references to the "new political thinking," the "positive changes in the world," and so forth.

[Petukhov] But sometimes quite authoritative authors are insistently claiming that today no danger of war exists, are they not?

[Yazov] I am simply uncomfortable with such authors. The current political realities are so obvious that they cannot "not be noticed."

Here, for example, are the general components of the NATO triad: the United States' strategic offensive arms, theater nuclear weapons, and conventional forces. The first is made up of about 2,300 strategic delivery vehicles capable of carrying in one launch about 16,000 nuclear weapons. The second includes more than 1,100 aircraft of the tactical air force, armed with nuclear weapons and deployed close to the borders of the USSR, and the aircraft carrier air forces, and also many thousands of sea-launched cruise missiles, operational and tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, and naval tactical nuclear

weapons. And finally, the third numbers more than 6.5 million men and 14,100 Air Force and Navy combat aircraft, including more than 8,500 strike aircraft, almost 14,000 combat helicopters, 38,400 tanks, 249 submarines, and 673 major surface ships.

I think that the purpose of all these resources, and who the "putative enemy" is, is clear not only to the professional military.

And again, now some people say nothing without looking over their shoulder to the West and holding up as an example its ability to manage and count money. You cannot take that ability away from it. So what about the way in which NATO military spending is growing?: from $460.1 billion in 1988 to $469.4 billion in 1989. And increases are also planned for this year. So, do they not have something better to do with their dollars?

[Petukhov] You have convinced me. It is essential to deal responsibly and competently with the problems of defensive development. Sensationalism here is out of place. So what do you think about the criticism of procedures in the Armed Forces being voiced by certain military deputies. Here, some degree of competence must be obvious...

[Yazov] Of course, their criticism carries special weight, and we must listen to it carefully. I have repeatedly met and talked for long periods with many of the deputies who are servicemen. And I must say that in these comradely meetings I have found much of use for myself. And I hope that those with whom I spoke did the same. In any event, every time it was a candid exchange of opinions among people interested in and associated with the matter. And this means that it is useful for the Army.

[Petukhov] Obviously the things most discussed are those that are at variance with military procedure and discipline. In particular, nonregulation relations—the so-called "grandfather system." To judge from some pieces that have been published, this is almost the norm in the Army today. At the same time many military leaders prefer to confine themselves to formulations such as "isolated negative facts." Is not this kind of "different interpretation" dangerous?

[Yazov] First of all let us clarify one thing: military leaders (and I say this with a proper sense of responsibility) assess nonregulation relations in no way as "isolated negative facts" but as a very serious phenomenon. I shall not talk about how it is something alien to the nature of the Armed Forces, the tenor of military and naval service, the spirit and the letter of military regulations, and the traditions of military comradeship, because it is obvious that the "grandfather system" does great harm to the authority of the Armed Forces and the prestige of the military profession and military service in general: There is a fear of military service, and in the milieu of young men of draft age the desire is forming to evade military service, and a reluctance for the military system is arising, and ultimately, for military duty.

And incidentally, because of this my working day starts with a study of the summary reports and telegrams and letters, and the mail on this problem. I emphasize particularly that **for each report on instances of nonregulation relations, without exception, a careful investigation is initiated and specific and urgent practical steps are taken.** I try to make this work as a rule everywhere, at all levels and in all elements of the Armed Forces.

Attention to the individual and his interests and spiritual state is a real, not declared, concern for his wants and needs; this, in my opinion, is the counting point in the struggle against nonregulation relations. The affirmation of and support for a healthy moral atmosphere in subunits and units and aboard ships, and democracy and comradeship are of fundamental importance.

Today we are doing everything possible to include in the struggle against nonregulation relations not only commanders and political workers but also the soldiers and sailors themselves, and the sergeants and warrant officers, and the public concerned with the Army and Navy. I would say more: In the past two years we have succeeded in halving the number of instances of nonregulation relations in the Army and Navy. But much work remains to eradicate them completely.

And the mass media could do a great deal for success in this work. Statements and published pieces, sharp and bitter but weighed and specifically addressed, undoubtedly help in solving this problem. Unfortunately, however, there are not too many of these. Instead there are more than enough others whose intention is to paint a picture of hooliganism in the barracks.

Just consider this fact. Last year, of 1,954 submissions made to the Ministry of Defense concerned one way or another with nonregulation relations, only 363, that is, essentially one in five, had any basis in reality.

What happens most often is this: When he encounters difficulties in his military service, some poorly prepared, untempered youth begins to write tearful letters home, garnished with information drawn from some published piece on the "grandfather system." The calculation is simple: The parents will "take" the son out of the Army, away from a bad end, and move him closer to home. This is just one example of many. Last summer military construction worker Aleksey Vorobyev wrote his mother letters, each one more alarming than the previous one: they were destroying him, killing him. Naturally his mother sounded the alarm and appealed to the highest authorities. But an investigation showed that her son had broken the law and had decided to "rehabilitate" himself by making reference to the "grandfather system," which did not exist in that unit.

And other parents who find themselves in similar positions send telegrams to the command and to journals and television and radio, and sometimes travel about the entire country in search of their sons. And (and, incidentally, very often), they send us letters and telegrams making apologies for their sons. Here is a telegram from

V.I. Sytyuk, the mother of a soldier. She made a long journey as a result of an alarming letter from her son. And what happened? Let me read this: "I have visited the military unit and looked into things on the spot, and I make no assertions against the command of the unit or my son's state of health. Please forgive me for the trouble."

I have no desire to condemn too harshly the young soldiers who are separated for the first time from their homes and find themselves facing difficulties and then display weakness. And I can understand the parents who, after receiving this kind of letter, sound the alarm, appeal for help, and rush "to the rescue" of their children. I see here where we are to blame: The commander and political officer have failed to spot the weakness of the recruit in good time and helped him to cope, and they have left him alone with his experiences and have not established really firm links with the parents...

But I am unable to understand or explain it when unverified, and sometimes even fabricated information gets onto the pages of the newspapers, is "relished with gusto" on television or radio, and is heard in statements made from high tribunes. Unfortunately, such things are no rarity.

Here is one of the latest. During M.S. Gorbachev's meetings with representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] in January this year, the writer V. Yasukaytite made sharp and serious accusations against the Ministry of Defense. I am forced to say that they were all highly strung and emotional in form, totally without foundation, and simply false in terms of their content. In particular, the writer stated that in December of last year six soldiers of Lithuanian nationality had died. This was not so: no Lithuanian soldier died. The statements about the existence of some kinds of "norms" for losses on exercises and maneuvers, and that AIDS was allegedly widespread in the Army, are absolutely groundless. There are no such blasphemous "norms" in the Armed Forces, nor any patients with AIDS.

[Petukhov] Once there are problems, changes are needed. And there are problems, and not only in the internal life of the Armed Forces. What do you consider to be the most important of these changes?

[Yazov] I would name first of all materialization in the development and training of the Armed Forces of the provisions of our new defensive military doctrine, and of the principle of reasonable and adequate sufficiency. This determines the basic parameters for perestroyka in the Army and Navy and its essence and direction, and the radical changes in composition, structure and equipment, and training for the Armed Forces. Second, approaches have changed in solving tasks relating to the building, development, and improvement of the Armed Forces, and they continue to change: quantitative and extensive approaches are being increasingly replaced by qualitative approaches. This not only stems from but is completely in line with the overall strategy of perestroyka in Soviet society. Third, the processes of democratization in military life are gathering force in the Army and Navy, and we have already talked about this in part. The creative potential of the military collectives and all the democratic institutions of the Army and Navy are being revealed more fully. For the first time in the history of our Armed Forces, at all levels of their structure meetings of officers have taken place, and they have rocked command and political personnel and sharply increased their political and service activeness; this has been confirmed by an All-Army meeting of officers. Universal legal education has been initiated in the troops and fleets.

Perhaps these three factors reflect the essence of the changes that are now taking place in both the quantitative and qualitative development of the Armed Forces and that make up the main content of the military reform.

[Petukhov] There is much talk about military reform. In particular there is debate on the idea of forming a professional Army on a volunteer basis. The advocates and opponents of this idea are equally categorical...and unconvincing. The impression is created that no one has yet calculated which is more efficient, more reliable, and, finally, cheaper.

[Yazov] I agree that this debate is often being conducted at an amateur level, when argument is replaced by doubtful analogies or juggling with the facts or simply unsubstantiated claims. The very concept of a professional Army is itself sometimes being interpreted quite incorrectly.

Take just an element of professionalism such as the level of combat training and the organization in subunits. Our regular cadre army, staffed on the basis of a universal military draft (I make this judgment from analysis of training and combat practice) is not only just as good as armies formed on the volunteer principle, but in terms of a number of parameters is better. The basis of our Armed Forces, its backbone, is the officer corps. And these are professionals in the full sense of the word. Together with the extended service warrant officers and servicemen they occupy all the key combat positions in the Army and Navy on which maintenance of the necessary level of combat readiness depends. Duties that do not require this level of skill are done by drafted servicemen. After two or three years the soldiers and sailors and sergeants and warrant officers acquire the necessary training, and then their transfer to the reserves insures the necessary quality and quantity of resources to guarantee that the country's defense capability is maintained at the proper level.

Is it advisable to switch to staffing of the Army and Navy on a totally volunteer basis? It is clear that this must be considered and decided giving due consideration to the specific socioeconomic situation in the country and the

military-political situation in the world, and on the basis of careful and comprehensive scientific work. Any other approach is simply unacceptable, for what we are talking about is that holy of holies—the defense of the country. So that if we bear in mind all these factors, both now and in the near future, a system by which the Armed Forces are staffed on a volunteer principle is hardly acceptable. First and foremost because it is incapable of satisfying the requirements mentioned above: efficiency, reliability, and economy.

Appropriate calculations have been done in the Ministry of Defense that have convincingly confirmed this. Because of the 500,000 cutback in the Armed Forces, their exclusion from internal, border, and railroad troops, the transformation of the structure, the assimilation of a defensive strategy, and of operational articles and tactics, these figures are now being refined. Scenarios are also being computed that take into account possible agreements at the talks in Geneva and Vienna. As these figures become available they will of course be published.

I am convinced that the calls for immediate abandonment of the universal military draft, like the proposals to switch to a militia system or divide the Army along national lines fail to take into account the country's real possibilities today and fail to meet the requirements of its defense. The First Congress of People's Deputies expressed itself unanimously in favor of having our Armed Forces develop in accordance with the existing principles by which they are formed. I think that this is a wise, statesman-like decision.

And it is not only the economic aspect of the problem that is involved here. Can everything really be measured in rubles? For a readiness to serve in the Army "on a hired basis" depends directly (even though we wish it did not) on the size of wages. Moral incentives are supplanted by material incentives, and collectivist links by corporate ones, the indispensable law of combat fraternity—"Die yourself to save a comrade"—which since time immemorial has always been strong in our Army, is devalued.

[Petukhov] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, you are aware of the polemic that is raging about Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. It also to some extent affects the Armed Forces. Some people, including people in military professions, are now casting doubts on the political organizers and political workers in the Army and Navy. What is your viewpoint on this question?

[Yazov] I have expressed it repeatedly: The political organizers are a very important instrument for insuring efficiency in military development, maintaining a firm moral spirit among personnel and a high level of combat readiness. In my opinion, the system of political organizers is an organic part of the dynamic centralized structure that the Army is, and is in accordance with the extraterritorial principle of its staffing and deployment and its specific missions.

The political organizers and political workers in the Army and Navy are undoubtedly needed. It is another matter that their activity is required in radical perestroyka and in renewing that combat, fiery, mobilizing spirit thanks to which the name "commissar" has become synonymous with a high sense of ideology, principle, fearlessness, and moral purity, while party-political work has rightly been assessed as a special kind of tool that determines one of the decisive advantages of our Armed Forces.

[Petukhov] There has recently been much talk about military construction workers. In the heat of the polemic some people are saying that they are little better than slaves, a unique kind of "working Army." What kind of need is there for the military construction detachments, and what are the prospects for them?

[Yazov] There has indeed been a great deal of talk, and it has contained constructive factors and interesting proposals, but as you noted, there is also more than enough of the heated polemic, which, as you know, is not a good counselor.

If we are talking about our own military construction detachments, they have existed for more than 30 years. Right from the start these detachments were created to build projects and carry out other work of defense importance. During the sixties they started to set up the special-purpose military construction detachments for major national economic projects in the chemical and metallurgical industries, the AvtoVAZ and KamAza automobile plants, water management projects, restoration of Tashkent City after the earthquake, and so forth. But today these detachments are working for 20 ministries. When they have completed their special-purpose tasks they are often transferred to do other work, particularly in remote areas where roads, housing, and social and cultural projects are necessary in order to open them up. Who should be creating all this? The military construction detachments do it; they are the most mobile subdivisions of the construction complex. And this is as it should be. In accordance with all-union legislation and international enactments, the state can thus regulate the use of manpower. And of course, concern itself with improving the organization of production activity, technical equipment, and working and everyday conditions for military construction workers.

[Petukhov] It is the opinion of some parents that the military commissariats who formally deal with the draft do not take into account the inclinations and requests of draftees. But it is there that the recruit embarks on his life in the Army. Does the "hand" of the Ministry reach down to the military commissariats, and how is their activity monitored?

[Yazov] It should be borne in mind that the decision on which branch of troops a young man will serve in is made not by the officers at the military commissariat but by the draft commissions. And let me note that these

decisions are made on a collegial basis. It is understandable that the desire of a young man cannot always be successfully taken into consideration when there are medical contraindications or other objective reasons. But it is essential to explain this intelligibily to draftees and their parents in order to avoid dissatisfaction or misunderstanding.

I agree that unfortunately it does happen that workers in the military commissariats display a negligent attitude toward the wishes of the draftee: Specialties mastered in the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF], school, occupation, individual inclinations and physiological and psychological features are ignored. All of this is unacceptable, for you are right: It is in the military commissariat that the recruit starts his military life.

Taking this into account, in recent years we have been radically changing the approach to the staffing of military commissariats. Whereas previously it was officers who had few prospects from a service standpoint who were assigned there, now we are trying to select for the military commissariats people with good organizational skills, a high level of professional training and general culture, and who possess what I would call a psychological-pedagogical vein. The everyday activity of the military commissariats is monitored by the headquarters and political organizers in the military districts, with whom we deal strictly in this matter.

[Petukhov] It is an old army rule that says "If you cannot do it, learn how to, if you cannot we will help you, if you are reluctant we will force you." But here, let me read one of the letters sent to the editor: "They are teaching our recruit sons nothing, they just break them and destroy them. Before they have even shown them how to put on their footcloths they send them off on a cross-country run of five or six km. The result is that their feet are so beaten up that they bleed. And when they have finished their service our children are thrown out of their units with hardly a penny to their names. What kind of procedure is this?" Is the Army too harsh in the way it rears and indoctrinates a soldier?

[Yazov] What does "too harsh" mean? Service in the Army is not some happy stroll. There are difficulties enough, and cross-country running is not the worst thing. A soldier must be able to deal with everything courageously and staunchly, for he is a soldier. And he must be taught this with exacting care.

It is unforgivable for the commander of a section, platoon, or company not to teach how to wind a footcloth and other soldierly skills. If what was said in the letter that you read to me is true—I mean the feet bleeding—then this could occur only with very bad commanders. Unfortunately, we do sometimes find them in the Army. To the point, does your letter have the address of the unit? The picture that it paints is very atypical. We must look into this...

Now about demobilized people. Let me remind you that those demobilized from the Armed Forces are provided with travel documents, parade uniforms, and rations. Many of them are moved by air. So it seems to me that the term "thrown out" smacks of today's "mass meeting" terminology and is hardly appropriate. In addition to what used to be done previously, from this year, when they are transferred to the reserve, compulsory service draftees will be paid a cash grant of 100 rubles [R].

[Petukhov] Social safeguards for servicemen constitute a problem that is worrying many people today. What is the Ministry of Defense doing, and what will it do, to strengthen the "rear services" for officers and warrant officers?

[Yazov] In recent years we have achieved a steady trend toward growth in the volume and rates of commissioning of housing. However, there is still not enough: Tens of thousands of families of officers and warrant officers do not now have apartments. The business is made the more complicated by the fact that year after year the local soviets are failing to meet the norms set by the government for allocating housing for servicemen. We are counting on the situation being improved by realization of the recently adopted USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On Measures To Improve the Provision of Housing for Officers and Warrant Officers and Extended Service Servicemen Transferred to the Reserves or Retired." Government resolutions on increasing the cash for the upkeep of officers and on introducing a number of other material privileges, and also uninterrupted work seniority for the wives of officers and warrant officers and extended-service servicemen who have no opportunities for employment are also designed to play an important rule.

I believe that actively developing the process of democratization and glasnost in the Armed Forces, and involving people in the Army and Navy (in meetings of officers, standing certification commissions, and the councils for the various categories of servicemen) in the resolution of issues such as advancement in the service, promotions, awards, and housing allocation, will strengthen social safeguards for servicemen.

[Petukhov] I must ask this question of you as a front-line soldier: Can we compare today's soldier with the soldier in the Great Patriotic War?

[Yazov] Of course, today's soldier bears little resemblance to the fighters in the first platoon that I led into the front in 1942. The first thing that I was asked to do was to help someone write a letter home. This was followed by a second and a third—half the platoon was poorly literate, and some were totally illiterate. And we were armed with 7.62-mm Mosin-Nagant service rifles; it was only near the end of the war that the company received the Shpagin submachine gun. The regiment had a gun battery. That was essentially all our equipment.

And today? The overwhelming majority of soldiers have a secondary or secondary-technical education and a good

feeling for technical matters, and even their general cultural level is high. In a motorized infantry company alone there are a dozen combat specialties, and in a regiment there are hundreds. Armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, antitank and antiaircraft missile complexes, grenade throwers, and various kinds and types of other weapons and combat equipment are now the gear of the "foot soldier"—the motorized infantryman. In this respect today's soldier is not very much like the soldier of the war period.

At the same time, when I look at today's soldiers I recognize in them almost painfully the well-known and dear features of the front-line soldiers. Loyalty to the oath, to military duty, to the laws of comradeship. So that they are the worthy sons and grandsons of the front-line soldiers, the legatees of their cause and their glory.

[Petukhov] A final question. In three months it is the 45th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. I have it in my mind that perhaps for the first time the preparations for this date are so...diffident. What do you think about this?

[Yazov] I am convinced that these preparations should be more intensive and move along in all directions, and naturally, should be reflected appropriately by the mass media. The country is now facing many problems and many very important tasks in the political, economic, and spiritual spheres, which must be resolved by making use of all the potential of socialism and of our people. And one very important component of this potential is the memory of the worthy pages of the past, the continuity of the generations, and attention to those who fought and to those who showed such courage in that feat.

The everyday work of the Army continues without pretentiousness or fuss. We see its meaning in preserving and multiplying the fruits of the victory and in indoctrinating patriots and internationalists—the conscientious workers and loyal defenders of our multinational Soviet Motherland.

Commentary Views Future Role of Military Pacts

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[Commentary on the future of military alliances by General Mikhail Yasyukov entitled: "A Mechanism of Confrontation or an Instrument of Stability?"; read by announcer]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted: recent meeting in Ottawa has shown that prerequsites for making headway in the sphere of European security exist. Thus the military political alliances could be changed into political military alliances. Suggestions have been made that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could play a stabilizing role in settling the German question]

However, in their present shape, the alliances will hardly be able to take up this role. The German Democratic Republic and the group of Soviet forces which is deployed there, represent the most important link of the Warsaw Pact, reminds General Yasyukov. What is needed is not only preserving the alliances in a mechanical way or redirecting them at new tasks. What is needed is their fundamental reconstruction. And how do we imagine this reconstruction? It seems to me that the first stage should include a considerable cut in the numbers of troops and armaments of the two alliances. A further evolution and rapprochement of military doctrines of European countries, the United States, and Canada as well as confidence strengthening should take place afterwards. This stage will require a considerable space of time. According to preliminary calculations, just for transporting people, equipment, and various objects in Soviet ownership from Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union will need more than 2,500 trains, while the capacity of the border point in Cop where they will be crossing is only two trains per day at most. There are problems connected with conversion, with the provision of apartments and jobs for the members of the Army who will return home.

In my view, a new mechanism of pan-European security should be created and should start functioning in the second stage. The proposal to set up a center for averting war has already been put forward. And so here is my conclusion: the building of a pan-European home will mark the end of military-political confrontation on the continent. No treaties resembling today's NATO and Warsaw Pact will be needed then.